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ABSTRACT 
Agency contracts differ from other contracts since they involve a triangular relationship 
among three parties: a principal, an agent and a contractor. This relationship is further divided 
into an internal relationship between the principal and the agent and two external relationships, 
one between the principal and the contractor, and the other between the agent and the contractor. 
Differences between various laws exist both in the substantive rules and the choice of law rules 
applicable to these relationships. This thesis addresses these choice of law problems, with 
reference to English law, the Rome I Regulation, the Hague Convention 1978, and the UAE 
Civil Code. 
With respect to agency contracts in internal law, there are important differences in the 
substantive rules adopted by different legal systems, particularly between those of civilian law 
and common law. These differences, in turn, have concequences in private international law. 
Moreover differences between various laws exist also in the choice of law rules applicable to 
these relationships. Thus this thesis addresses these choice of law problems in respect of the 
three agency relationships, with reference to English law, the Rome I Regulation, the Hague 
Convention 1978, and the UAE Civil Code. 
Since the UAE legislation does not contain any provision specifically addressing the question of 
which law governs the agency relationships, and the Rome I Regulation has excluded from its 
scope the question of whether an agent is able to bind a principal, this thesis endeavours to 
identify the best solution to the various choice of law problems which may arise in connection 
with the three agency relationships. In the final chapter the solutions identified are embodied in a 
draft bill, designed to amend the UAE Civil Code, as well as a draft proposal to add provisions to 
the Rome I Regulation.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
 The current thesis examines an important area in the field of private international law: 
choice of law with regard to agency relationships. Firstly, the significance of this topic comes 
from the importance of international agency relationships, which have spread widely in terms of 
international trade, and in which area the agency relationship is important for all parties. For 
instance, it helps a principal to find numerous markets for the promotion of commodities and 
provision of services. In addition, such agency will help the principal to avoid the substantial 
costs of building or opening a new branch in other countries; accordingly, the principal 
empowers agents and brokers to act on his behalf in regard to selling, buying, distributing, or 
providing services by concluding an agency contract with a local agent. Moreover, it is important 
to an agent since it is a large source of his income. It is helpful to a principal to have an agent 
who will find the required services and commodities in the designated area. In addition, agency 
contracts are extremely important to economic prosperity; therefore, most legislators in a variety 
of countries provide protective provisions for local agents. 
 Secondly, the importance comes from the fact that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
legislator has not regulated the conflict of laws in respect of agency relationships by special 
rules, but subjects them to the general conflict rules in regard to international contracts, although 
these may be inappropriate to cover agency relationships in some cases. In addition, there are 
various approaches to determining the applicable law, particularly in respect of the relationship 
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between the principal and contractor, especially in view of the fact that the Rome I Regulation 
excludes from its scope the question of whether the agent is able to bind his principal to a 
contractor. 
 These issues are examined with reference to the UAE Civil Code, the Hague Agency 
Convention 1978, and the Rome I Regulation. Various methodologies, such as critical, analytical 
and comparative approaches, are used to identify the problems and solve them, and the 
conclusions reached are embodied  in a draft bill to amend the UAE Civil Code and some draft 
amendments to the Rome I Regulation. 
 Consequently, in this chapter, we will identify the subject matter, after which we shall 
provide a brief summary of the UAE legal system. Then, consideration will be given to the 
purpose of the study. Next, the research methodology used in this study will be explained, after 
which we shall determine the scope of the study. Finally, we will address the structure of the 
study.  
 
The subject matter 
Agency relationships 
 This thesis considers the legal issues that arises when one party (the principal) appoints 
another person (the agent) to conclude a contract on behalf of the principal with a third person 
(the contractor). In other words, it is concerned with the relationship between the agent and the 
principal and with the agent’s acts towards the contractor. Hence, it relates to a tripartite 
relationship. In some cases the principal will authorise the agent to act for him, granting actual 
authority and thereby empowering the agent to enter into legal relations with a contractor. In 
other cases the principal will not authorise the agent to bind him contractually, but may only 
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entrust the agent with introducing him to certain business opportunities. In such a situation, the 
agent only acts as an intermediary. Moreover the principal may place the agent in a position 
where he may be seen by a third party as acting on the principal’s behalf. This leads to other 
types of authority, such as ostensible authority (apparent authority), which may enable the 
agent’s acts to bind the principal. Thus, it is clear that agency contracts differ from other 
contracts, as they involve a triangular relationship among three parties: a principal, an agent and 
a contractor. This relationship may be further divided into the internal relationship between the 
principal and the agent and two external relationships, one between the principal and the 
contractor, and the other between the agent and the contractor. Each of these three relationships 
will be examined in the following chapters. Various issues will be addressed, such the position of 
an undisclosed principal or indirect agency, the various types of authority (actual and apparent 
authority), and the liability of an agent who lacks or exceeds his authority. 
 Most legal systems regulate agency relationships and all the issues related to them. 
However, there is an important difference in the substantive rules adopted by the various legal 
systems, particularly between those of civilian law and those of common law. These differences 
in substantive law, and their effects in private international law, will in due course be examined 
in this thesis. 
 
Private international law 
 Like other rules of private international law, choice of law rules deal with cases which 
have factual connections with more than one country. Such cases may usefully referred to as 
involving transnational situations. As regards contracts, the most typical situation is where the 
contracting parties reside in different countries. As regards agency relationships, perhaps the 
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most common scenario is where the principal and the agent reside in different countries, while 
the agent and the contractor reside in the same country; in other words, where a principal in one 
country appoints an agent in another country, and the agent deals with a contractor who is 
resident in the same country as the agent. This scenario may arise because the principal needs an 
agent to assist with international trade, as the principal is not himself in a position to deal 
effectively or economically with parties abroad, and he wants the agent to deal with such 
contractors. Another scenario is where the principal and the agent are resident in the same 
country but the agent concludes a contract with a contractor who is resident in another country. 
This may arise because the agent is more experienced than the principal in engaging in 
international trade. A third scenario is where each of the parties (the principal, the agent and the 
contractor) are residents of different countries. In such cases the agent’s activities in dealing with 
the contractor may be carried out in the agent’s country or in the contractor’s country. A fourth 
scenario is where each party is resident in a different country, and the agent carries out his  
activities in a country in which none of the parties is resident. 
 In general every country is free to adopt its own rules of private international law, but 
constraints may arise from treaties governed by public international law, or from membership of 
and instruments adopted by Regional Economic Integration Organisations such as the European 
Union. Various international legislative attempts have been made to establish harmonised choice 
of law rules in respect of transnational agency relationships. Particularly notable is the Hague 
Convention of 14 March 1978 on the Law Applicable to Agency (the Hague Convention 1978, 
or the Hague Agency Convention), which lays down choice of law rules with regard to all three 
of the agency relationships. Yet, although the Convention has entered into force, it has only been 
ratified by a small number of countries. Within the European Community or Union, the Rome 
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Convention 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations was established to 
harmonise the choice of law rules for contracts in the Member States. This has now been 
replaced
1
 by EC Regulation 593/2008 the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, which is 
known as the Rome I Regulation. The Rome I Regulation, like the Rome Convention 1980, deals 
with some, but not all, of the choice of law problems which may arise in respect of agency 
relationships. 
 Within dualist states, a distinction is drawn between domestic and international law, so 
that the latter is not directly binding, but must be implemented internally; monist states, 
conversely, absorb international law directly into domestic law, and where a conflict arises, the 
international rules prevail. EU Regulations have direct effect in all EU Member States, 
regardless of whether they otherwise follow a dualist or a monist approach, so that the Rome I 
Regulation is operative within all the Member States (except Denmark).
2
 This has created a 
particularly thorny situation for monist countries within the European Union who are also 
signatories to the Hague Agency Convention,
3
 as they have to respect the Convention whilst also 
giving effect to the Rome I Regulation. 
 One of the most problematic areas relates to the exclusion specified by Article 1(2)(g) of 
the Rome I Regulation, by which the Regulation does not apply to "the question of whether an 
agent is able to bind a principal, or an organ to bind a company or other body corporate or 
unincorporated, in relation to a third party". This provision therefore excludes from the scope of 
the Regulation a question arising between a principal and a contractor (or between an agent and a 
                                      
1
  See Article 24(1) of the Rome I Regulation. 
2
  In Denmark the Rome Convention 1980 remains in force. 
3
  Among the EU Member States, France, Portugal and the Netherlands are party to the Hague Agency 
Convention.  
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contractor) as to whether the principal is bound by the acts of the agent. Its effect is to leave a 
gap, so that there is no effective single international approach within European law in respect of 
such conflicts. This is fundamentally problematic when considered in light of the need for 
harmonisation within EU private international law. 
 
The UAE legal system   
 After the British withdrawal from the seven emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Umm 
Al Quwain, Ajman, Al Fujairah and Ras Al Khaimah), a federal country was formed under the 
name of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on 2 December 1971. The legal system in this new 
country consisted of local acts of each emirate, which only applied in the territory of that 
emirate, along with Islamic Shari’a law and customs. But Articles 110, 120 and 121 of the 
Constitution of the United Arab Emirates granted the federal authorities the right to enact the 
federal legislation. As the UAE was a newly established country, it relied on jurists and scholars 
from other Arab countries, particularly from Egypt, to draft its legislation. These jurists and 
scholars were influenced by their own law (Egyptian law), which in turn had been influenced by 
French law, and directly by French law itself because they had studied in France. As a result 
most UAE enactments are very similar to Egyptian enactments, and this is true in particular of 
the choice of law rules contained in Articles 10-28 of the UAE Civil Code,
4
 which correspond to 
the Egyptian Civil Code. 
 The judiciary in the UAE is divided into a federal judiciary and a local judiciary in some 
emirates, such as Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah. The structure of the federal courts 
includes a first instance court, an appeal court, and the federal supreme court. There are also 
                                      
4
  The Civil Code (or Civil Transactions Act) is contained in federal Act 5/1985, as amended by Act 1/1987. 
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separate first instance courts, appeal courts, and cassation courts in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Ras 
Al Khaimah. The laws applied by all these courts include federal enactments, such as the Civil 
Code, the Commercial Code,
5
 and the Commercial Agencies Act.
6,7
 
 The Civil Code regulates civil issues and transactions in the UAE. Various important 
issues are regulated in this Act, such as representation in the conclusion of a contract (Articles 
149–156) and civil agency contracts (Articles 924–961). These provisions, which include 
substantive rules, extend to commercial agency contracts, where there is no substantive rule in 
the UAE Commercial Code regarding commercial agency contracts.  
 The Civil Code also contains choice of laws rules (Article 10–28). Despite the 
importance of choice of law with respect to agency relationships, the UAE legislator has not 
enacted particular choice of law rules regarding agency, but has merely specified general rules 
governing choice of law in respect of international contracts, as enshrined in Article 19 of the 
Civil Code. In addition, in cases that cannot be solved according to the provisions of Article 19, 
the UAE courts apply Article 23, which provides that “the principles of private international law 
shall apply in the absence of a relevant provision in the foregoing Articles governing the conflict 
                                      
5
  The Commercial Code (or Commercial Transactions Act) is contained in federal Act 18/1993. 
6
  The Commercial Agencies Act is contained in federal Act 18/1981, as amended. 
7
  There is also within the UAE an enclave, known as the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), which 
has its own courts and its own civil and commercial laws, to the exclusion of the normal UAE legislation on civil 
and commercial matters (including private international law). The DIFC “is designed to be a financial free zone 
offering a unique, independent legal and regulatory framework in order to create an environment for growth, 
progress and economic development in the UAE and the wider region". The DIFC regulates choice of law by special 
enactments.  See www. http://difccourts.ae/ (last visited on 10/5/2015). In general this thesis will not deal with the 
law of the DIFC.  
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of laws”. This thesis will discuss the important conflict principles established by the Civil Code, 
as well as examining Articles 19 and 23 with respect to agency relationships. 
 In addition, the UAE legislator has laid down substantive rules concerning commercial 
agency contracts in the Commercial Code. Another relevant enactment is the Commercial 
Agencies Act. This includes provisions designed to protect agents which are considered 
mandatory rules. Some of the substantive rules in the Commercial Code will be examined in this 
thesis and compared with the substantive rules in the common-law systems. The provisions of 
the Commercial Agencies Act, as mandatory rules, will also be addressed in this study.  
 
The purpose of the study   
 The aim of this study is to investigate choice of law issues with regard to agency and to 
critically review the position in the European Union (with particular reference to the Hague 
Convention 1978 and the Rome 1 Regulation) and the United Arab Emirates, and to compare 
these and other rules and theories in respect in agency relationships, in order to establish the 
differences between them with a view to identifying  an improved approach in conflict cases, 
whether between principal and agent, between principal and contractor, or between agent and 
contractor. 
 
Research methodology 
 The current thesis uses a methodology based on examining published materials, such as 
legislative texts (internal enactments and international instruments), case law and commentaries. 
Thus, it uses an analytical method to assess the effectiveness of legislation with regard to agency 
relationships, such as the UAE Civil Code, the Hague Agency Convention and the Rome I 
9 
 
Regulation. In addition, it uses a critical method to evaluate these enactments and relevant case-
law, in the light of differences between civilian legal systems (such as UAE law) and common-
law systems (such as English law), and of the opinions of reputable commentators. Hence, the 
study uses a critical analysis to examine legal texts, particularly legislation, case law and 
commentators’ opinions, with a view to identifying legal problems and proposing solutions. 
 This study also uses a comparative method with a view to identifying the best solutions to 
the problems of identifying the appropriate conflict rules regarding agency relationships. 
Therefore, after using the critical analysis method to evaluate each piece of legislation, case-law 
and commentary, the study uses a comparative method to compare these legal texts. For instance, 
the comparative study addresses the differences between the substantive rules of internal UAE 
law (as a civilian legal system) regarding agency relationships and the English internal 
substantive rules (as a common-law system), which affect private international law. Moreover, as 
regards the conflict rules, the study compares the different approaches adopted by the UAE Civil 
Code, the Hague Agency Convention, the Rome I Regulation, and in some contexts the 
traditional English law, with a view to achieving the aim of this study, which is to identify an 
improved approach in respect of conflict rules for all three relationships involved (between a 
principal and an agent; a principal and a contractor; and an agent and a contractor). Such a 
comparative study is important with a view to reforming the conflict of laws rules applied in the 
UAE, whether by means of possible amending legislation or by means of judicial acceptance of 
the best approach identified to the conflict rules in respect of agency relationships as general 
principles of private international law, applicable by UAE courts under Article 23 of the UAE 
Civil Code. 
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 The reason for choosing UAE law as a part of this study is that the legislator has failed 
adequately to provide conflict rules for triangular agency relationships. It has provided general 
conflict rules for international contracts, but these are not adequate to deal with some agency 
relationships, such as the external relationship between the principal and the contractor. Another 
reason is that the current writer is from the UAE and is hoping to provide a draft bill concerning 
conflict rules regarding agency relationships, which could be used to amend the UAE Civil 
Code.  
 The reason for choosing the Hague Agency Convention is that it is the only international 
convention which deals fully with the conflict issues in respect of all three of the agency 
relationships (the internal agency relationship between the principal and the agent; and two 
external relationships: between the principal and contractor and between the agent and 
contractor).  
 The Rome I Regulation contains a modern and widely accepted set of conflict rules in 
the field of contracts which apply in the 27 EU Member States (the exception being Denmark),
8
 
and which have become influential in many Asia and Africa countries. The Regulation is 
valuable to any comparison study since it may be regarded as the latest major development 
regarding  conflict rules in respect of contracts. Moreover, the European approach (embodied in 
the Rome I Regulation) has be chosen rather than the US methods since the conflict rules in the 
US are not unified or even harmonised, in that some US states follow the Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws, while others follow the earlier First Restatement. Furthermore, because both 
restatements are merely advisory guidelines offered by academic experts and lack mandatory 
legislative force, sometimes a US court will apply other conflict rules. 
                                      
8
  There is an exception in respect of Denmark, where the Rome Convention 1980 remains applicable. 
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  Nonetheless, it excludes from its scope the question of whether an agent can bind his 
principal towards a contractor. The initial proposal of the EC Commission, which led eventually 
to the adoption of the Rome I Regulation, included provisions in Article 7 that closely resembled 
provisions of the Hague Convention, but the proposed Article 7 was omitted from the Rome I 
Regulation as finally adopted.
9
 Thus the Regulation instead retained the exclusion relating to the 
agent’s power to bind his principal to a third party which had hitherto been present in the Rome 
Convention 1980. This unexciting solution appears to reflect the existence of considerable 
disagreement about the appropriate rules for determining the applicable law with regard to 
questions of external authority (which will be examined in Chapter 6), as can be seen from the 
                                      
9
 Article 7 of the Rome I Proposal provided:  
"1. In the absence of a choice under Article 3, a contract between principal and agent shall be governed by the law of 
the country in which the agent has his habitual residence, unless the agent exercises or is to exercise his main 
activity in the country in which the principal has his habitual residence, in which case the law of that country shall 
apply. 
2. The relationship between the principal and third parties arising out of the fact that the agent has acted in the 
exercise of his powers, in excess of his powers or without power, shall be governed by the law of the country in 
which the agent had his habitual residence when he acted. However, the applicable law shall be the law of the 
country in which the agent acted if either the principal on whose behalf he acted or the third party has his habitual 
residence in that country or the agent acted at an exchange or auction. 
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2, where the law applicable to a relationship covered by that paragraph has been 
designated in writing by the principal or the agent and expressly accepted by the other party, the law thus designated 
shall be applicable to these matters. 
4. The law designated by paragraph 2 shall also govern the relationship between the agent and the third party arising 
from the fact that the agent has acted in the exercise of his powers, in excess of his powers or without power." 
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fact that the Hague Agency Convention has only been adopted by four countries. No doubt the 
EU institutions chose merely to retain the existing exclusionary solution rather than to delay the 
adoption of the Regulation so as to allow a deep analysis and lengthy discussion of matters on 
which there might be difficulty in reaching agreement. Consequently the Rome I Regulation 
excludes the question whether the agent able to bind his principal to the contractor. 
Consequently, this study will examine the various possible solutions to this question to 
investigate the best solution.    
 Furthermore, a historical method has been used in this study with a view to understanding 
how the relevant conflict rules have developed. Thus, for example, some attention is given to the 
negotiations at the Hague Conference on Private International Law which led to the adoption of 
the 1978 Convention, and to the legislative process which led to the adoption of the Rome I 
Regulation. 
 
The scope of the study 
 The scope of the present thesis will be confined to the choice of law rules with respect to 
agency relationships. The main comparison will be between the UAE law (Articles 19 and 23 of 
the Civil Code) on one hand and the provisions of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Agency 1978 and Rome I Regulation on the other hand. In addition the conflict rules of 
traditional English law will considered in some cases when the Rome I Regulation may not 
apply. Moreover, the internal substantive rules regarding agency relationships in the UAE (as a 
civilian legal system) and those of English law (as a common-law system) will be addressed to 
identify differences in substantive rules that may affect conflict rules. 
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 Moreover, the mandatory rules contained in the UAE Agency Commercial Act and in the 
EU Directive on commercial agents
10
 will be examined. Attention will be limited to the scope of 
application of these two enactments in conflict cases, with regard to provisions that may be 
considered mandatory rules.  
 
The structure of the study 
 Analysis of the conflict rules with respect to agency relationships requires separate 
examination of the main choice of law rules regarding three relationships: between a principal 
and an agent, between a principal and a contractor, and between an agent and a contractor. This 
requires some discussion of the more general conflict provisions of the relevant systems, as well 
as detailed examination of their rules relating to agency in particular. Determining the law 
applicable to these relationships also requires examination of the cases where the normally 
applicable law is set aside on grounds of public policy and where a mandatory rule is applied 
regardless of the normally applicable law. 
 Consequently, this study is divided into eight chapters as follows. The present chapter 
provides an essential introduction to the subject matter of this study. Chapter two addresses the 
fundamental provisions of the Rome I Regulation and the Hague Agency Convention. Then 
chapter three considers the general provision in the field of choice of law in UAE law. 
Thereafter, chapter four focuses on the law applicable to the relationship between the principal 
and the agent. Next, chapter five examines the exceptions relating to public policy and overriding 
mandatory provisions. Then, chapter six focuses on the law applicable to the relationship 
                                      
10
  EEC Directive 86/653 on the co-ordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed 
commercial agents, [1986] OJ L382/17.  
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between the principal and the contractor, while chapter seven considers the law applicable to the 
relationship between the agent and the contractor. Finally, chapter eight offers conclusions to the 
questions studied in this thesis, and provides a draft bill to amend the UAE Civil Code, as well as 
a proposal to add provisions to the Rome I Regulation. 
15 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE ROME I REGULATION AND 
THE HAGUE AGENCY CONVENTION 1978 
 
Introduction  
 As noted in chapter one of this thesis, agency contracts provide an extremely important 
facility for businesses, enabling them to sell their products or supply their services. Such contracts 
are also important to countries in respect of business development, as well as in facilitating the 
acquisition of goods and services by contractors. Thus, legal systems regulate the various aspects 
of agency contracts via substantive rules. However differences exist in the substantive rules 
adopted in various countries. Consequently, countries have adopted choice of law rules to address 
this problem. But differences also exist in the choice of law rules. Some efforts have therefore be 
made to unify the conflict rules in regard to agency contracts. The most two important treaties in 
this field are the Hague Agency Convention 1978, which regulates choice of law in regard to 
agency contracts, and the Rome I Regulation, which addresses conflicts in the field of contracts in 
general. We will examine the conflict rules in respect of the various agency relationships 
according to these instruments in later chapters (4, 6, and 7). The present chapter will provide a 
background by addressing the general provisions in these international instruments which affect 
the determination and application of the law applicable to agency relationships. 
 The two international measures on choice of law adopt different approaches, although they 
contain some similar provisions, such as those dealing with public policy and mandatory rules. 
Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, the conflict rules adopted by each will be examined in detail in 
chapters 4–7. In this chapter we will focus on the history, scope, and various general provisions of 
these measures; dealing first with the Hague Convention, and then with the Rome I Regulation. 
16 
 
 
The Hague Convention 1978 
The Hague Conference 
 The Hague Conference on Private International Law dates from 1893, when it held its first 
session, sponsored by the Dutch government. The Conference is an intergovernmental 
organisation whose aim is “to work for the progressive unification of the rules of private 
international law", as is indicated by Article 1 of its Statute, which was adopted on 31 October 
1951 during its seventh session, and entered into force on 15 July 1955.
1
 
 With regard to participation in the Hague Conference and its Conventions, we must 
distinguish between Conference members and parties to the various Conventions adopted by the 
Conference, since there are 67 countries which are not members of the Conference but have 
signed, ratified, or acceded to one or more of the Conventions. The normal procedure is for a 
convention to contain a clause enabling non-member States to accede to that convention. Such a 
clause is included as Article 24 of the 1978 Agency Convention. Under the amendments which 
came into effect in 2007, a Regional Economic Integration Organisation may become a member of 
the Hague Conference, and the European Union has done so, alongside the 77 state members. The 
United Kingdom has been a member of the Conference since 1955, and has adopted many of the 
Conventions, such as the 1985 Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their 
Recognition, and the 2007 Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other 
Forms of Family Maintenance.
2
 In contrast, the UAE is not a member of the Hague Conference, 
                                      
1
  The Statute was amended on 30 June 2005, with effect from 1 January 2007. See the Hague Conference 
website: www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=4, last accessed on 17 February 2015. 
2
  See the Hague Conference website: www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=4, last accessed on 17 
February 2015. 
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and has not become party to any of the Hague Conventions.  
 Ordinarily, a plenary session of the Hague Conference is held every four years. Since 
1983, the Conference has adopted 39 international Conventions in respect to rules on choice of 
law, jurisdiction, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments, in various areas, such as 
commercial law, family law, and international civil procedure. One area unified by the Hague 
Conference is that of agency contracts, which are the subject of the Hague Convention 1978.
3
 
 
Structure  
 The Hague Agency Convention contains five chapters. The first chapter determines the 
scope of the Convention. The second chapter addresses the law applicable to the internal 
relationship between a principal and an agent. The third deals with the external relationships 
between a principal or an agent and a contractor (or third party). The fourth contains general 
provisions on private international law, and the fifth contains final provisions. At this point we 
shall proceed to examine the scope of the Convention, and to address the general provisions. The 
provisions on the internal and external relationships will be examined in chapters 4, 6, and 7. We 
will begin with the history of the Convention in order to understand the stages of its preparation 
and adoption. 
 
Historical Stages  
 The 1950 and 1952 drafts from the International Law Association may be regarded as the 
first attempts to unify the choice of law rules in regard to agency contracts. The first draft was 
submitted in Copenhagen in 1950. It aimed to govern all kinds of agency contract in respect of 
                                      
3
  See the Hague Conference website: www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=4, last accessed on 17 
February 2015. 
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private law except in the representation of incompetents and family relationships. The second draft 
was submitted in 1952 in Lucerne. This draft addressed the conflict rules in respect of agency in 
the field of the international sale of goods. These drafts were submitted to the Hague Conference.
4
 
 The question of unification of choice of law rules in regard to agency contracts, 
particularly agency in the field of the international sale of goods, was considered at the eighth 
session of the Hague Conference in 1956, but little interest was shown by member states, and in 
the ninth session the question was postponed for an indefinite period. In 1972, during the twelfth 
session, it was suggested that the agency conflict rules should be considered at a future session, 
and thereafter the Permanent Bureau of the Conference prepared a preliminary study of the law 
applicable to agency contracts and submitted a useful draft of a convention to unify the choice of 
law rules thereon. All member states agreed with it except Germany. At the thirteenth session, the 
draft convention was entrusted to a Special Commission to complete the work. In 1977, the 
Special Commission completed its work on a draft convention.
5
  
 The Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency was ultimately adopted by the Hague 
Conference in plenary session, and signed by France, on 14 March 1978. Eventually, after 
signature and ratification by France, Portugal and Argentina, the Convention entered into force 
                                      
4
  See Gamal Moursi Badr, Agency: Unification of Material Law and of Conflict Rules, (1985) 184 Académie 
de Droit International, Recueil des Cours 46, at p. 132. See also Alexey V, Kostromov, International Unification of 
the Law of Agency (Institute of Comparative Law, McGill University, Montreal, 1999), at p. 108. 
5
  See Karsten, I.G.F., Karsten Report: Explanatory Report, Actes et documents of the 13
th
 Session of the Hague 
Conference (hereafter “the Karsten Report"), parg. 1, p. 8 et seq. See also H.L.E. Verhagen, Agency in Private 
International Law: The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Netherland, 1995), p. 126; and Peter Hay and Wolfram Muller-Freienfels, Agency in the Conflict of Laws and the 
1978 Hague Convention, (1979) 27 American Journal of Comparative Law 35. 
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between these three States on 1 May 1992. The Netherlands ratified later in 1992, so as to become 
bound on 1 October 1992,
6
 These four States are the current parties to the Convention.  
 
The Scope of the Convention 
 The Convention defines its scope in Chapter I (Articles 1 to 4). Moreover, as its title 
indicates, the Convention confines itself to the establishment of conflict rules, and does not lay 
down substantive rules. It is further limited to specifying choice of law rules, and does not lay 
down rules with regard to judicial jurisdiction or the recognition and enforcement of judgments.
7
 
 
THE CONCEPT OF AGENCY 
 Article 1 limits the scope of the Convention to relationships which have an international 
character.
8
 But the Convention does not define the term international character, and the question 
thus arises as to the criteria for deciding whether an agency relationship should be characterised as 
international. Israel’s delegation to the special commission suggested that the criterion should be 
based on geographical circumstances, and depend on whether the places of business or habitual 
residences of at least two parties are located in different countries. A contrary view would 
recognise that it is possible for all parties involved to have their places of business in one country, 
but for them to be involved in an international transaction
9
 when selling and/or transferring a good 
from country A to country B. Thus, others argued in favour of the presence of a foreign element as 
                                      
6
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 5 above,  p. 127. 
7
  Ibid.   
8
  Article 1(1) of the Convention provides: "The present Convention determines the law applicable to 
relationships of an international character arising where a person, the agent, has the authority to act, acts or purports to 
act on behalf of another person, the principal, in dealing with a third party." 
9
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 5 above,  p. 130.  
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determining whether an agency contract has an international character,
10
 and the view referring to 
effective foreign elements was more widely accepted
 
.
11
 
 Furthermore, pursuant to Article 4, the Convention will apply whether this leads to the 
application of law of a country which is party to the Convention or to the law of a country which 
is not a contracting state.
12
  Moreover the parties do not have to reside in a contracting state for the 
Convention to apply. In other words, the Convention will apply even if the parties have their 
places of business or habitual residences in non-contracting states.
13
  
 Moreover, Article 1(1) provides for the application of the Convention where an agent “has 
the authority to act, acts or purports to act” on behalf of a principal, in dealing with a contractor. 
Thus, a wide interpretation should be given to the term authority, as including any concept of 
authority accepted in either civilian or and common-law systems. The notion of authority in 
civilian legal systems is interpreted as a power granted to the agent to act in the name of his 
principal, while in common-law systems the concept is not confined to acting in the name of 
someone else. Moreover, Article 1(3) of the Convention provides that the Convention will apply 
whether the agent acts in the name of the principal or in his own name.
14
 Consequently, as well as 
                                      
10
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 5 above,  p. 130. 
11
  See Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal, (نيناوقلا عزانت يف طيسولا) Conflict of law (Dubai Police Academy, 2008), p. 
706. See also H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 5 above,  p. 131. 
12
  Article 4 of the Convention  provides: "The law specified in this Convention shall apply whether or not it is 
the law of a Contracting State." 
13
 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 5 above,  p. 129.  
14
  Article 1(3) of the Convention provides: "The Convention shall apply whether the agent acts in his own name 
or in that of the principal and whether he acts regularly or occasionally." 
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cases of disclosed and undisclosed agents,
15
 indirect agency (as in the case of a commission agent 
under civilian laws) is also within the scope of the Convention.
16
  
 Moreover, the Convention applies whether the agent is a professional or a non-
professional.
17
 This follows from the provision specifying that an agency is within the scope of the 
Convention whether the agent acts occasionally or regularly.
18
 
 According to Article 1(2),
19
 the Convention is not limited to agents whose function is to 
conclude a contract with the contractor on behalf of a principal, but extends to agents whose 
function is to negotiate contracts or to receive and communicate proposals.
20
 
 
EXCLUDED ISSUES AND CATEGORIES  
 Exclusion in respect of issues or of categories of agency, are specified by Article 2 of the 
Convention.
21
 As regards issues, Article 2(a) and (b) excludes for the scope of the Convention 
questions as to the capacity of parties and to formal requirements.  
                                      
15
             Katarzyan Reszczyk Krol,  Law Applicable to Voluntary Representation in Some European Legal Systems, 
(2014) 10 (2) Journal of Private International Law 280. See also H.L.E. Verhagen,  n. 5 above, p. 144; and Alexey V, 
Kostromov, n. 4 above, p. 112. 
16
  Peter Hay and Wolfram Muller-Freienfels, n. 5  above ,  p. 37.   
17
  Peter Hay and Wolfram Muller-Freienfels, n. 5 above ,  p. 37. See also Katarzyan Reszczyk Krol, n. 15 
above,  p. 280. 
18
  Article 1 (3) of the Convention. 
19
  Article 1 (2) of the Convention provides: "It shall extend to cases where the function of the agent is to receive 
and communicate proposals or to conduct negotiations on behalf of other persons". 
20
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 5 above,  p. 151; see also Peter Hay and Wolfram Muller-Freienfels, n. 5 above,  p. 37.  
21
  Article 2 of the Convention provides:  
"This Convention shall not apply to – 
a) the capacity of the parties;  
22 
 
 Some categories of agency are also excluded from the Convention by Article 2. For 
instance, agency by operation of law is excluded by Article 2(c), since the Special Commission 
adopted the prevailing view that agency by operation of law has a special character and has no 
importance for commercial intercourse. This exclusion applies to agency under family law, agency 
in matrimonial property regimes, and agency in succession law. Such agencies are excluded from 
the Convention since the persons involved as principal in these types of agency need protection 
because they cannot deal with their own affairs. Other excluded categories (under Article 2(d) and 
(e)) are agency created by a judicial or quasi-judicial decision, and agency related to judicial 
proceedings. Presumably the lex fori will govern these categories. In some cases, a shipmaster, 
when performing his function, may be considered an agent; but this kind of agency is excluded 
from the scope of the Convention by Article 2(f). The law of ship’s flag may govern such 
agency.
22
  
 The Hague Convention deals with the interface between company matters and agency 
matters by Article 3(a), which excludes an agency from the Convention when the agent is 
considered an organ, partner, or officer of a company, association, or other entity, but only when 
he is performing actions in that capacity by virtue of an authority conferred by law or by the 
constitutive documents of that entity. Consequently, the agency in this case will governed by 
conflict rules in respect of companies.
23
  
                                                                                                                         
b) requirements as to form;  
c) agency by operation of law in family law, in matrimonial property regimes, or in the law of succession;  
d) agency by virtue of decision of a judicial or quasi-judicial authority or subject to the direct control of such an 
authority;  
e) representation in connection with proceedings of a judicial character;  
f) the agency of a shipmaster acting in the exercise of his functions as such." 
22
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 5 above, p. 154. 
23
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 5 above, p. 171. 
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 Article 3(2) prevents a trustee from being regarded as an agent of the trust, the 
beneficiaries or the settlor of the trust, and thus excludes such cases from the scope of the 
Convention.
24
 The exclusion is designed to make clear that a trust is a different kind of institution 
from agency. It is a clarification aimed mainly at avoiding confusion in civilian countries. Trusts 
are instead regulated by the Hague Convention 1986 on the Law Applicable to Trusts. 
 
EXCLUSIONS BY RESERVATION  
 ARTICLE 18 OF the Convention grants each contracting state the right to make a reservation 
excluding three types of agency from the application of the Convention. One type is when the 
agent is a bank and acts in regard to a banking transaction. Another type is when the agent acts in 
the course of insurance matters, and the third is where the agent is a public servant acting on 
behalf of a private person. France and Argentina have not used this right. A reservation has been 
made for all three types of agency by Portugal, but the Netherlands has made a reservation only 
for insurance matters.
25
 
 
General Provisions  
 Like many other Hague conventions, the Agency Convention contains a number of general 
provisions and final clauses
 26
 in Articles 16–28. For instance, Article 16 enables the mandatory 
rules of any country which has a significant connection with the agency relationship in question to 
be applied, irrespective of the normally applicable law. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 17, the 
                                      
24
  Article 3(b) provides: " a trustee shall not be regarded as an agent of the trust, of the person who has created 
the trust, or of the beneficiaries." 
25
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 5 above, p. 162. See also Katarzyan Reszczyk Krol, n. 15 above, p. 280. 
26
  Alexey V. Kostromov, n. 4 above, p. 126. 
24 
 
applicable law may be set aside if its provisions are manifestly incompatible with the forum’s 
public policy.
27
 In this section, some of these provisions, concerning territories and conflicting  
international instruments, will be examined.  
 
TERRITORIES 
 In the case of a federal state in which each territory has its own law, each territory must be 
considered as a country for the purpose of determining the applicable law under the Convention.
28
 
Nevertheless, if the situation is connected solely with several territories of a federal state, that 
State will not be bound to apply the rules specified by the Convention to determine the applicable 
law.
29
 In other words, the Convention will not have to be applied to purely internal conflicts of law 
between the state’s territories.30 For instance, supposing that the UK were a contracting state and 
each of its territories (England and Wales; Scotland; and Northern Ireland) had its own agency 
law, and a principal in England appointed an agent in Scotland to act on his behalf with a 
contractor in Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom would not have to apply the Agency 
Convention to determine the applicable law in this case. In fact the UK never utilizes such 
permissions. They appear to be designed to encourage the USA to adopt the Hague conventions, 
but in fact the USA rarely ratifies such conventions, even where its negotiators have succeeded in 
                                      
27
  Mandatory rules and public policy will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis 
28
  Article 19 of the Convention provides: "Where a state comprises several territorial units each of which has its 
own rules of law in respect of agency, each territorial unit shall be considered as a State for the purposes of identifying 
the law applicable under this Convention." 
29
  Article  20 of the Convention provides: "A state within which different territorial units have their own rules 
of law in respect of agency shall not be bound to apply this Convention where a State with a unified system of law 
would not be bound to apply the law of another State by virtue of this Convention."   
30
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 5 above, p.133. See also Karsten Report, n. 5 above, parg. 235, p. 61. 
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incorporating the solutions which were seeking (as, for example, in the case of the Convention on 
Products Liability 1973).   
 Furthermore, a state which is responsible for the international relations of one or more 
territories other than its own territory may, when entering into the Convention or subsequently, 
declare that the application of the Convention will extend to some or all of these additional 
territories.
31
 Thus, a declaration by the Netherlands has extended the application of the Convention 
to Aruba.
32
  
 
RELATION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
 The Hague Convention aims to avoid any conflict between its own provisions and those of 
other existing or future international instruments which deal with the same questions, where a state 
is party both to the Convention and the other instrument (as is the case for France, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal, which are parties to the Rome I Regulation).
33
 Therefore Article 22 of 
the Convention provides that the Convention is not to affect the application of any international 
                                      
31
  Article 25(1) provides: “Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession, declare that the Convention shall extend to all the territories for the international relations of which it is 
responsible, or to one or more of them. Such a declaration shall take effect at the time the Convention enters into force 
for that State.” See also Article 21(1), which provides: “If the Contracting State has two or more territorial units which 
have their own rules of law in respect of agency, it may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession, declare that this Convention shall extend to all its territorial units or to one or more of them, and may 
modify its declaration by submitting another declaration at any time."  
32
 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 5 above, p. 133. 
33
            Karsten Report, n. 5 above, parg. 238, p.62.  
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instrument, signed or to be signed in the future by a contracting state, which deals with questions 
governed by the Convention.
34
  
 Consequently, the question arises whether there is a conflict between the Rome I 
Regulation and the Hague Convention in countries that are party to both instruments. It is clear 
that conflict may arise in respect to the internal relationship between a principal and an agent. 
However, in regards to the external relationship between the principal and the contractor, no 
conflict can arise since Article 1(2)(g) of the Rome I Regulation excludes the question whether the 
agent has authority to bind his principal to a contractor.
35
 On the other hand, it seems that conflict 
may arise in respect to the relationship between the agent and contractor, since the exclusion by 
Article 1(2)(g) confined the agent’s authority to bind the principal to the contractor. Thus, both 
instruments could apply to such issues as the existence and extent of the agent’s warranty of 
authority, or his own liability arising from terms which might be construed as rendering him liable 
on the main contract along with the principal. 
 Regarding the question of conflict between the Convention and the Regulation, the 
principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali supports the argument that preference should be 
given to the application of the Hague Convention rather than the application of the Rome I 
Regulation.
36
 Furthermore, Article 25(1) of the Rome I Regulation
37
 provides that the application 
of any international treaty to which a Member State is party at the time of the adoption of the 
                                      
34
  Article 23 of the Convention provides: "The Convention shall not affect any other international instrument 
containing provisions on matters governed by this Convention to which to which a Contracting State is, or becomes, a 
Party."   
35
 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 5 above, p. 135. 
36
 Ibid.  
37
  Article 25(1) of the Regulation provides: "This Regulation shall not prejudice the application of international 
conventions to which one or more Member States are parties at the time when this Regulation is adopted and which 
lay down conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations.” 
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Regulation will not be prejudiced by the Regulation. Hence, preference will be given to the Hague 
Convention.
38
 Thus at present, in France, the Netherlands and Portugal, the Convention prevails 
over the Regulation. But each of these States could, if it wished, denounce the Convention in 
accordance with its Article 27. The denouncing State would then have to apply the Regulation to 
the internal relationship between the principal and the agent, and to some aspects of the external 
relationship between the agent and the contractor, but could deal with external authority in respect 
of the relationship between the principal and the contractor as it liked. 
 
The Rome I Regulation 
Introduction 
 In the European Union, the Rome I Regulation regulates and unifies choice of the 
applicable law in respect of contracts by adopting several principles. First, the Regulation grants 
the parties the freedom to choose explicitly or impliedly the applicable law. In the absence of any 
choice, the Regulation adopts the doctrine of characteristic performance by Article 4(2), and adds 
in Article 4(1) rules to determine the party whose performance is considered characteristic of 
certain types of contracts, it proceeds to apply a rebuttal presumption in favour of the law of the 
country in which that party habitually resides. The Regulation also adopts the principle of closest 
connection, pursuant to Article 4(3) and (4), so as to enable rebuttal of the applicable presumption, 
and to fill the gap where no presumption is applicable. Furthermore, the Regulation sets out 
specific conflict rules to regulate certain types of contracts, such as contracts of carriage (Article 
5), consumer contracts (Article 6), insurance contracts (Article 7), and individual employment 
                                      
38
 See Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (Elgar European Law, UK, 3rd edition, 2014), p. 287. 
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contracts (Article 8). Moreover, the Regulation, like other international enactments, defines its 
scope of application and contains some general provisions. 
 Thus, in this chapter, we will proceed to consider the scope of the Regulation, and then to 
examine some general provisions adopted by the Regulation. But first we will recall the 
Regulation's history. 
 
The Historical Development 
 From soon after their creation the European institutions have worked to harmonise the 
European private international rules, such as choice of law rules and jurisdiction rules.
39
 An 
example of this is the Rome Convention 1980, which aimed to harmonise the choice of law rules 
in respect of contractual obligations within the Member States of the European Community. When 
the Brussels Convention on civil jurisdiction and judgments was completed in 1968, the group of 
experts in the Commission and Council began to work towards the Rome Convention. The 
Convention was opened for signature in 1980, but it did not enter into force until 1 April 1991.
40
  
It eventually came into force in the first 27 member states of the European Union.
41
  
 On 15 December 2005, the European Commission presented a proposal that led to the 
adoption of the Rome I Regulation, which has now replaced the Rome Convention. Eventually the 
Regulation was adopted on 17 June 2008, and became applicable in the first 27 member states 
                                      
39
 See Alexander J. Belohlavek, Rome Convention: Rome I Regulation (Juris, USA, 2010), p. 1. 
40
 See  Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, UK, 15th edition, 2012), p. 217. 
See also John O'Brien, Conflict of Laws (Cavendish Publishing Ltd, UK, 2nd edition, 1999), p. 314. The United 
Kingdom was among the group of Member States for which the Convention entered into force on 1 April 1991; see 
Dicey, Morris and Collins, p. 1779. 
41
 Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 279. 
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(with the exception of Denmark) on 17 December 2009.
42
 It also became applicable in Croatia on 
1 July 2013.
43
 Since the Regulation does not apply to existing contracts, the Convention remains 
applicable to contracts concluded before 17 December 2009.
44
 Furthermore, the Convention still 
applies in the French overseas territories and in Denmark,
45
 since Denmark did not participate in 
the Regulation.
46
 
 The Rome I Regulation has in general followed the approach adopted by the Rome 
Convention, but it has made numerous amendments, including three which may be regarded as of 
major significance.
47
 The first is the inclusion, for cases when parties have not chosen the 
applicable law, of specific provisions designed to determine the applicable law for certain types of 
contract. Thus, Article 4(1)
48
 lays down specific default rules for (among others) sales of goods, 
                                      
42
 Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 280. See also Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 40 above, p. 1781. 
43
 See Article 2 of the Croatian Accession Act, [2012] OJ L112. 
44
 Article 28 of the Regulation provides: "This Regulation shall apply to contracts concluded after 17 December 
2009." 
45
 Article 24 of the Regulation provides: "This Regulation shall replace the Rome Convention in the Member 
States, except as regards the territories of the Member States which fall within the territorial scope of that Convention 
and to which this Regulation does not apply pursuant to Article 299 of the Treaty." 
46
 Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 279. 
47
 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 40 above, p. 1781. 
48
 Article 4(1) of the Regulation provides: "To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been 
chosen in accordance with Article 3 and without prejudice to Articles 5 to 8, the law governing the contract shall be 
determined as follows: 
(a) a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the country where the seller has his habitual 
residence; 
(b) a contract for the provision of services shall be governed by the law of the country where the service provider has 
his habitual residence; 
30 
 
contracts for the provision of services, contracts of franchise, and contracts of distribution. 
Additionally, Article 5(2) deals specifically with the law governing contracts for the carriage of 
passengers.
49
  
 The second major change is that Article 7 of the Regulation provides specific provisions 
for contracts of insurance. In this respect the Regulation has incorporated, with some 
simplification, choice of law rules for insurance which were previously contained in EU 
directives. Another important difference between the Regulation and the Convention is that under 
the Regulation effect may be given to certain mandatory rules of the law of the country in which 
the contract is performed by virtue of Article 9(3). This replaces a wider provision made by 
                                                                                                                         
(c) a contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or to a tenancy of immovable property shall be 
governed by the law of the country where the property is situated; 
(d) notwithstanding point (c), a tenancy of immovable property concluded for temporary private use for a period of no 
more than six consecutive months shall be governed by the law of the country where the landlord has his habitual 
residence, provided that the tenant is a natural person and has his habitual residence in the same country; 
(e) a franchise contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the franchisee has his habitual residence; 
(f) a distribution contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the distributor has his habitual residence; 
(g) a contract for the sale of goods by auction shall be governed by the law of the country where the auction takes 
place, if such a place can be determined; 
(h) a contract concluded within a multilateral system which brings together or facilitates the bringing together of 
multiple third-party buying and selling interests in financial instruments, as defined by Article 4(1), point (17) of 
Directive 2004/39/EC, in accordance with non-discretionary rules and governed by a single law, shall be governed by 
that law". 
49
 Article 5(2) of the Regulation provides: "To the extent that the law applicable to a contract for the carriage of 
passengers has not been chosen by the parties in accordance with the second subparagraph, the law applicable shall be 
the law of the country where the passenger has his habitual residence, provided that either the place of departure or the 
place of destination is situated in that country. If these requirements are not met, the law of the country where the 
carrier has his habitual residence shall apply". 
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Article 7(1) of the Convention, which was not confined to prohibitions by the law of the place of 
performance, but extended to overriding mandatory rules of a country with which the contract had 
a close connection. But many Member States had made reservations excluding the use by their 
courts of Article 7(1). 
 
The Scope of the Regulation     
 Article 1 provides that the application of the Rome I Regulation is confined to cases that 
involve a conflict of laws.
50
 The Giuliano and Lagarde Report states that this requirement will be 
satisfied where the relationship involves one or more foreign elements; for example, in cases 
where the parties have different nationalities or where one or all of them habitually reside abroad 
or where one or more parties perform their obligations in a foreign country. In these cases, the 
issue of the applicable law in several countries will arise.
51
 It is clear that if the parties choose a 
foreign law to govern their relationship pursuant to Article 3(3) of the Regulation, the choosing of 
foreign law is sufficient to establish that the relationship involves a conflict of laws.
52
 
 It is clear that the a conflict situation also arises when several territories of a federal state, 
each of which has its own rules for contractual obligations, are involved in the relationship.
53
 This 
is confirmed by Article 22(1) of the Regulation, by which each territory within a federal state 
which has own law in the field of contracts is treated as a country in regard to the application of 
                                      
50
 Article 1(1) provides: "This Regulation shall apply, in situations involving a conflict of laws ..." 
51
 See Mario Giuliano and Paul Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations, [1980] OJ C282/17, Article 1, Comment 1. 
52
  Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 281. See also Gralf Peter Calliess, Rome Regulation: Commentary on the 
European Rules  of Conflict of Laws (Wolters Kluwer and Business, New York, 2011), p 41. 
53
  See Geert Van Calster, European Private International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013), p. 128. See 
also Gralf Peter Calliess, n. 52 above, p. 42.  
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the Regulation. Article 22(2), which enables the exclusion of purely internal cases by a federal 
State, is merely permissive, and the UK has wisely declined to make use of the permission in order 
to avoid pointless complication.
54
 
 According to Article 1(1),
55
 the Regulation is limited to contractual obligations. Thus, non-
contractual obligations fall outside its scope. Nonetheless, contractual obligations are not defined 
by the Regulation except for the indication by Recital 7 that the provisions and the substantive 
scope of the Regulation should be consistent with the Rome II Regulation and the Brussels I 
Regulation.
56
 Consequently, the concept of contractual obligation should be interpreted widely 
with an independent meaning, defined (ultimately by the European Court) as an autonomous 
concept of European Union law, in the light of the purpose of the Regulation and of the general 
trend in the laws of the Member States as a whole, rather than referring its definition to the lex 
fori.
57
  
 Furthermore, the court should interpret the concept of a contractual obligation as having 
the same meaning as under Article 7(1) of the revised version of the Brussels I Regulation, so that 
a contractual obligation arises when a party freely assumes an obligation towards another party.
58
  
 The independent meaning of a contract prevents the application of technical rules of forum 
law;
59
 for instance, the English rule that consideration is a requirement for a valid contract, while 
                                      
54
  Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 281.  
55
 Article 1(1) provides: "This Regulation shall apply, in situations involving a conflict of laws, to contractual 
obligations ..." 
56
  Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 281. 
57
  Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 40 above, p. 1784 See also Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 281; and C. M. V. 
Clarkson and Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th edition, 2011), p. 206. 
58
  Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 281. See also Geert Van Calster, n. 53 above, p. 128; and Gralf Peter Calliess, n. 
52 above, p. 38.  
59
  Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 282. 
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there is no such requirement in civilian legal systems. Consequently, under the Rome I Regulation  
an agreement unsupported by consideration is considered to be a contract.
60
 Furthermore, 
according to Article 12(1) of the Regulation,
61
 the consequences of nullity of a contract are within 
the scope of the Regulation.
62
 However, the transfer of ownership by virtue of a contract of sale 
falls outside the scope of the Regulation, since proprietary issues are not been regulated by the 
Regulation, except in the case of Article 14 (on assignments of the benefit of contractual 
obligations).
63
  
 Moreover, Article 1(1) of the Regulation
64
 confines the application of the Regulation to 
civil and commercial matters, and thus to contracts governed by private law.
65
 Thus, a contract 
that concerns public matters (a non-civil contract) falls outside the scope of the Regulation. In 
accordance with the rulings of the European Court on the Brussels I Regulation, it is the exercise 
of special public powers by a State or a public body, which are not available between private 
persons, which serves as the criterion for distinguishing between a civil or commercial contract 
and a public contract. Consequently, if a public body acts in accordance with its special public 
powers and concludes a contract with another party, this contract is considered a public contract, 
which is outside the scope of the Regulation.
66
 The second sentence of Article 1(1) outlines 
                                      
60
  Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 40 above, p. 1786.  See also Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 282. 
61
  Article 12(1)(e) provides: "The law applicable to a contract by virtue of this Regulation shall govern in 
particular: … (e) the consequences of nullity of the contract.” 
62
  Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 40 above, p. 1786. See also Gralf Peter Calliess, n. 52 above, p. 38. 
63
  Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 282. 
64
 Article 1 (1) provides: "This Regulation shall apply, in situations involving a conflict of laws, to contractual 
obligations in civil and commercial matters." 
65
  Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 281.  See also;  David Mcclean and Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, The Conflict of 
Laws (Sweet and Maxwell, UK, 8th edition, 2012), p. 347.  
66
  Gralf Peter Calliess, n. 52 above, p. 37.  
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specific matters that are excluded from the application of the Regulation.
67
 These matters relate to 
customs, revenue, or administrative issues, as they are considered public matters.
68
 Despite the 
fact that a civil court may hear some cases concerning public matters, this does not mean that a 
public matter will become a civil matter.
69
 Since the same distinction between civil and public 
matters must apply in all EU countries, the test is whether the public body acts as an ordinary 
trader, or whether it make use of special powers not available to ordinary traders. The dividing line 
is ultimately a matter for the European Court. The case-law under Brussels I will normally also 
apply to Rome I on this question. 
 The Regulation adopts the principle of universal application by Article 2, which provides 
that the Regulation will apply whether that leads to the application of law of a Member State or the 
law of a non-member country.
70
 Thus, the Regulation will apply where the parties choose the law 
of a non-member state, and where such a law is applicable under the default rules as the law of the 
country that is presumed or found to be most closely connected to the contract.
71
 
 Article 1(2) outlines a list of matters that fall outside the scope of the Regulation, since 
there are other treaties or EU measures which lay down conflict rules in regard to these matters, or 
because the Regulation has chosen to leave these matters to the conflict rules contained in the law 
                                      
67
  Article 1(1) provides: "This Regulation shall apply, in situations involving a conflict of laws, to contractual 
obligations in civil and commercial matters. It shall not apply, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative 
matters." 
68
  Gralf Peter Calliess, n. 52 above, p. 37.  
69
  Ibid. 
70
 Article 2 provides that:  "Any law specified by this Regulation shall be applied whether or not it is the law of 
a Member State." 
71
  Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 40 above, p. 1788. See also Geert Van Calster, n. 53 above, p. 131; and C. M. 
V. Clarkson and Jonathan Hill, n. 57 above, p. 207. 
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of the Member States.
72
 These excluded matters can be divided into three types: excluded 
transactions, excluded terms, and excluded issues.
73
 
 
EXCLUDED TRANSACTIONS  
 The effect of Article 1(2)(b) and (c) of the Regulation is to exclude from its scope all 
contracts which relate to family matters (familial status, maintenance and property) and succession 
on death. Some of these matters are subject to other treaties. For instance, obligations that arise out 
of succession and wills fall within the scope of the 1989 Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons,
74
 and fall within the EU Succession 
Regulation
75
 now that it has entered into force on 17 August 2015. Thus, the Rome I Regulation 
aims to avoid conflict with these treaties and measures.
76
  
 Article 1(2)(d) and Recital 9 exclude from the scope of Regulation obligations that arise 
under cheques, bills of exchange, or promissory notes, or under other negotiable instruments (such 
as bills of lading) to the extent that the obligations under such other negotiable instruments arise 
out of their negotiable character. The exclusion was made because the conflict rules laid down in 
the Regulation are unsuitable for negotiable instruments in view of their special character. Usually 
they are documents which are designed to embody a definite obligation, specified in precise terms, 
                                      
72
  Gralf Peter Calliess, n. 52 above, p. 42. 
73
  Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 282.   
74
 See Convention of 1 August 1989 on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons; 
see www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=62 (last accessed on 26 February 2015). 
75
  See EU Regulation 650/2012 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions 
and Acceptance and Enforcement of Authentic Instruments, in Matters of Succession, and on the Creation of a 
European Certificate of Succession; [2012] OJ L201/107.  
76
 Gralf Peter Calliess, n. 52 above, p. 43.  See also Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 3rd edition, 2013), p. 229. 
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in order to ease its transfer.
77
 Furthermore, the Giuliano and Lagarde Report provides another 
reason for this exclusion: that such instruments are subjected in many Member States to the 
Geneva Conventions,
78
 and elsewhere may be subject to special conflict rules of lex fori,
79
 as in 
the United Kingdom. 
 According to Article 1(2) (h), the constitution of trusts, and the relationship between 
trustees, settlors and beneficiaries, fall outside the scope of the Regulation. The exclusion is 
designed to make clear that a trust is a different kind of institution, distinct from contract law, and 
having affinities with property or association law.
80
 It is a clarification aimed mainly at avoiding 
confusion in civilian countries which in their internal law do not recognise the trust institution as 
understood in the UK and Ireland.
81
 
 Although  Article 7 of the Regulation  provides that a contract of insurance is within the 
scope of the Regulation, Article 1(2)(j)
82
excludes a small range of insurance contracts from the 
scope of the Regulation under certain conditions: the contract should be concluded by an insurer 
who is established outside the European Union; the contract should provide benefits either to self-
employed or employed persons "belonging to an undertaking or group of undertakings" or to a 
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 Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 282. 
78
 See the Geneva Convention 1930 and 1931 for the Settlement of Certain Conflict of Laws in connection with 
Bills of Exchange or Cheques respectively.  
79
  Giuliano and  Lagarde Report, n. 51 above, Article 1(2), Comment 4, p. 11. 
80
  Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 282. 
81
  Gralf Peter Calliess, n. 52 above, p. 51. 
82
 Article 1(2)(j) provides: "insurance contracts arising out of operations carried out by organisations other than 
undertakings referred to in Article 2 of Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 
November 2002 concerning life assurance[,] the object of which is to provide benefits for employed or self-employed 
persons belonging to an undertaking or group of undertakings, or to a trade or group of trades, in the event of death or 
survival or of discontinuance or curtailment of activity, or of sickness related to work or accidents at work."  
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trade or group of trades; and the insurance contract should cover the event of survival or death, or 
of discontinuance or curtailment of activity, or sickness in regard to work or accidents at work.
83
 
In contrast the Rome Convention, by Article 1(3), excluded from its scope an insurance contract 
that covered risks located within the European Community.
84
 In fact the gap in the Rome 
Convention was filled by provisions contained in Directives on insurance.
85
 The Regulation has 
incorporated slightly simplified provisions derived from the Directives, and the remaining minor 
exclusion is itself derived from the Directives. 
 
EXCLUDED TERMS 
 Choice of court and choice of arbitration agreements are excluded from the scope of the 
Regulation pursuant to Article 1(2)(e). In other words, the interpretation and validity of 
jurisdiction or arbitration clauses fall outside the Regulation’s scope.86 This is because these 
matters are governed by other international instruments, such as the Brussels I Regulation or the 
New York Convention 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
87
 
Some argue that the exclusion of jurisdiction clauses relates to procedural rather than contractual 
matters.
88
 Nonetheless, this exclusion does not extend to a substantive contract that contains a 
jurisdiction or arbitration clause. The substantive contract remain within the scope of the Rome I 
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 Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 283. See also Gralf Peter Calliess, n. 52 above, p. 52. 
84
  John O'Brien, n. 40 above, p. 324. 
85
  EC Directive 88/357, as amended by EC Directive 92/49, in the case on non-life insurance, [1988] OJ L172 
and [1992] OJ L228; and  EC Directive 2002/83, in the case on life insurance, [2002] OJ L345. 
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 Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 283. 
87
 Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 284. See also John O'Brien, n. 40 above, p. 321. 
88
 Gralf Peter Calliess, n. 52 above, p. 48.  
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Regulation.
89
 Moreover the forum clause is often an indication of an implied choice of the law 
governing the substantive contract. 
 
EXCLUDED ISSUES  
 Questions that relate to an individual’s status or his legal capacity are excluded from the 
Regulation by Article 1(2)(a). However, the Regulation will apply in certain cases where an 
individual who entered into a contract with another party who was present in the same country was 
incapable under the law of another country, although he had capacity pursuant of the law of the 
place of contracting. He may not rely on that other law to invoke his incapacity except in a 
situation when the other party was aware or was negligently unaware of the incapacity.
90
 This 
provision is set out in Article 13 of the Regulation.
91
  
 Article 1(2)(f) excludes from the application of the Regulation questions governed by the 
law of companies and other bodies (unincorporated or corporate), such as legal capacity, creation 
by registration or otherwise, internal organisation, winding up, and officers' and members' 
personal liability for the obligations of the body. Furthermore, the question of a director's liability 
arising from his office is within the exclusion.
92
 This exclusion leaves unaffected the difference in 
conflict rules in respect of companies between common-law countries, which usually refer to the 
                                      
89
  Giuliano and  Lagarde Report, n. 51 above,  Article 1(2), Comment 4, p. 12. 
90
  Gralf Peter Calliess, n. 52 above, p. 42. See also Pippa Rogerson,  Collier's Conflict of Laws (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 4th edition, 2014), p. 320.  
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 Article 13 provides: "In a contract concluded between persons who are in the same country, a natural person 
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law of the country of incorporation, and civilian countries, which usually refer to the country of 
the central administration (or head office).    
 Furthermore, Article 1(2)(g) excludes from the scope of the Regulation the question of 
whether an agent is able to bind his principal by his act toward a contractor. The effect of this 
provision will be closely examined in this thesis.
93
 
 According to Article 1(2)(i), pre-contractual obligations are excluded from the scope of the 
Regulation. Recital 10 explains that the exclusion of obligations arising out of dealings prior to the 
conclusion of a contract is due to the fact that they are covered by the Rome II Regulation. 
Nevertheless, according to Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation, a pre-contractual obligation 
will normally be governed by the law that governs the contract or the law that would have 
governed the contract if it had been concluded.
94
 Therefore, the law applicable to a pre-contractual 
obligation will be determined by reference to the Rome I Regulation; but if this proves impossible, 
Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation will apply.
95
 
 Article 1(3) of the Rome I Regulation excludes the question of evidence and procedure 
from the scope of the Regulation. However, this exclusion gives way to Article 18, which deals 
with the burden of proof, modes of proof, and presumptions. One important result of this provision 
is that the burden of pleading and proving the identity and content of applicable foreign law fall 
                                      
93
  See especially chapter 6 of this thesis.  
94
 Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation provides: "The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising 
out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract, regardless of whether the contract was actually concluded or not, 
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95
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outside the scope of the Regulation. Consequently, these matters are subject to the conflict rules of 
lex fori.
96
 
 
General Provisions  
 The Regulation, like many treaties, contains a number of general provisions. For instance, 
Article 9 regulates the operation of overriding mandatory rules. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 
21, the applicable law will be set aside if its provisions are manifestly incompatible with the 
forum’s public policy.97 Article 20 excludes renvoi and confines application to the internal 
provisions of the applicable law.
98
 This section examines some of the general provisions. 
 
 FEDERAL STATE 
 In the case of a federal state that comprises several territories, and in which each territory 
has its own contract law, each territory must be treated as a country for the purpose of determining 
the applicable law under the Regulation.
99
  Nevertheless, a Member State is not required to apply 
the Regulation to internal conflicts of law solely between its own territories.
100
 However the 
United Kingdom has chosen not to utilise this permission. 
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 Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 284.   
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  Renvoi will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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 Article 22(1) provides: "Where a State comprises several territorial units, each of which has its own rules of 
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identifying the law applicable under this Regulation." 
100
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such units." 
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RELATION WITH OTHER TREATIES AND MEASURES 
 The Regulation aims to avoid any conflict between the Regulation and other legislation 
adopted by the European Union that deals with questions governed by the Regulation. Therefore, 
Article 23 of the Regulation provides that the application of any European Union law that deals 
with particular matters will not be prejudiced by the Regulation.
101
 This is applicable whether the 
other European Union measure provides ordinary conflict rules or mandatory rules.
102
 
Nevertheless Article 23 provides an exception in favour of Article 7 (on insurance), since the 
Regulation is intended to replace the choice-of-law provisions in the earlier Directives on 
insurance. 
 Furthermore, the Regulation aims to avoid any conflict with any existing international 
instrument to which a Member State is already a party that deals with questions that are within the 
scope of the Regulation.
103
 Thus, Article 25(1) of the Regulation provides that the application of 
any existing international treaty to which a Member State is a party at the time of the adoption of 
the Regulation will not be prejudiced by the Regulation.
104
 Consequently, with regards to the 
conflict between the Regulation and the Hague Agency Convention, preference will give to the 
Convention in France, the Netherlands and Portugal.
105
 But if the UK wished now to become party 
to the Agency Convention, it would have to follow the procedure laid down by EC Regulation 
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 Article 23 of the Regulation provides: "With the exception of Article 7, this Regulation shall not prejudice 
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relating to contractual obligations." 
102
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662/2009,
106
 which subjects such an accession to supervision by the EU Commission. Moreover, 
Article 25(2) of the Rome I Regulation provides that the Regulation will have precedence over any 
conventions concluded exclusively by two or more of the member states concerning matters 
within the scope of the Regulation.
107
 However this does not apply to the Hague Agency 
Convention, since Argentina is also a party thereto. 
 
Habitual Residence 
 Under the Rome I Regulation, in the absence of a choice of law by the parties, the law of 
the country in which an agent has his habitual residence will usually govern the relationship 
between the principal and the agent. Consequently, the definition of habitual residence is 
important.  
 Recital 39 of the Rome I Regulation explains that a clear definition of habitual residence 
will lead to certainty, especially in case of companies and other bodies, unincorporated or 
incorporated. In addition, it explains that for the purpose of choice of law habitual residence 
should be defined by a single criterion, unlike Article 60(1) of Brussels I, which adopted three 
criteria, because using a single criterion for choice of law purposes will enable parties to predict 
                                      
106
  EC Regulation 662/2009, establishing a procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements between 
Member States and third countries on particular matters concerning the law applicable to contractual and non-
contractual obligations; [2009] OJ L200/25.  
107
  Article 25(2) of the Regulation provides: "However, this Regulation shall, as between Member States, take 
precedence over conventions concluded exclusively between two or more of them in so far as such conventions 
concern matters governed by this Regulation." 
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the law applicable to their relationship.
108
 Consequently, Article 19 of the Rome I Regulation 
defines habitual residence as follows. 
 “1. For the purposes of this Regulation, the habitual residence of companies and other 
bodies, corporate or unincorporated, shall be the place of central administration. The habitual 
residence of a natural person acting in the course of his business activity shall be his principal 
place of business. 
  2. Where the contract is concluded in the course of the operations of a branch, agency or 
any other establishment, or if, under the contract, performance is the responsibility of such a 
branch, agency or establishment, the place where the branch, agency or any other establishment is 
located shall be treated as the place of habitual residence. 
  3. For the purposes of determining the habitual residence, the relevant point in time shall 
be the time of the conclusion of the contract.” 
 This Article distinguishes between the habitual residence of a company and that of an 
individual. 
 
THE HABITUAL RESIDENCE OF A COMPANY 
 For companies and other bodies, the habitual residence will be in the country in which the 
company or body has its central administration. The concept of central administration, under the 
Brussels I Regulation, was fully considered by the English Court of Appeal in Young v Anglo 
American South Africa Ltd, where Aikens LJ concluded that it refers to the place where the 
                                      
108
 Recital 39 of the Rome I Regulation explains that "For the sake of legal certainty there should be a clear 
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company in question, through its relevant organs according to its own constitutional provisions,  
takes the decisions that are essential for its operations; or (put another way) to the place where the 
company, through its relevant organs, conducts its entrepreneurial management, for that 
management must involve making decisions that are essential for that company's operations. Such 
essential decisions must be distinguished from mere secondary management tasks, such as 
accounting and settling of tax matters. Thus, the concept usually refers to the place where the 
board of directors (or equivalent corporate organ) usually meets and takes important decisions.
109
 
 Where the agent acts through a branch, two cases must be distinguished, in each of which 
the branch will count as the relevant residence of the agent. The first case is where the branch is 
involved in the conclusion of the contract. The second instance is where the branch is to be 
involved in the performance of the contract. Nonetheless, if several branches are involved in the 
conclusion or performance of the contract, it seems likely that one must revert to the main rules 
referring to the agent’s central administration or (where he is an individual) his principal place of 
business. For instance, where a company has its central administration in the UAE, and has a 
branch in Paris, through which the contract was concluded, and another branch in London, from 
which the contractual performance is required. In this case, it seems likely that the law of the 
country where the central administration is located will apply.
110
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THE HABITUAL RESIDENCE OF AN INDIVIDUAL 
 As regards an individual agent acting in the course of his business, his principal place of 
business will usually counts as his habitual residence, though if the business has a branch which is 
involved, the exception for branches may apply.
111
  
 In contrast, the Regulation does not define the habitual residence of an individual who is 
not acting in the course of his own business activities. Therefore, the question of determining his 
habitual residence in this case arises. It seems clear that in such a case an autonomous definition of 
habitual residence under EU law should be applied, rather than a reference to the lex fori.
112
  
Moreover, except where a special definition is included in a particular regulation, such as is 
provided for an individual carrying on his own business activity by the Rome I and Rome II 
Regulations, the concept of the habitual residence of an individual adult should usually have the 
same meaning in all the EU regulations in the sphere of private international law; that is, the Rome 
I and II Regulations, the Brussels IIA Regulation, the Maintenance Regulation, the Succession 
Regulation, and the Insolvency Regulation. A starting point may be the European Court’s ruling in 
Swaddling v Adjudication Officer,
113
 given in a context other than private international law, that 
the habitual residence is the place in which the person has established on a "fixed basis, his 
permanent or habitual centre of interest", and that all relevant facts should be taken into account to 
determine such residence. The English court also adopted this principle in Marinos v Marinos
114
 
and Munro v Munro.
115
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 More precisely, the definition of the concept of the habitual residence of an individual 
adult for the purpose of the EU regulations in the sphere of private international law should now 
be derived primarily from the ruling of the European Court in Mercredi v Chaffe.
116
 The case 
involved a woman of French origin, who had lived in England for about nine years, during which 
she gave birth to a child, and who had returned to France with her baby shortly after the birth. As 
regards the definition emerging from Mercredi, the following propositions appear to be justified.  
 In general an adult is habitually resident in the country in which he has intentionally 
established the centre of his interests on a lasting basis. However, a person cannot be habitually 
resident in more than one country at the same time. But he may have no habitual residence 
anywhere at a given time. Where he has several lasting centers of interests, he may be habitually 
resident at the principal of them, determined by reference to the length of time spent at and the 
strength of his social and familial connections with each of them; or, in case of equality, at the 
centre established earlier. Moreover, to become habitually resident in a country, an adult must be 
present in the country, for a moment at least, and while so present must have the intention of 
establishing in that country the centre of his interests, with the intention that this centre should be 
of a lasting character. Thus, one cannot be habitually resident in a country in which one has never 
set foot. But one may retain one's existing habitual residence despite temporary absences from the 
country, for example by way of holidays or business trips. Moreover, if the requisite intention 
exists, one may become habitually resident in a country from the moment when one arrives or 
returns there.
117
 Further, in determining whether the requisite intention exists, the actual duration 
of the person's stay in the country is a relevant factor, but account must also be taken of the extent 
of his integration in a social and family environment there, and this involves consideration of the 
reasons for his move to the country, the languages known to him, and his geographic and family 
                                      
116
  Case C-497/10-PPU, [2010] ECR I-14309. 
117
  Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 425. 
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origins. The requisite intention is probably that to have one's centre of interests in the country 
either for an indefinite period, or for a definite period of not less than three years. Thus, a soldier 
and the members of his family may become habitually resident in a country in which he is 
stationed and lives with the family members.
118
  
 Finally, a person may abandon his habitual residence in a country, even if he does not at 
the same time become habitually resident in another country; and in this situation he will for the 
time being have no habitual residence anywhere. Such abandonment will occur where he leaves or 
remains absent from the country of his existing habitual residence, and has the intention that the 
centre of his interests shall no longer be in that country.
119
 
 Assistance may also be drawn from the decision of Slade J in Winrow v Hemphill,
120
 which 
involved a tort claim arising from a traffic accident in Germany in November 2009 between a car 
whose driver and passenger were of British nationality, and another car driven by a person of 
German nationality. The claim was between the passenger and her driver. Both women in the first 
car were living in Germany with husbands posted there in the British military. The passenger 
unsuccessfully claimed that she had been habitual resident in the UK, rather than Germany, 
because she and her husband had intended to return to the UK to live, and her presence in 
Germany was involuntary. Slade J followed the European Court’s rulings and determined habitual 
residence by reference to residence in a particular place for the period of time necessary to acquire 
a degree of stability. The mere intention to reside somewhere did not determine habitual residence. 
Therefore, the court decided that: 
                                      
118
  Peter Stone, n. 38 above, p. 425. See also James Fawcett, Janeen M. Carruthers and Peter North, Private 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 14th edition, 2008), p. 189. 
119
  James Fawcett, Janeen M. Carruthers and Peter North, n. 118 above, p. 191. 
120
 [2014] EWHC 3164 (QB). 
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  in my judgment the habitual residence of the Claimant at the time of her accident  was 
 Germany. When the Claimant came to live in England in 2011 her status changed and she 
 became habitually resident here. However, the family's intention to return to live in 
 England after the Claimant's husband's posting in Germany came to an end did not affect 
 her status in November 2009. 
 
Conclusion  
 As we have seen, there are similarities and differences between the provisions of the 
Hague Agency Convention 1978 and the provisions of the Rome I Regulation. Both have similar 
objectives, to achieve the unification of conflict rules. However, the Convention regulates the 
choice of law in regards to specific contracts and issues (agency contracts and the external 
relations between principals or agents and contractors), while the Regulation provides conflict 
rules for contracts in general.  
 Both have adopted a principle of universal application, so that the Regulation or 
Convention will apply whether that leads to the application of the law of a Member State or a 
Contracting State or to the law of a country that is not a party to the Regulation or Convention. 
However, participation in the Regulation is confined to countries within the European Union, 
whereas participation in the Convention is open to any country. Nevertheless, any country could 
choose to model its conflict rules on the Rome I Regulation, and Russia has in fact done so. 
 The Regulation limits its scope to cases that involve a conflict of laws, while the 
Convention requires agency contracts to have an international character. These criteria are very 
similar, since both are based on the presence of a foreign element (or perhaps an effective or 
significant foreign element).  
 The Regulation, like the Convention, has excluded some issues from its scope; for 
instance, family matters and succession on death are excluded. Matters related to judicial 
49 
 
procedure (such as the mode of trial) are also excluded from the scope of the Regulation and the 
Convention. Other excluded issues are conflict rules in respect of capacity, company matters, and 
trusts. Most importantly for the purpose of this thesis, the Regulation excludes the external 
authority of the agent from its scope. On the other hand, the Convention, unlike the Regulation, 
has granted each contracting state the right of reservation to exclude certain types of agency from 
the application of the Convention. Therefore, in terms of completeness, the Convention approach 
is better adapted than the Regulation approach to the needs of international trade in respect of 
agency relationships. This lacuna in the Regulation could be cured if the Regulation were 
amended by the addition of conflict rules in respect of agency external relationships. That will be 
examined in the later chapters (6 and7). 
 The Convention and the Regulation both consider any territory which has its own law 
relating to the matter in question as capable of providing the applicable law. They also agree in 
permitting the exclusion from their scope by a participating State of internal conflicts solely 
between the laws of its territories in cases connected exclusively with those territories. 
 The Regulation, like the Convention, aims to avoid any conflict between its own 
provisions and other treaties that deal with questions within its scope. Nevertheless, the 
Convention’s approach is that the application of the Convention will not affect the application of 
international instruments, already signed or to be signed in the future by a contracting state, 
dealing with questions governed by the Convention, without provides a definitive criterion  to 
determine the preferable treaty in case of conflict between the Convention and another treaty.  
 The Regulation approach distinguishes between a conflict with a European Union measure 
and a conflict with another international instrument. With regard to a European Union measure, 
the Regulation provides that its application will not prejudice the application of any European 
Union legislation on particular matters concerning questions covered by the Regulation.  
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 With regard to the conflict with other international instruments, the Regulation has adopted 
the criterion of precedence in time.  Hence, if the international treaty was in force for the relevant 
Member State at  the time of the adoption of the Regulation, preference will be given to the treaty 
rather than to the Regulation. Consequently, in the case of conflicts that may arise between the 
Regulation and the Convention in particular matters, such as the internal relationship between a 
principal and an agent, preference will be given to the Convention, since it existed before the 
adoption of the Regulation. Such preference for the Convention also accords with the principle of 
lex specialis derogat legi generali. 
 In this chapter, we have examined the Rome I Regulation and the Hague Agency 
Convention by addressing their historical context, their scope of application, and some of their 
general provisions. The next chapter will examine the UAE approach to conflict rules by 
examining the general provisions set out in the UAE Civil Code, since the overall aim of this 
thesis is to compare the UAE conflict rules with respect to agency with those of the Rome I 
Regulation and the Agency Convention. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CHOICE OF LAW IN THE UAE 
 
Introduction 
 As was explained in Chapter One, UAE legislation is strongly influenced by Egyptian 
legislation; and this is especially true of the UAE legislation on questions related to conflict of 
laws, contained in Articles 10 to 28 of the UAE Civil Code. Some of these provisions (Articles 
11–21) determine the law applicable to various particular issues, such as marriage, divorce, 
contract and tort. Others (Articles 10 and 22–28) deal with more general aspects of the operation 
of the choice of law rules. 
 Regarding choice of law questions, some provisions apply in all types of cases. Thus, 
Article 10 specifies the law applicable to the classification of the nature of relationships for the 
purpose of applying the choice of law rules. Article 23 authorises the court to apply the general 
principles of private international law to fill gaps in the specific choice of law rules. Article 25 
provides the solution where a country has several legal systems. Article 26 regulates the question 
of renvoi, and Article 27 provides for the exclusion of the normally applicable law if its content 
offends the forum’s public policy. All these provisions may impact on the determination and 
application of the law applicable to agency relationships. Therefore, this chapter addresses these 
provisions by way of background, since we will examine the conflict rules in respect of agency 
relationships according to the UAE legal system as one part of the comparative study in this 
thesis. 
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 Consequently, the current chapter attempts to examine these issues, and in view of the 
purpose of the thesis, we also address the provisions of Article 19, which regulates the law 
applicable to contracts. Thus, we shall first examine the classification of matters and issues. 
Thereafter, we shall consider the law which governs contractual obligations. Next, we will 
examine the role of general principles of private international law. Then we will proceed to 
address renvoi. After this, we shall consider the possible impact of public policy on the 
applicable law. Then we will examine the question of proof of foreign law. Finally we shall 
consider determination of the applicable law in the case of a country with several legal systems. 
 
Classification 
 The choice of law rules specified by the UAE legislation neither deal with  all legal issues 
by means of a single general provision (for example, in favour of the law of the country which 
has the closest connection with the matter in question);
1
 nor do they create a highly specific rule 
for each detailed legal issue. Rather, the approach adopted is to divide these legal issues into 
different categories, so that each category includes legal issues with similar features.
2
 Thus, a 
court called on to determine the law applicable to any relationship or legal issue must determine 
the category to which the relationship or issue belongs. This procedure is known as 
classification. Accordingly the question arises as to the law by reference to which the court 
should classify a relationship or legal issue, as one law may classify the relationship or issue as 
                                      
1 See Ali Essa Aljasmi, )راضلا لعفلا ىلع قيبطتلا بجاولا نوناقلا( The Law Applicable to Torts (UAE Researcher, 
1st edition, 2011), p. 23. 
2
 See Abdulla Saif Alsuboosi, Choice of Law in Tort- A Comparative Study involving the Laws of the United 
Arab Emirates and of Other Countries, (PhD Thesis, University of Essex, 2009), p. 80.  
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belonging to a different category from the category to which the matter is assigned by another 
law.
3
 For instance, the unjustifiable breaking-off of negotiations towards the conclusion of a 
contract may give rise to liability in tort in some civilian legal systems, such as the UAE, Egypt 
and France; however, in other countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, this is considered a 
contractual liability.
4
 
 As determining the law applicable to classification of relationships or issues for the 
purposes of private international law is of fundamental importance, many theories have been 
proposed to resolve this issue. For instance, some argue in favour of the lex causae, while others 
prefer classification by reference to comparative law. Nevertheless, the currently prevailing view 
is that classification is governed by the law of the forum; this approach is known as Bartin’s 
theory.
5
 
 The UAE legislature has adapted Bartin’s theory in Article 10 of the Civil Code, which 
provides: 
“The law of the State of the United Arab Emirates shall be the authoritative source in 
determining relationships when the nature of such relationships requires to be determined 
in a suit in which there is a conflict of laws as to the law to be applied between the parties.”  
 This Article establishes that it is UAE law (the lex fori) which determines the nature of a 
relationship for the purpose of including it in a particular category in order to identify the law 
governing the relationship. However, after the court has determined the applicable law in this 
                                      
3
  Abdulla Saif Alsuboosi, n. 2 above, p. 88.  
4
 Ahmed Abdulkarim Salama, (ةيلودلا ةراجتلا دوقع تاضوافمل ينوناقلا ماظنلا) The Legal System of The Negotiation in 
International Trade Contract, (2003) V11 Security and Law Journal (Dubai Police Academy), p. 253. 
5
  Bartin, Etienne A., Principes de Droit International privé,selon la loi et la jurisprudence francaises. 
(éditions Domat- Montchrestien, 3, place de la Sorbonne, 1930). p. 228..  See also Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal, 
(نيناوقلا عزانت يف طيسولا) Conflict of law (Dubai Police Academy, 2008), p. 716. 
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way, other classifications may become relevant under the lex causae. For instance, if the claim is 
treated as contractual in accordance with Article 10, the proper law of the contract, determined in 
accordance with Article 19, will apply, and this law may have different rules for contracts of 
agency from its rules for contracts of distribution. It will then be necessary to determine whether 
the contract in question is a contract of agency or a contract of distribution, and for this purpose 
the proper law will provide the relevant definitions. In any event, when interpreting the forum’s 
conflict rules in accordance with Article 10, the court should use a broader concept of issues or 
relationships than that contained in its internal law, so that its conflict rules are able to absorb 
issues and relationships which exist under various foreign legal systems. Such broad-mindedness 
is authorised by Article 23 of the Civil Code.
6
 
 Furthermore, the UAE legislator has adopted an exception to Bartin’s theory by virtue of 
Article 18(2), which provides that “The lex situs of the place in which real property is situated 
shall apply to contract made over such property.” Consequently, the law of the country where the 
property is located governs the classification of a property’s nature as immovable or movable. 
 
Evaluation of the UAE approach (Bartin's theory) 
 It seems Bartin’s theory is the best approach to classification in relation to choice of law 
rules for many reasons. The first reason is that classification involves the interpretation of the 
forum’s choice of law rules; thus, logically, it is appropriate to interpret these rules according to 
lex fori rather than another law. Another reason is that the identification of the applicable law 
                                      
6
 Okasha Mohamad Abd Al-aal, n. 5 above, p. 113.  
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logically follows, rather than precedes, the characterisation of the relationship or issue; 
consequently, it is impossible to classify the relationship according to the lex causae, whose 
identity is not yet known, and the best approach is to apply the lex fori.
7
 Moreover, the legal 
environment in the forum country and the prevailing principles of its law will influence the court 
when classifying a relationship or issue; hence, adopting this theory makes the court’s task much 
easier.
8
  
 Regarding the exception of Bartin’s theory - the classification of the nature of property by 
reference to the lex situs- some argue in favour of the proprietary exception by providing  that 
the desirable approach is to adopt Bartin’s theory as a whole, which include the exception in 
favour of  lex situs of property  as the UAE law did.
9
 Others argue the exception is not important, 
as the UAE law does not distinguish between immovable and movable property with respect to 
choice of law rules.
10
 The latter view is not wholly justified, since the UAE law in some cases 
does make the application of the choice of law rules dependent on the classification of property 
as immovable or movable; for instance, Article 19(2) of the UAE Civil Code makes the law 
governing a contract in respect of an immovable property different from the law governing a 
contract dealing with a movable property under Article 19(1).
11  
                                      
7
 Abdulla Saif Alsuboosi, n. 2 above, p. 90. 
8
 See Awad Allah Al-Saiid,  يئاضقلا صاصتخلاا عزانتو نيناوقلا عزانت ماكحأ( لودلايتاراملاا نوناقلا يف ي)  The Provisions 
on Conflicts of Law and Conflicts of International Jurisdiction in Emirate Law (Dubai Police Academy, 1st edition, 
1993), p. 64. 
9
 Ibid, p. 77. 
10
 Essam El-Din Al- Qasabi,   ةيبرعلا تاراملإا ةلودل صاخلا يلودلا نوناقلا()يلودلا ينوناقلا صاصتخلاا عزانت، ةدحتملا  The 
UAE Private International Law, Conflict of Laws ( UAE University, 2nd edition, 1991), p. 70. 
11
          Article 19 provides:  
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 In general, it seems that the best approach to the characterisation of relationships or 
issues (leaving aside movable and immovable property) is that one should apply the lex fori, but 
use its private international law, not its internal law. A broad, internationally-minded, approach 
is appropriate, taking account of the purposes of the forum’s choice of law rules as well as the 
need for international harmony. It is the primordial legal error to suppose that the same concept 
must have exactly the same meaning for the purpose of different legal rules. 
 
Contractual Obligations 
 The UAE legislation, like that of most other countries, grants to contracting parties the 
freedom to choose expressly or impliedly the applicable law; however, if no such choice is made, 
the court will apply the default rules. Thus, Article 19(1) of the Civil Code provides: 
The form and the substance of contractual obligations shall be governed by the law of the 
state in which the contracting parties are both resident if they are resident in the same 
state, but if they are resident in different states the law of the state in which the contract 
was concluded shall apply unless they agree, or it is apparent from the circumstances that 
the intention was, that another law should apply. 
 It should be noted that the official English translation of Article 19 might be interpreted 
as restricting the parties’ freedom available under Article 19 to cases where the parties are not 
                                                                                                                       
"(1) The form and the substance of contractual obligations shall be governed by the law of the state in which the 
contracting parties are both resident if they are resident in the same state, but if they are resident in different states 
the law of the state in which the contract was concluded shall apply unless they agree, or it is apparent from the 
circumstances that the intention was, that another law should apply. 
(2) The lex situs of the place in which real property is situated shall apply to contract made over such property."  
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resident in the same country. However, this interpretation is incorrect, as the text of the 
authoritative Arabic version makes it clear that the Article enables the parties to choose explicitly 
or impliedly the applicable law even where they reside in the same country. If the parties do not 
choose the applicable law, the court will use the default rules to apply the law of the parties’ 
common residence, if a common residence exists; or, if not, that of the place of contracting. The 
text in Arabic is clear and all Arab commentators tend to agree.
12
  
 Moreover, the UAE courts have admitted this interpretation in many decisions. For 
instance, the federal Supreme Court has decided in numerous cases that the law of the parties’ 
common residence will govern their contract if the parties do not select the applicable law.
13
 This 
interpretation is consistent with the international trend in respect of conflict rules in the field of 
contract law, and it is based on granting the parties the freedom to determine the applicable law 
as the primary rule. If they do not, the court will apply the default rules. 
 It should be noted Article 19(1) does not distinguish between the contractual formalities 
and the substance of the contract. Consequently, the formal validity of contractual obligations 
will be subject to the law that is selected expressly or impliedly by the parties, to the law of the 
parties’ common residence, or to the law of country of conclusion of the contract, as the case 
may be. 
 A normal choice of law clause (for example, one specifying “This contract shall be 
governed by Egyptian law.”) will apply to both form and substance. But Article 19 appears to 
                                      
12
 See Ahmad Alhawary, (يتاراملإا صاخلا يلودلا نوناقلا يف زجوملا)  The Emirate Private International Law (Ithraa 
Publishing and Distribution, Jordan, 3rd edition, 2012), p. 458. See also Okasha Mohamad Abd Al-aal, n. 5 above,  
p. 697; and Awad Allah Al-Saiid, n. 8 above, p. 284. 
13
  See the federal Supreme Court decisions in Case 212, 255/1990, 19 June 1990; Case. 201, 270/1998, 15 
February 1998; and Case 364/2005, 17 May 2005. 
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enable the parties expressly to select one law to govern form and another law to govern 
substance, or to choose expressly a law to govern the substance of the contract without 
mentioning the law governing its form.
14
 Some argue that in the last-mentioned case, the law 
expressly chosen to govern the substance of the contract will be impliedly chosen to govern form 
if the form used is valid according to that law; but that if the form used is invalid under that law, 
the court should apply the law of the common residence or the law of the place of contracting 
under which the form is valid.
15
 
 It should be noted that under Article 19(2) the parties do not have the freedom to choose 
the law that will govern a contract which deals with immovable property. Such a contract will 
always be subject to the lex situs.
16
  
 
Evaluating the UAE approach 
 Granting the parties the freedom to select an applicable law is recognised as a desirable 
approach in various legal systems and various international conventions, regulations and treaties. 
Nevertheless, the default rules adopted by Article 19(1) are open to criticism. The parties often 
do not reside in the same country. Moreover in recent years numerous contracts have come to be 
concluded electronically; hence, the default rule in favour of the law of the place of contracting 
gives rise to increasing difficulty in determining that place. In addition, the default rules utilise 
rigid criteria which may not be appropriate to particular types of contract, such as banking 
                                      
14
 Okasha Mohamad Abd Al-aal, n. 5 above, p. 751.   
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Article 19 (2) provide :"The lex situs of the place in which real property is situated shall apply to contract 
made over such property."  
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transactions
17
 or agency contracts. Moreover the UAE legislation does not provide for an escape 
clause in favour of the law which has a closer connection to the contract. 
 Further, the UAE legislation does not contain any explicit provisions in the field of 
choice of law designed to secure protection of weaker parties in relation to certain contracts, such 
as consumer, insurance and employment contracts. However, it is recognised elsewhere that 
these kinds of contract require special provisions with respect to conflict rules.
18
  
 Due to the criticisms of the default rules in Article 19(1), commentators
19
 suggest the 
application of the general principles of private international law pursuant to Article 23 of the 
Civil Code to replenish deficiencies regarding conflict rules in the field of contracts. 
 
The  Principles of Private International Law 
 Article 23 of the UAE Civil Code provides that “The principles of private international 
law shall apply in the absence of a relevant provision in the foregoing Articles governing the 
conflict of laws.”20 This Article grants the court the ability to apply general principles of private 
                                      
17
 Okasha Mohamad Abd Al-aal, n. 5 above, p. 744.   
18
 See Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, UK, 15th edition, 2012), p. 1948. 
See also Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (Elgar European Law, UK, 3rd edition, 2014), p. 343.  
19
 Okasha Mohamad Abd Al-aal, n. 5 above, p. 743. 
20
 This corresponds to Article 24 of the Egyptian Civil Code. It should be noted that the Arab commentators 
and scholars have not studied this provision sufficiently, but have confined their efforts to considering its application 
in certain areas, such as contracts or torts. Nonetheless, Samia Rashid, (  ةدملا رود24 نيناوقلا عزانت تلاكشم لح يف يندم ) 
“The role of Article 24 to solve the problems of conflict of laws” (Cairo University), while not elaborating on the 
concept, has endeavoured to identify some relevant principles of private international law; for instance, that state 
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international law to determine the appropriate conflict rule for the matter in question, where it is 
not governed by any provision of the conflict rules specified in the UAE Civil Code. The 
legislator of this provision wishes to keep abreast of recent developments in the field of conflicts 
of law. Nevertheless, questions arise regarding the establishment of such principles with a view 
to applying them; or, in other words, as to when a choice of law rule can be considered as falling 
within the scope of the concept of general principles of private international law. 
 The first problem which arises from Article 23 is to determine the characteristics which 
must be possessed by a choice of law rule to enable it to qualify as embodying a general 
principle. Some argue that a conflict rule may be regarded as a general principle of private 
international law when it has been adopted by the numerous legal systems, national courts in 
various countries, international courts or international arbitrations.
21
 Furthermore, provisions 
adopted by treaties, conventions, or supranational regulations may be recognised as embodying 
general principles. Some argue that a UAE court may rely on Article 23 of the Civil Code to 
utilise a rule which applies in the USA;
22
 however, this view cannot be acceptable unless other 
countries or other legal systems have adopted the same rule. In other words, a general principle 
should be one which is accepted in many countries. It need not be universally accepted, but 
acceptance in one country (even the USA, which contains about 50 law districts, and has given 
rise to an enormous volume of litigation dealing with conflicts between their laws) is not enough. 
Treaties and EU regulations may be sufficiently widely accepted. If international practice is 
divided between two conflicting approaches, Article 23 should be interpreted as authorizing the 
                                                                                                                       
contracts are not subjected to the default rules in Article 20 of the Egyptian Civil Code (Article 19 of the UAE Civil 
Code). Rashid’s work has also identified some important questions that will be discussed in the present thesis.  
21
 Samia Rashid, n. 20 above, p. 8. 
22
 Abdulla Saif Alsuboosi, n. 2 above, p. 181.  
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UAE courts to make a choice between them, to be exercised in the light of UAE values, needs 
and policies. 
 Another important question which may arise concerns the role of the general principles of 
private international law. The first role of these principles is to establish conflict rules from other 
sources to supplement the UAE Civil Code where it does not contain any conflict rule on the 
matter in question. Such a role is consistent with the explicit text of Article 23. A second, and 
similar, role is to assist where the UAE Code is ambiguous, and needs interpretation to resolve 
the ambiguity. For example, as to the time at which the parties to a contract may conclude their 
agreement as to the law governing the contract. Much more controversial is the argument, which 
some have advanced, that Article 23 may be treated as an escape device granting the court a 
basis for disregarding the conflict rules explicitly provided in the Civil Code and instead 
applying a conflict rule drawn from other legislation.
23
 A further possible role, for which some 
have argued, is that the court may rely on Article 23 to restrict the operation of an existing rule. 
For example, although Article 19(1) permits the court to infer an implied choice from the 
circumstances, without any explicit requirement of reasonable certainty or clear demonstration,  
some argue in favour of relying on Article 23 to insist that an implied choice should be clearly or 
certainly demonstrated by reference to the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the 
case.
24
 
 In addition, some practical questions arise about the feasibility and effectiveness of these 
roles for Article 23. First, some facts should be considered. There is rare judicial precedent in the 
UAE courts relating to Article 23 of the Civil Code. Moreover, in the UAE the burden of 
                                      
23
 Abdulla Saif Alsuboosi, n. 2 above, p. 181. 
24
 Okasha Mohamad Abd Al-aal, n. 5 above, p. 710. 
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invoking foreign law and proving its content rests on the litigants (plaintiff and defendant). Thus, 
foreign law is ignored unless one or both of the parties requests the court to apply a conflict rule, 
and that party must then prove the content of the applicable law. This practice has been 
established in the UAE courts by many decisions. For instance, the federal Supreme Court
25
 and 
the Dubai Court of Cassation
26
 have decided in numerous cases that a litigant who asks for the 
application of a foreign law must prove and provide an official translation of it. 
 Moreover, it seems arguable that the establishment of a general principle of private 
international law, with a view to its adoption in the UAE under Article 23, will also be held to be 
subject to a requirement that a plaintiff or defendant must prove that the relevant conflict rule has 
been adopted by various legal systems, national courts in numerous countries or international 
courts or arbitrations, or has been recognised by an international treaty or similar measure. If so, 
this burden will severely limit the practical effect of Article 23.  
 To return to the discussion of the legitimate scope and effect of Article 23, it seems  that 
where there are no existing conflict rules in the Civil Code which are applicable to the issue or 
matter, the UAE court may utilize Article 23 to recognise and apply a general principle of private 
international law. On the other hand, if there is an existing conflict rule in the Civil Code, it is 
not easy to consider Article 23 a legitimate escape device from the rule enacted, as the 
fundamental rule on interpretation of legal texts is that where the text is clear, the court should 
apply it without departing from its clear and explicit meaning. Consequently, the application of 
Article 23 in the case of existing conflict rules should be severely limited by reference to the 
                                      
25
 See the federal Supreme Court decisions in Case 257/2001, 28 March 2001.  
26
 See the Dubai Court of Cassation decisions in Case 258/1999, 2 October 1999; and Case. 17/2001, 10 
March 2001.  
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purpose of the legislation; the economic, social, political or moral interests that the legislature 
intends to achieve from the legal text of an Article.  
 The best example of the application of Article 23 is in the area of the law applicable to 
contracts. Although the text of Article 19 is clear and explicit, Article 23 may also be applied for 
several reasons. Firstly, the Explanatory Memorandum of the Civil Code points out the legislator 
chose an elastic formulation to allow the court some scope for creativity, as well as to enable the 
use of recent developments in jurisprudence.
27
 Secondly, the legislator has not directly regulated 
by specific rules the choice of law for certain contracts which have a special nature. 
Consequently, the default rules in Article 19(1) may be inflexible and unsuitable for contracts 
such as bills of exchange and promissory notes, where the document is intended to embody a 
precise obligation in a special way.
28
 In this case, the text of Article 19, as regards the default 
rules, may be regarded as a defective text that must be interpreted in a manner that eliminates 
this defect by using conflict rules drawn from other legal systems as indicating general principles 
of private international law. 
 Another situation in which recourse may usefully be had to Article 23 in relation to 
contracts is where the parties do not reside in the same country
29
 and there is difficulty in 
determining the place of contracting; particularly where the parties conclude a contract by 
communications across borders, especially as there are various rules to resolve this question 
                                      
27
 UAE Ministry of Justice, Explanatory Memorandum of the Federal Act No 5 of 1985 (Civil Transactions 
Act), p. 29.  
28
 Okasha Mohamad Abd Al-aal, n. 5 above, p 742.  
29 Foad Mohammed Alodaini (يلودلا عباطلا تاذ نييراجتلا ءاطسولا دوقع ىلع قيبطتلا ةبجاولا ةينوناقلا دعاوقلا ديدحت) 
Determination of the Legal Rules Applicable to International Commercial Agency (PhD thesis, Cairo University, 
2012), p. 71.  
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according to different legal systems.
30
 Moreover, one might argue that the reference in Article 19 
to the place of contracting is impliedly limited to cases where the entire negotiations took place 
unambiguously in a single country, and that otherwise there is no single place of contracting to 
which the reference by Article 19 applies. In other words, in some situations the court cannot 
apply the default rules in Article 19 of the Civil Code because the parties do not have a common 
residence and the place of contracting cannot be determined. This means that there is a gap or 
lacuna in the enacted conflict rules. Consequently, Article 23 will apply because there are no 
other relevant provisions of the conflict of laws in the UAE Code. But it is only where, by means 
of a legitimate process of interpretation, that such a gap or lacuna can be established, that it is 
legitimate to apply Article 23 so as to override an otherwise apparently clear and complete 
enactment in this way.   
 A remaining question in relation to Article 23 arises where examination of the conflict 
rules applied in other countries reveals a dichotomy in international practice. For example, for 
the same issue, some countries may refer to the law of the nationality of the relevant person, 
while other countries refer to the law of his habitual residence. In this case, the UAE court 
should decide which rule should apply to the issue in question in the light of the interests of the 
state, the parties and (where relevant) the weaker party. The general objectives and purposes of 
the UAE legislation should also be considered. In other words, the UAE court should choose the 
general principle which it considers more useful, in the light of UAE values, needs and policies. 
                                      
30
 Walter Breslauer, Agency in Private International Law, (1938) 50 Juridical Review, p. 284. See also 
Hisham Sadek, ةيلودلا ةراجتلا دوقع ىلع قيبطتلا بجاولا نوناقلا()  The Applicable Law on the International Trade Contract 
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But once a UAE court has made its choice, its decision should serve as a precedent in other cases 
dealing with the same issue. 
 
Renvoi 
 In any legal system, there are two kinds of rule: substantive rules and choice of law rules. 
When the forum’s choice of law rules point to the application of a foreign law, the question 
arises as to whether the court should simply apply the internal substantive rules of that foreign 
law, or whether it should also take into account the conflict rules of the said foreign law. In the 
latter case it will be utilizing some version of a doctrine of renvoi. In other words, the question of 
renvoi will arise when the forum’s conflict rule refers to a foreign law; but the conflict rules of 
that law refer the question to the forum law or to the law of a third country.
31
 
 With regard to the problem of renvoi, any legal system may resolve this question in one 
of three possible ways. In the first approach, the court may simply apply the domestic 
substantive rules of the foreign law and ignore its conflict rules. This is called the internal law 
theory. In other words, whenever the forum choice of law refers to the law of a particular 
country, the court simply considers the internal law of that country, regardless of the private 
international law of that country.
32
 
 Single (or partial) renvoi is another approach that may be followed by the forum. This 
approach occurs when the lex fori refers to the law of a particular country, and the court takes 
account of the conflict rule of that country, which either refers back to the lex fori, or onwards to 
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 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 18 above, p. 79.  
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 Abdulla Saif Alsuboosi, n. 2 above, p. 232; see also  James Fawcett, Janeen M. Carruthers and  Peter 
North, Private International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 14th edition, 2008), p. 59. 
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the law of a third country. On this approach the forum accepts the remission to the lex fori, and 
applies its own internal law; or it follows the transmission to the law of third country, and applies 
the internal law of the third country.
33
 
 Double (or total) renvoi is also an approach that may be adopted. In this method, the 
forum will resolve the question of renvoi by endeavouring to decide the issue in the same manner 
as would be followed by the courts of the foreign country whose law is referred to by the forum’s 
conflict rule. For instance, if we suppose that the UAE adopted this approach, and the UAE 
conflict rule referred the issue to Indian law, the UAE court would try to resolve the renvoi so as 
to apply whatever  internal law would be applied to the issue by the Indian courts if they had 
been seised of the dispute. Thus, if the Indian conflict rule referred to UAE law and was 
construed as referring to UAE domestic law, the UAE Court would also apply UAE internal law. 
However, if the Indian conflict rule referred to the UAE conflict rule and accepted the reference 
by the UAE conflict rule to Indian law, the UAE court would apply Indian domestic law.
34
 
 
The situation in the UAE 
 In the UAE, the legislator has regulated the problem of renvoi by Article 26 of the Civil 
Code, which provides that:  
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 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 18 above, p. 80. See also Abdulla Saif Alsuboosi, n. 2 above, p. 232; and 
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Publishing, Copenhagen, 1st edition, 2009), p. 22. 
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“(1) If it is established that a foreign law is to be applied, only the domestic provisions 
thereof shall be applied, to the exclusion of those provisions relating to private 
international law.  
(2) Provided that the law of the United Arab Emirates shall apply if international law 
relating to applicable law provides that United Arab Emirates law shall apply.” 
 According to this Article, it is clear the UAE legislation regarding renvoi has adopted a 
general principle and an exception. The general principle is the rejection of renvoi and the 
application of the domestic provisions of the applicable law. Hence, a party who invokes the 
application of foreign law should prove the substantive rule of the applicable foreign law. The 
exception is that if the applicable law refers back to the lex fori, the UAE court will accept the 
renvoi and apply the domestic provisions of UAE law. Nonetheless, a party relying on Article 
26(2) to override Article 26(1) must prove the foreign conflict rule referring to UAE law.  
 
Evaluating the UAE approach 
 Scholars are divided with respect to the UAE approach to renvoi into two groups. The 
first group is opposed to the admission of renvoi. Consequently, they support the approach 
adopted by Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which rejects renvoi and applies the domestic 
provisions of the applicable law. However, they argue against the exception in Article 26(2), 
which admits partial renvoi to the lex fori, on the grounds that this is contrary to the principle of 
legal consistency and the standardisation of solutions between countries in respect of the 
relationship in question. Standardization would only be achieved if some countries adopted the 
doctrine of renvoi and others rejected it. Moreover in some cases the renvoi may be contrary to 
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the parties’ expectations, and in other cases it is worthless, particularly when the UAE conflict 
rules are similar to the conflict rules in other countries.
35
 
 The second group, who support the use of renvoi, argue that the application or rejection 
of the renvoi (partial and total) should be based on the purpose and object of the relevant conflict 
rule; thus, the decision should consider each case individually. They would prefer the UAE legal 
system to adopt the whole renvoi doctrine not by enactment, but by leaving to the court the 
decision to accept or reject the renvoi in each case. Therefore, they justify the UAE law approach 
in Article 26(2) by arguing that this approach will achieve the national interests of the country, 
and that the application of the lex fori makes the court’s task much easier.36 
 Through reading and analysing the last-mentioned approach, which supports the use of 
renvoi, several conclusions can be drawn. First, this approach would grant the court great 
discretion. Secondly, this approach would apply renvoi in all cases except those wherein a 
difficulty arises, such as when the lex fori refers to the law of country (A) and this law refers to 
the law of country (B), which refers to the law of country (C), and this law refers to the law of 
(A) or (B); one would then reject the use of renvoi and apply the internal law of country (A). It 
also rejects the use of renvoi if lex fori refers to the law of country (A), which refers to the law of 
country (B), which accepts the application of its domestic provisions, but these are contrary to 
the public policy of the forum; then the internal law of country (A) will be applied.  
 Thirdly, that group of commentators would also use renvoi as an escape device for any 
conflict rules which they consider inappropriate to the matter in question. For example, suppose 
that students from the UAE travel to New York, and all the students have UAE nationality and 
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 Ahmad Alhawary, n. 12 above, p. 360.  
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  Okasha Mohamad Abd Al-aal, n. 5 above, p. 136.  
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normally reside there. During the visit to New York, one student injures another student. In this 
case, according to Article 20(1)
37
 of the UAE Civil Code, the court will apply New York law, 
which is not appropriate in this case. However, a more acceptable result could be reached if we 
suppose New York law refers to UAE law as that of the common domicile or residence (as is 
indeed likely in most constituent states of the USA).
38
 
 Nonetheless, it seems to the current writer that using renvoi as an escape device is 
inconsistent with the legislative purpose and objectives of the conflict rules established by the 
UAE legislator. Furthermore, these commentators also advocate the principle that the court 
should itself, of its own motion, apply the relevant conflict rules and ascertain the content of the 
relevant foreign law. But at present, in the UAE, it is for the parties to request the application of 
conflict rules and to provide proof of the foreign law, including as regards the invoking and 
proof of the domestic provisions alone of the applicable law or also of its conflict rules. Thus, the 
current situation of the UAE regarding proving the applicable law makes it difficult to accept this 
approach. 
 
Contractual obligations and renvoi  
 The majority of scholars argue renvoi should not be applied in the area of contractual 
obligations. Consequently, whether the parties select the law governing their contract or this law 
is determined by the default rules, it is the substantive rules of this law which will be applied, 
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and not its conflict rules.
39
 Accordingly, at EU level, the Rome I Regulation excludes the 
application of renvoi within its scope by virtue of Article 20;
40
 and similar provision is made by 
the Rome II Regulation in respect of torts and restitutionary obligations. Renvoi is also excluded 
in relation to contracts by the traditional laws of many European countries; including England 
and France. It is also excluded for many matters by various Hague Conventions.   
 Others argue that whenever the parties choose expressly or impliedly the applicable law, 
the substantive rules of this law should be applied. But if the applicable law is determined by 
default rules, consideration should be given to the nature of these default rules. Thus, if the 
legislation adopts a rigid approach (as in the UAE legal system), the court should admit renvoi, 
as this rigid approach is not appropriate to certain contracts. Consequently, renvoi is accepted as 
an escape device or correction method that achieves the parties’ interests. In contrast, if the 
default rules utilise a flexible approach, as by referring to characteristic performance and closest 
connection, renvoi should not be applied.
41
 
 It can be concluded that whatever the merits, article 26 does not explicitly exclude 
contractual claims. The most conventional view must be that article 26 applies to such claims, 
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and accordingly that an internal law approach is operative, with an exception for remissive 
partial renvoi to UAE law. This appears to be the case whether the proper law is determined by 
reference to party choice or to the default rules. 
 
Public policy 
 The UAE legislation, like many others, recognises the principle of public policy in the 
context of choice of law rules. This is by virtue of Article 27 of the UAE Civil Code, which 
provides:  
“It shall not be permissible to apply the provisions of a law specified by the preceding 
Articles if such provisions are contrary to Islamic Shari'a, public order, or morals in the 
State of the United Arab Emirates.”  
 Consequently, the court should refuse to apply the normally applicable law if such an 
application would infringe on the basic concepts and fundamental values underpinning the UAE 
community. In other words, the applicable law will be set aside if its provisions are manifestly 
incompatible with the UAE public policy or Islamic Shari’a. 
 
The concept of public policy in the UAE 
 The UAE legal system does not have a definition of public policy and does not list the 
issues involved in public policy. Consequently, some argue that public policy is related to the 
basic concepts and fundamental values underpinning the UAE community; however, regarding 
private international law, the issues that fall within the scope of public policy cannot be listed, as 
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the concept of public policy is not constant and changes from time to other. The court determines 
whether the question is within the scope of public policy.
42
 
 The  explanatory memorandum of the UAE Civil Code provides that the concept of 
public policy in internal law differs from the notion relevant when the relation contains a foreign 
element under private international law.
43
 
 The UAE legislation, differing from the corresponding Egyptian legislation, has added 
the terms “Islamic Shari’a” to Article 27; thus, the question arises regarding the notion of Islamic 
Shari’a in relation to public policy. 
 Some argue the concept of Islamic Shari’a law falls naturally under the concept of public 
policy as part of it; consequently, specific reference to Islamic Shari’a is not needed. It has also 
been argued that not all Islamic Shari’a rules should be considered to fall within public policy, 
but only the Islamic Shari’a rules which have been included in the statutory codification should 
be considered to do so.
44
 On the other hand, although the protection of the fundamental rules of 
Islamic Shari’a law might have been accomplished under the general reference to public policy, 
the specific reference to Islamic Shari’a confirms that the provisions of the Civil Code are 
compatible with Islamic Shari’a.  
 Furthermore, it seems to the present writer that the interpretation of Islamic Shari’a in 
Article 27, as limited to the Shari'a rules that have been codified, is unacceptable. Article 1 of the 
Civil Code states in the absence of any provision of the Civil Code, the court should apply the 
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provisions of Shari’a.45 Article 2(3)of the UAE Personal Status Code also states in the absence of 
any provision in this Act, the court should apply the provisions of one of the Sunni schools of 
Shari’a law, selected in a specified order.46 Consequently, according to these two Articles, the 
provisions of Shari’a may be applied despite not being codified; and in such cases there is no 
reason why they should not be capable of being considered public policy within Article 27 of the 
Civil Code.  
 Moreover, the codification of some Shari’a provisions is not within the scope of public 
policy. The best example of that is Article 1(2) of the UAE Personal Status Code, which states 
this measure has codified some Shari’a provisions. However, not all of its provisions are 
considered as universally applicable public policy, as this Act will not apply to non-Muslim 
citizens who belong to a group for which special provisions have been adopted. It also does not 
apply to non-citizens if they ask for the application of their own law.
47
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 Article 1 of Civil Code provides: "Legislative provisions shall be applicable to all matters dealt therein, in 
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 In other words Shari’a law cannot be confined to rules which have been specifically 
codified, but must extend to rules which apply in the UAE under general enactments, such as 
Article 1 of the Civil Code. But the reference to Shari’a law must be confined to rules which, in 
one way or another, form part of UAE internal law. 
 Some argue that not all of Shari’a law constitutes public policy. Some its provisions 
establish a public policy applicable only to Muslims, while other provisions establish a public 
policy extending both to Muslims and non-Muslims.
48
 It can also be argued that the reference to 
Shari’a law in Article 27 can be limited in various other ways. Some rules may leave to the 
legislator a choice of ways of achieving a result compatible with Islamic requirements, and in 
such cases any rule which could be reasonably considered compatible with those aims could then 
be regarded as acceptable. 
 Furthermore, it should be noted that if the foreign law is based on Shari'a law, but it 
adopts a different approach to Shari'a,
49
 it will not necessarily be incompatible with UAE public 
policy; for instance, if Qatar adopts Abi Hanifa’s doctrine, which is different from Malik's 
doctrine adopted by UAE law, then the Qatar law is not incompatible with UAE law since 
Hanifa's doctrine is not fundamentally different from Malik's doctrine. Nevertheless if the 
foreign law is based on the doctrine of a group of Islam other than the Sunni group adopted by 
UAE law, the court will have to decide whether the foreign rules in question are fundamentally 
incompatible with the UAE version of Shari'a law; and if so, they will be set aside. However, 
rules adopted by a Shia version of Islamic law are not necessarily fundamentally incompatible 
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with the UAE version of Shari'a law; for instance,  the UAE Supreme Court has decided that the 
Kuwaiti law based on Shia doctrine should apply to govern a claim between Kuwaiti parents in 
accordance with Article 16 of the UAE Civil Code (on the protection of children).
50
  
 
The results of the application of public policy 
 The application of the public policy provision has two main results: a negative result, 
which is the exclusion of the relevant substantive rules of the normally applicable law. This 
exclusion is limited to the provision that is contrary to public policy. Thus, the court will apply 
other provisions of the applicable law that are consistent with public policy. In other words, the 
court will not exclude the entire applicable law, but only the part which is inconsistent with the 
public policy of the lex fori. Nonetheless, if the unacceptable element the applicable law cannot 
be severed from other parts of that law, a merely partial elimination will not be possible.
51
 
 The exclusion of the whole or part of the applicable law will lead initially to a legislative 
vacuum, which needs to be filled. The best method of filling this gap is to apply the lex fori, 
since the elimination of the foreign law is a result of opposition to the forum’s public policy; 
consequently, the protection of that public policy will be accomplished through the application of 
the lex fori, instead of the excluded foreign law.
52
 
 
 
 
                                      
50
  See the federal Supreme Court decision in Case 254/25, 29 Janunary 2005.   
51
 Okasha Mohamad Abd Al-aal, n. 5 above, p.402. See also Abdulla Saif Alsuboosi, n. 2 above, p. 259.  
52
 Abdulla Saif Alsuboosi, n. 2 above, p. 259.   
76 
 
Proof  of Foreign Law 
 Where a relationship involves a foreign element and the conflict rules in the lex fori call 
for the application of foreign law, two questions about pleading and proving the foreign law must 
be addressed. The first question is whether the court will apply the forum’s conflict rules of its 
own motion, or the parties must ask the court to apply those rules. The second question is 
whether the court will seek to determine the provisions of the foreign law and apply them, or the 
parties must prove the content of the foreign law. 
 The UAE Civil Code does not contain any provisions to answer these questions. But 
Article 1(2) of the federal Act No. 28/2005 on Personal Status (Family Law) provides that: 
"The provisions of this Law shall apply to citizens of the United Arab Emirates State 
unless non-Muslims among them have special provisions applicable to their community or 
confession. They shall equally apply to non-citizens unless one of them asks for the 
application of his law". 
 
The Practice of the UAE Courts  
 The UAE Supreme Court judgments have established that foreign law must be treated as 
a question of fact; consequently, the parties must ask the court to apply it and they should also 
prove its content. The court has further insisted that the foreign law should be translated into 
Arabic. Otherwise, the court will apply its own law.
 53
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 Although the Dubai Court of Cassation adopted this approach in numerous earlier cases, 
at one stage it changed its approach and adopted another principle, that the conflict rules in 
respect to personal status are related to public policy. Consequently, the court should apply the 
forum’s conflict rules, whether or not the parties ask for the application of those rules. In 
addition, in the application of the foreign law, the court must investigate that law’s provisions.54 
Thus, the Dubai Court of Cassation considered foreign law to be a question of law not fact.  
 In response, the UAE legislator enacted Federal Act No. 28/2005 on Personal Status Act 
(Family Act), which in Article 1(2) provides that the parties should ask the court to apply the 
foreign law; otherwise the court will apply the lex fori. Furthermore, the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the UAE Personal Status Act explains that, in the case of non-citizen personal 
status, UAE law will be applied unless the parties ask the court to apply their foreign law and 
prove it, since foreign law is a question of fact and whoever asks to apply it should also prove it. 
Consequently, the Dubai Court of Cassation has reverted to applying the old principle, that the 
parties should ask for the application of the foreign law and prove its content.
55
 
 
Commentators 
 Most of the explanations for the UAE situation were offered before the Personal Statues 
Act was enacted, and all of the commentators criticised the UAE Supreme Court’s approach by 
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arguing that foreign law is a question of law. Thus, the court should apply the forum’s conflict 
rule whether or not the parties ask for its application.  Moreover, the court must seek to ascertain 
the provisions of the foreign law, with the possibility of requesting assistance from the parties.
56
  
The commentators support their view by arguing that the objective of the conflict rules in the law 
of forum is to achieve harmony between different legal systems and to choose the most 
appropriate law. In addition, the conflict rules are compulsory; consequently, the court should 
apply them automatically. Moreover, the application of the forum’s conflict rules and the 
application of the law to which they refer should adhere to the aims that the legislators sought to 
accomplish, which accord with the legislative policy.
57
 
 Although the legislator enacted the Personal Status Act, some have criticised it since 
Article 1(2) adopted the optional approach to the application of conflict rules.
58
 
 
Evaluation of the UAE situation 
 In order to evaluate the UAE situation it is important to consider the following points. In 
principle, it is inaccurate to consider foreign law to be a question of fact, since the foreign law 
has the character of law, even where it is applied by a court of another country. However, the 
procedural treatment of the foreign law differs from that of the lex fori. Since the Supreme Court 
monitors the correct interpretation and application of law, if foreign law is regarded as a question 
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of fact it will not be subjected to the supervision of the Supreme Court. On the other hand, proof 
of the foreign law by the parties does not make it a question of fact, since in internal law the 
parties must sometimes prove a custom, and the custom is a question of law. 
 In regards to pleading and proving foreign law, it is obvious that when the UAE Supreme 
Court was established it was influenced by the Egyptian Supreme Court and other Arabian 
courts, which consider foreign law as a question of fact. Moreover, most of the judges were from 
Egypt and other Arab countries. Nevertheless, at one point the Dubai Court of Cassation adopted 
a different approach since it was influenced by input from some scholars. However, it reverted to 
its previous approach after the enactment the Personal Status Act.  
 The committee that prepared a draft of the Personal Status Act included judges from the 
UAE Supreme Court and some Shari'a law scholars, but it did not include any private 
international law jurists or scholars; hence, this Act was influenced by the Supreme Court’s 
approach. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Personal Status Act only provided that the 
parties should ask for the application of their foreign law, without any mention of the question of 
proof of its content., It is only the Explanatory Memorandum which insists that the parties should 
prove the foreign law since foreign law is a question of fact; and the Explanatory Memorandum 
is not binding on the courts. 
 All the commentators who have criticised the UAE federal Court’s approach are from 
Egypt and are influenced by the French scholars. 
 The courts in the UAE could face some difficulty in respect of the burden of proof of 
foreign law, since there are people of more than 200 nationalities who are resident in the UAE. 
Thus, it would be impracticable to expect the court to know or investigate all relevant foreign 
laws. On the other hand, a requirement that the parties must bear the burden of proof of the 
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foreign law and of translating that law into Arabic may be impossible to fulfil in some cases. For 
example, if an impecunious wife has a maintenance claim against her husband and the court asks 
her to prove the applicable foreign law (such as German law) and translate it into Arabic, she 
cannot do so since that task would be extremely expensive for her. Thus, asking her to do so 
represents an injustice, since justice requires taking an individual’s personal condition into 
account, particularly the condition of the weaker party. 
 The wording in the Articles of the Civil Code, laying down conflict rules, indicates that 
the rules are compulsory and not optional; consequently, the court should apply the conflict rules 
of its own motion.
59
 
 Moreover, it can be argued that the court should distinguish between the question of 
applying the conflict rules and the question of who bears the burden of proof of the foreign law. 
In regard to the application of the conflict rules, the court should inform the parties that there is a 
conflict rule which it is willing to apply a foreign law, since the forum’s conflict rules are 
compulsory. In many cases the parties then have a right to choose between the application of the 
conflict rules and the substantive rules of the lex fori, since, the parties' right to choose which 
law governs their relationship is generally recognised in private international law, at least 
regarding  ordinary obligations, such as in contracts or torts. Nevertheless, this right is restricted 
by certain conditions. Firstly, the choice is limited to the application of the lex fori instead of the 
law which is indicated by the conflict rules.
60
  Moreover, with regard to immovables, the court 
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should apply the law of the country in which the immovable is located. Furthermore, the court 
should not apply the substantive rule in the lex fori if that leads to invalidating the form. 
 With regard to the proof of foreign law, it can be argued that the court should investigate 
and determine the content of foreign law and apply it, when the court is easily able to access the 
content of the foreign law. For instance, in the UAE judges can easily know about or research the 
laws of any of the Arab countries, particularly if the decisions of a country’s Supreme Court or a 
country’s laws are available online. Nevertheless, where it is difficult for the court to ascertain 
the foreign law, it may ask the parties to provide proof of the foreign law; and if they fail to do 
so, the court can apply the lex fori. However, the court should indicate the reason for its decision, 
and the decision should be subjected to the supervision of the Supreme Court. 
 With regard to agency relationships, in view of their contractual nature, the parties should 
ask the court to apply the law that they have chosen to govern their relationship; and the parties 
should also prove that law. 
 
Countries with multiple legal systems 
 Some countries have more than one law governing some or all matters, and this may add 
a further level of complication to the operation of private international law. There are two types 
of situation of this kind. The first situation occurs where a federal state, such as the UK or the 
USA, is composed of several territories, and each territory has its own law in respect of the 
matter in question. We may then speak of an inter-territorial conflict. The second situation is 
where a country has different laws on personal status for different groups of people according to 
their religion. For example, the Egyptian legislation provides different rules on personal status 
for Muslims, Christians and Jews. This may be referred to as an inter-personal conflict. Although 
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the conflict of internal laws in respect of personal status issues is largely irrelevant to the current 
thesis, there is an exception in respect of capacity, since the existence of capacity to contract is 
essential to the valid formation of an agency relationship.  
 Both inter-territorial and inter-personal conflicts have been addressed in the UAE by 
Article 25 of the Civil Code which provides:  
"Where, in the provisions of the preceding Articles the governing law is that of a specific 
country that has a multi-legislative system, the domestic law in this country shall indicate 
which law in this system should be applied. In the absence of such indication, the 
prevailing law or the domicile, as the case may be, shall apply." 
 Thus, the UAE legislature distinguishes between two situations. The first situation occurs 
when the law applicable to the matter in question has a provision to solve an internal conflict of 
law. In this case, the court will apply this law in determining which law to apply. The second 
situation happens when the applicable law does not contain any provisions to solve this issue. In 
this situation, a distinction can be drawn between inter-territorial and inter-personal conflicts.
61
 
In particular, the reference to the law of domicile can be applied in inter-territorial conflicts, but 
is meaningless in the case of inter-personal conflicts.  
 Although the wording of Article 25 may lack perfect clarity, it seems to present writer 
that Article 25 will rarely apply when the choice of law rule laid down by the UAE Civil Code is 
based on a territorial connection (such as the residence of a person, the place where a contract 
was concluded, or the place where the events constituting a tort occurred), since each territory 
having its own legal system should be treated as a country in determining the applicable law. For 
                                      
61
 Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal, n. 5 above, p. 198. See also Awad Allah Al-Saiid, n. 8 above, p. 104. 
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instance, in the case of tort liability, Article 20(1) of the Civil Code
62
 refers to the law of the 
country where the event giving rise to the obligation took place. Thus, if the road accident 
involved in the case happened in California, Article 20(1) points directly to Californian law, and 
there is no need to consider Article 25 or the law of any other territory within the United States. 
In contrast, Article 25 will have significant operation where the UAE choice of law rule refers to 
the law of the nationality of a person involved. 
 
Inter-territorial conflicts 
 Article 25 may apply to an inter-territorial conflict in cases where the UAE conflict rule 
refers an issue (such as an individual’s capacity to contract, under Article 11(1) of the Civil 
Code) to the law of a person’s nationality, and the person in question is a national of a federal 
state (such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada or Australia). 
 Some argue that when the applicable law under the UAE conflict rules is that of a federal 
state, and it does not contain any provision to determine the inter-territorial conflict, the UAE 
court will apply the law of residence. Nevertheless, commentators
63
 have raised an issue about 
the situation where the party has his residence in a country other than the federal state. Some 
writers argue that the law of the country in which the party has his residence should apply not to 
determine which law in the federal state should apply, but that the law of the residence should 
itself apply in governing the matter in question.
64
 However, this view is open to criticism. First, 
Article 25 is designed to resolve conflicts between laws of different territories within the same 
                                      
62
 Article 20(1) provides: "Non-contractual obligations shall be governed by the law of the state in which the 
event giving rise to the obligation took place." 
63
 Ahmad Abdul Karim Salama, n. 56 above, p. 124. See also Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal, n. 5 above, p. 
197; and Awad Allah Al-Saiid, n. 8 above, p. 103. 
64
 Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal, n. 5 above, p. 198.  See also Awad Allah Al-Saiid, n. 8 above, p. 104. 
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state, where the UAE conflict rule refers to the law of that state, not to enable application of the 
law of third country, which has no relevance under the conflict rule of lex fori. Moreover, the 
explanatory memorandum of the UAE Civil Code explains that under Article 25 the applicable 
law does not give up its jurisdiction to other laws, in contrast to what may happen under renvoi.
65
 
 Others argue that in such cases the court should apply the law of the territory that has the 
closest connection with the matter in question.
66
 This argument relies on the reference to general 
principles of private international made by Article 23 of the UAE Civil Code, and on the relevant 
provisions of numerous international instruments, including the Hague Agency Convention 
(1978) and the Rome I Regulation.
67
 Furthermore, this provision is consistent with the purpose of 
the UAE legislature in regulating the conflict rule.  
 Nevertheless, if the matter in question is an individual’s capacity to contract, when the 
party is a national of a federal state and has his residence in a country other than that of his 
nationality, and the applicable law does not contain any provision to determine its territory 
whose law should apply, Article 25 directs the UAE court to the “prevailing law”. This appears 
to mean the law which is dominant in the relevant state. Thus, in the UK the prevailing law is 
English, since about 90% of the population reside in England. It may be more difficult to identify 
the “prevailing law” in the United States. If the court cannot determine the prevailing law, it 
should apply an internal law of the forum pursuant to Article 28 of the Civil Code, which 
provides that "The law of the United Arab Emirates shall be applied if it is impossible to prove 
the existence of an applicable law or to determine its effect."   
 
                                      
65
 The explanatory memorandum, n. 27 above, p. 33. 
66
 Ahmad Abdul Karim Salama, n. 56 above, p. 124. 
67
 See Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
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Inter-personal conflicts  
 In regard to personal status, where the forum conflict rule points to the law of a country 
that has several laws for personal status, Article 25 of the Civil Code directs the court to apply 
the applicable law in determining which of its personal status laws should apply. For instance, if 
the country in question has enacted different legislation on personal status for persons of 
different religions, so as to apply to Muslims a law based on shari'a law and to Christians a law 
based on Christianity, the applicable law provides the criterion (religion) to determine which of 
its laws should apply.  
 Other question may arise when there are two parties involved, and each of them has a 
different religion (personal status). Since the reference in Article 25 of the Civil Code to 
domicile is meaningless in this situation, the court will apply the “prevailing law”.68 This seems 
to mean the dominant law in the relevant country. For instance, in India Hinduism is the 
dominant religion, because it has the greatest number of adherents. 
 It seems to present writer that this solution may cause some difficulties, since this law 
may lead to strange results or may not be accepted by the parties. For example, the prevailing 
law may be a personal status law based on Christianity, and one party may be Muslim and other 
party Jewish. In the UAE, if one party is a Muslim, the UAE court will not accept this solution 
and will apply the law based on shari'a law, since this solution is inconsistent with UAE public 
policy. It may be difficult for the court when no party involved is Muslim. In this case, it seems 
that the court should select the personal status law by reference to the party to whom the UAE 
conflict rule in the Civil Code gives priority in relation to the particular status issue. For instance, 
                                      
68
  Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal, n. 5 above, p. 193. 
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as regards the effects of marriage, Article 13 of the Civil Code gives preference to the husband;
69
 
As regards maintenance obligation, Article 15 prefers the person that has the obligation;
70
as 
regards the protection of incompetent persons, Article 16 prefers the person requiring 
protection;
71
 as regards inheritance, Article 17(1) prefers the deceased; 
72
 and as regards wills, 
Article 17(3) prefers the person who makes the testamentary disposition.
73
 
 
Contractual obligations (including agency relationships) 
 Article 19(1) of the Civil Code will rarely give rise to any particular problems in 
connection with inter-territorial conflicts. If the parties expressly or impliedly choose the law of 
a territory within a federal state, such as a choice of New York law, the court will apply the law 
of this territory.
74
 Similarly, where there is no express or implied choice by the parties, the 
default rules referring to the residence of the parties or the place of contracting can be applied on 
the basis that each territory within a federal state is a separate country. 
                                      
69
 Article 13 (1) of the Civil Code provides: "The law of the state of which the husband is a national at the 
time the marriage is contracted shall apply to the effects on personal status, and the effects with regard to property, 
resulting from the contracting of the marriage." 
70
 Article 15 provides: "Obligations to support relatives shall be governed by the law of the person having 
such obligation." 
71
 Article 16 provides: "Substantive matters relating to guardianship, trusteeship and maintenance and other 
systems laid down for the protection of persons having no competence or of defective competence or of absent 
persons shall be governed by the law of the person requiring to be protected." 
72
 Article 17(1) provides: "Inheritance shall be governed by the law of the deceased at the time of his death." 
73
 Article 17(3) provides: "The substantive provisions governing testamentary dispositions and other 
dispositions taking effect after death shall be governed by the law of the state of which the person making such 
dispositions is a national at the time of his death." 
74
 Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal, n. 5 above, p. 191.  
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 However it seems possible that ill-advised parties may on occasion expressly choice a 
federal law without choosing the law of a particular territory, and it seems that in this situation 
the court should apply Article 25 of the Civil Code to identify the law of the territory that should 
apply. In such cases it is possible that the chosen law does not contain any provisions to solve 
this problem; for instance, where the parties choose US law, since the choice of law rules are not 
harmonised in the United States. It seems that under Articles 19 and 25 the UAE court will then 
apply the law of the territory within the federal state in which both parties have their residence. If 
one party is resident within the federal state and other in a different country, a sensible solution 
would be to interpret the choice of the federal law as a choice of the law of the territory within 
the federal state in which one party is resident. However, if the parties have their residences in 
different territories of the federal state or neither is resident therein, it seems that the court should 
treat the choice of law clause as void for meaninglessness, and proceed to apply the default rules 
specified by Article 19 (referring to the common residence or the place of contracting), or 
determine the applicable law under general principles in accordance with Article 23 (and thus 
perhaps refer in the case of agency contracts to the agent's habitual residence). Under the default 
rules each territory will be treated as a separate country.  
 
Conclusion  
 The aim of this chapter was to shed light on some important provisions of UAE private 
international law, which are regulated in the Civil Transactions Act (the Civil Code). 
 The UAE legislator regulates questions related to choice of law in the Civil Code, 
particularly in Articles 10 to 28. Nevertheless, it would be better if the UAE legislator regulated 
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all questions related to private international law, such as rules on conflict of laws or jurisdictions, 
in a separate enactment (a Code on Private International Law).  
 Classification of issues is important in the operation of the conflict rules to determine the 
applicable law. The UAE legislation has adopted Bartin’s theory by virtue of Article 10 of the 
Civil Code; therefore, the lex fori will be applied to classify the relationship or legal issue in 
question. Furthermore, Article 18(2) recognises the exception to Bartin’s theory; consequently, 
the court will apply the lex situs to classify the nature of the property as immovable or movable.   
 Regarding contractual obligations, Article 19(1) has granted the contracting parties the 
freedom to select expressly or impliedly the applicable law to the form and the substance of their 
contractual obligations; however, if there is no such choice, the court will apply the default rules, 
which make applicable the law of the parties’ common residence or (failing any such common 
residence) the law of the place of contracting. Nonetheless, a contract dealing with immovable 
property will be governed by the lex situs by virtue of Article 19(2), and the parties cannot select 
the law applicable to such a contract.  
 Regarding default rules, it seems that the legislation has adopted rigid criteria to 
determine the applicable law, and these will frequently give rise to difficulty or inconvenience. 
Furthermore, there is no escape clause in favour of the law which has the closest connection with 
the contract. The legislator has also not specified conflict rules to protect weaker parties to 
contracts in which disparity of bargaining power may lead to abuses. Consequently, it seems to 
the present writer it would be better if the legislator amended Article 19(1) by providing for the 
application of modern theories in place of the default rules, as well as by adopting an escape 
clause in favour of the law which has the closest connection with the contract. Furthermore, it 
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would be desirable to provide special rules for certain kinds of contract, such as agency 
contracts, consumer contracts, insurance contracts and employment contracts. 
 The general principles of private international law pursuant to Article 23 of the Civil 
Code have a supplementary role in determining the applicable law where there are no relevant 
conflict rules in the Civil Code, or that rules are unclear or incomplete. Nevertheless there has 
not yet been any application of this provision in the UAE case law. 
 The UAE legislator rejects the renvoi doctrine as a general principle; however, 
exceptionally, it utilizes partial renvoi to the lex fori. Nevertheless, it would be better if the 
legislator added a paragraph to Article 26 to provide that partial renvoi will not apply to 
contractual obligations.  
 The applicable law will be set aside when its provisions are manifestly incompatible with 
the UAE public policy or with Islamic Shari’a as applied in the UAE. It should be mentioned not 
all Islamic Shari’a rules are considered to relate to public policy, so as to fall within Article 27.  
 In view of the absence of any provision in the UAE legislation to regulate the questions 
of pleading and proving foreign law except Article 1(2) of the Federal Act No.28/2005 on 
Personal Status (Family Law), which provides that the parties should ask the court to apply their 
law", the UAE Courts have decided that foreign law is a question of fact; hence, the parties must 
ask the court to apply it and they should also prove its content. In addition, the court has gone 
beyond that by requiring that the foreign law should be translated into Arabic. Nevertheless, the 
application of this principle may lead to an injustice in some cases as we discussed above. It is 
also inaccurate to consider the foreign law to be a question of fact. Thus, it is more appropriate to 
avoid adopting a general rule for all cases in respect of the question of proof of foreign law. The 
court should consider in each individual case whether the court is able to ascertain the content of 
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the relevant foreign law, or whether this would involve excessive difficulty task, so that it must 
call on the parties to prove it. Nevertheless, the court before that should draw the attention of 
parties to the relevant conflict rule and indicate its willingness to apply the appropriate foreign 
law, since the conflict rules in the forum country are compulsory. The parties then have a right to 
choose between the application of the conflict rules and the substantive rules of the lex fori, but 
this right is restricted by certain conditions. 
 With regard to agency relationships (contracts), when the parties have chosen the 
applicable law they  should ask the court to apply the law that they chose and they should  prove 
it.  
 Article 25 of the Civil Code addresses the question of determining the applicable law in 
the case of a country with multiple legal systems. However, it would be useful if the legislature 
indicated more clearly that, where possible in view of the connecting favours used in the UAE 
conflict rules, each territory of a federal state should be treated as a country in determining the 
applicable law. 
 In this chapter and previous chapter we examined the general provisions of the Rome I 
Regulation, the Agency Convention and the UAE legal system in respect of conflict rules. We 
shall proceed to compare them more specifically in regard to choice of law in respect of agency 
relationships. Thus, in the next chapter we will examine conflicts of law in relation to the internal 
relationship between a principal and an agent. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE PRINCIPAL AND THE AGENT 
 
Introduction 
 Agency contracts differ from other contracts because they involve a triangular 
relationship between three parties: a principal, an agent and a contractor. This relationship is 
further divided into an internal relationship between the principal and the agent and two external 
relationships, one being an inter praesentes relationship between the agent and the contractor, 
and the other an inter absentes relationship between the principal and the contractor.  
Nonetheless, some argue that the internal relationship between the principal and the agent is not 
an agency contract, and that agency contracts are limited to the external relationships.
1
 There are 
also many countries, such as Germany, Italy and Sweden, which have limited the concept of 
agency contracts to the external relationships.
2
 Nevertheless, this is a minority approach, and it 
seems proper to regard the relationship between the principal and the agent as an agency 
contract. The Hague Agency Convention treats the relationship between the principal and the 
agent as an agency contract, and regulates the law which governs this relationship in its Chapter 
                                      
1
 See Gamal Moursi Badr, Agency: Unification of Material Law and of Conflict Rules (1985) 184 Académie 
de Droit International, Recueil des Cours, 46. 
2
 See Peter Hay and Wolfram Muller-Freienfels, Agency in the Conflict of Laws and the 1978 Hague 
Convention (1979) 27 American Journal of Comparative Law 37. 
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2. According to the (UK) Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulation 1993, Council 
Directive, the relationship between the principal and the agent is an agency contract. 
 In the UAE, the legislator regulates commercial agency in Part 6 (Articles 197 to 253) of 
the Commercial Code, and deals therein with the relationship between the principal and the 
agent. This means that the relationship is considered an agency contract. Additionally, the 
legislator, when defining the different types of agency in Article 17 (contracts proxy),
3
 Article 
229 (proxy by commission),
4
 and Article 245 (commercial representation),
5
 focuses in these 
definitions on the relationship between the principal and the agent.  
 With respect to the internal relationship, there is an important difference in the 
substantive rules adopted by different legal systems, particularly between those of civilian law 
and those of common law. This difference in substantive law has consequences in private 
international law.  
 With regard to the internal relationship between the principal and the agent, we shall first 
determine the law governing this relationship. Thereafter, we shall examine the scope of this law. 
                                      
3
 Article  217 of the Commercial Code provides: "A contracts proxy is a contract pursuant to which a person 
undertakes to carry on continuously against remuneration, in a specific area of activity, instigation and negotiation in 
order to enter into transactions for the benefit of the principal and in return of a fee. The agent's task may include the 
execution and implementation of transactions in the name of the principal and for his account."  
4
 Article  229 (1) of the Commercial Code provides: "A proxy by commission is a contract pursuant to which 
the agent undertakes to carry out in his own name a legal act for the account of the principal against a commission to 
be received from the principal." 
5
 Article  245 of the Commercial Code provides: "The commercial representation is a contract pursuant to 
which the commercial representative undertakes to enter into transactions in the name and for the account of his 
principal, on a permanent basis and within a specific area."   
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Finally, we will consider the possible impact of mandatory rules and public policy on the 
applicable law. 
 Since the relationship between the principal and the agent should be considered a 
contract, it should be subjected to the same conflict principles as apply to other international 
contracts. The primary principle is that the contracting parties have freedom or autonomy in 
choosing a law to govern their contract. The principle has been accepted in most enactments and 
international conventions and regulations, including (in respect to an agency contract between 
the principal and the agent) the Hague Convention 1978 on the Law Applicable to Agency and 
the Rome I Regulation. The choice of law by parties may be express or implied.   
 The relationship between a principal and an agent plays an important role in the 
marketing of goods and services. Therefore sound rules of conflict of laws are needed to 
facilitate such transactions, so as to enable parties to achieve the cooperation aimed at, and in 
some cases to protect the agent as a weaker party. The conflict rules need to be suitable to 
facilitate the employment of agents abroad, and to enable such agencies to operate effectively in 
the market. The conflict rules also need to ensure that agents are not exploited by foreign 
principals. Consequently, some rules are needed to protect the agent as a weaker party in some 
cases. All these considerations should be borne in mind in the framing of appropriate choice of 
law rules. 
 
Choice of law 
 With respect to private international law, the law governing the internal relationship may 
be determined by the parties by means of an express or implied agreement. However, if the 
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parties do not choose the governing law, the court will apply the default rules to solve the 
conflict question. We will examine these three ways to determine the applicable law.  
 
Express Choice  
 The parties have a right to choose expressly the law applicable to the internal relationship 
between the principal and the agent. This right was recognised by the International Law 
Association in Article 3 of both its 1950 Copenhagen draft and its 1952  Lucerne draft. In 1948, 
the International Law Institute had formed a committee to consider the conflict of laws with 
respect to the commission agency contract. In 1950, the committee established a draft that was 
limited to determining the law applicable to the relationship between a principal and a 
commission agent, and Article 2 of this draft granted the parties a right to choose the law that 
governs their relationship.
6
 Moreover, in the Hague Convention 1978, Article 5 grants the parties 
(the principal and the agent) the right to choose the law that governs their relationship.
7
 
 Although, by Article 1(2)(g),
8
 the Rome I Regulation excludes from its scope the 
question of whether the agent can bind a principal towards a contractor, it is generally accepted 
that the exclusion does not extend to the relationship between the principal and the agent. Thus, 
                                      
6
 Gamal Moursi Badr, n. 1 above, p. 132. 
7
 Article 5 of the Convention stipulates: "The internal law chosen by the principal and the agent shall govern 
the agency relationship between them. This choice must be express or must be such that it may be inferred with 
reasonable certainty from the terms of the agreement between the parties and the circumstances of the case." 
8
 Article 1(2)(g) provides: "The following shall be excluded from the scope of this Regulation: … (g) the 
question whether an agent is able to bind a principal, or an organ to bind a company or other body corporate or 
unincorporated in relation to a third party".  
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the Regulation covers any disputes between them.
9
  Moreover, the EC Commission has 
explained that the relationships between the principal and the agent and between the agent and 
the contractor are covered by the Convention (now replaced by the Rome 1 Regulation).
10
 
Therefore, under Article 3(1) of the Regulation, the parties (principal and agent) may choose 
expressly a law to govern their relationship.
11
 
 In the UAE, Article 19(1) of the Civil Code grants the parties to international contracts 
the right to choose the law that governs their contract. An internal relationship between principal 
and agent is a contract; hence, the principal and the agent may determine the law that is 
applicable to this relationship.
12
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
9
 See Gralf Peter Calliess, Rome Regulation: Commentary on the European Rules  of Conflict of Laws 
(Wolters Kluwer and Business, New York, 2011), p. 50. See also Alexander J. Belohlavek, Rome Convention: Rome 
I Regulation,( Juris, USA, 2010),  p. 561. 
10
 EC Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the  Council on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), COM(2005) 650 final, at p. 7;  [2008] OJ. L177/6.  
11
 Article 3(1) of Rome I Regulation provides: "A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. 
The choice shall be made expressly or ...". 
12
 Article 19(1) of the Civil Code provides: "The form and the substance of contractual obligations shall be 
governed by the law of the state in which the contracting parties are both resident if they are resident in the same 
state, but if they are resident in different states the law of the state in which the contract was concluded shall apply 
unless they agree, or it is apparent from the circumstances that the intention was, that another law should apply." 
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IS A CONNECTION REQUIRED BETWEEN THE CHOSEN LAW AND THE INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP? 
 As regards the parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law, the question may arise as to 
whether the law chosen by the parties must have an objective connection to the internal 
relationship. Some argue that the autonomy of the principal and the agent in determining the 
applicable law should be constrained by a requirement that a connection should exist between the 
applicable law and the internal relationship, or that there should be some other valid reason for 
the choice.
13
 The Spanish delegation in the committee of the Hague Conference argued that the 
agent and the principal should choose a law that is "necessarily related to the surrounding 
circumstances of the transaction".
14
 
 Others argue that the parties have a right to choose a law, irrespective of whether it has a 
connection with the transaction.
15
 From Article 5 of the Hague Agency Convention, it is obvious 
that no kind of connection is required between the chosen law and the internal relationship.
16
 
                                      
13
 Peter Hay and Wolfram Muller-Freienfels, n. 2 above,p. 9. See also Alexey V, Kostromov, International 
Unification of the Law of Agency (Institute of Comparative Law, McGill University, Montreal, 1999), p. 53. 
14
 See H.L.E. Verhagen, Agency in Private International Law: The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Agency (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Netherland, 1995), p. 199.  
15
 See Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, UK, 15th edition, 2012), p. 217. 
See also Michael Bogdan, Concise Introduction to EU Private International Law (European Law Publishing, 
Netherland, 2006), p. 122. 
16
 The Karsten Report explains that "The Commission considered that the parties should be completely free to 
choose whichever law they wished, regardless of the degree of the connection between that law and their 
relationship and irrespective of the parties' motives in making the choice" See See Karsten, I.G.F., Karsten Report: 
Explanatory Report, Actes et documents of the 13
th
 Session of the Hague Conference (hereafter “the Karsten 
Report"), parg. 45, p. 19 et seq.  
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Moreover, it is generally accepted that under Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation no 
connection is required between the law chosen and the parties or the contract.
17
 
 It seems acceptable for many reasons that the principal and the agent should have the 
right to determine expressly the law applicable to an international contract, even if the chosen 
law does not have any other connection with their relationship. A requirement of a connection 
between the law and the contract would be contrary to the parties’ freedom, and could lead to 
uncertainty, since the principal and the agent might choose a particular law to regulate their 
relationship, but other applicable laws might compel one party to take on an obligation greater 
than his expectation. Some add that the parties are granted wide freedom with respect to 
applicable laws, permitting them to achieve a mutually acceptable solution regarding the 
appropriate law to regulate their relationship. In addition, in reality, the law most often chosen by 
parties for practical reasons is the law of the country which controls a particular market.
18
  
 It is also arguable that the effect of a choice of law by the principal and the agent should 
be restricted by mandatory rules and public policy. Thus, the judge should apply the mandatory 
rules of the fourm.
19
 Additionally, the judge can refuse to apply the otherwise applicable law if it 
is incompatible with the forum’s public policy.20 
  Under Article 19 of the UAE Civil Code, parties have the freedom to determine expressly 
the law that governs their contract, regardless of any connection between the chosen law and the 
transaction. Some support the freedom of parties to choose the law that governs their contract, 
                                      
17
 See Geert Van Calster, European Private International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013), p. 126.   
18
 See Alan Reed, The Rome I Regulation and Rapprochement of Anglo-American Choice of  Law in 
Contract: A Heralded Triumph of Pragmatism over Theory (2011) 23/3 Florida Journal of International Law 360.  
19
  The question of mandatory rules and public policy will be examined in detail in Chapter 5.  
20
 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 14 above, p. 199. See also Karsten Report, n. 16 above, parg. 45. p. 19.  
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but insist that there should be a legitimate and serious interest of the parties in choosing the law 
in question.
21
 This argument is based on an alleged general principal of private international law, 
applicable under Article 23 of the Civil Code.
22
 But the argument seems unacceptable, since 
Article 23 is expressed in general terms, while Article 19 is specific in granting the parties 
freedom of choice, without any restriction by reference to a connection between the chosen law 
and the transaction or a legitimate and serious interest. Moreover the alleged general principle 
imposing such restrictions would contradict the solutions adopted by the Rome I Regulation 
(Article 3(1)) and in the Hague Agency Convention (Article 5). 
 
TIME OF CHOICE 
 As regards express choice, the question arises as to the time when the principal and the 
agent may determine the applicable law. It is widely accepted that the parties may choose the law 
governing their contract at any time. For instance, when the contract is concluded, or later by 
separate agreement, or when the court is hearing the case.
23
 Furthermore, the parties may choose 
another law to replace the law which they had previously chosen. However, the subsequent 
                                      
21
 See Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal, (نيناوقلا عزانت يف طيسولا) Conflict of law (Dubai Police Academy, 2008), p. 
716. 
22
 Article 23 provides: "The principles of private international law shall apply in the absence of a relevant 
provision in the foregoing Articles governing the conflict of laws."  
23
 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 14 above, p. 208. See also Alexander J. Belohlavek,n. 9 above,  p. 565; and Okasha 
Mohamed Abdel-aal,,n. 21 above, p. 719.  
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choice should not prejudice the contract’s formal validity, and it should not affect negatively the 
rights of third parties.
24
 The Rome I Regulation so provides in Article 3(2).
25
 
 Although the Hague Convention contains no similar provision, some argue that it permits 
the principal and the agent to choose the law governing the internal relationship at any time, and 
also to subject the internal relationship to a law other than the law previously agreed upon.
26
 In 
the UAE Article 3(2) of the Rome I Regulation may be followed as embodying a general 
principle, pursuant to Article 23 of Civil Code. 
 
PARTIAL CHOICE OF LAW  
 Another question is whether the principal and the agent may subject the internal 
relationship to more than one law, or whether they can only choose a single law to govern their 
relationship. Some argue in favor of maintaining the unity of a contract and are against splitting 
the applicable law. They argue that a partial choice of law negatively affects the harmony of the 
contract.
27
 But others argue in favour of permitting a partial choice of law; thus, the parties may 
expressly subject their contract to more than one law. In other words, the parties may choose 
                                      
24
 See  Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (Elgar European Law, UK, 3rd edition, 2014), pp. 291-92. 
See also Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 15 above,  p. 1805.  
25
 Article 3(2) provides: "The parties may at any time agree to subject the contract to a law other than that 
which previously governed it, whether as a result of an earlier choice made under this Article or of other provisions 
of the Regulation. Any change in the law to be applied that is made after the conclusion of the contract shall not 
prejudice its formal validity under Article 11 or adversely affect the rights of third parties." 
26
 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 14 above,  p. 208.  
27
 See the presentation of this opinion in Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal,,n. 21 above,  p. 721. 
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different laws to govern different parts of the contract.
28
 The Rome I Regulation endorses this 
approach in the last sentence of Article 3(1): "By their choice the parties can select the law 
applicable to the whole or to part only of the contract". However, in the case of the partial choice 
of law, some argue that subjecting various parts of a contract to different laws must not prejudice 
the logical consistency of the contract or lead to contradiction.
29
 It should also not prejudice the 
balance between the different parts of the contract.
30
 The Giuliano and Lagarde Report limited 
the splitting of the applicable law to contract elements that can be subjected to different laws 
without leading to contradiction.
31
 
 The Agency Convention does not expressly regulate the question of partial choice of law. 
Karsten relies on the words, "in so far as", at the beginning of Article 6 of the Convention to 
argue that the principal and the agent may select more than one law to govern different parts of 
the internal relationship.
32
 Other jurists
33
 argue that the words, "in so far as", are not sufficient on 
their own to provide a strong basis for permitting the possibility of the partial choice. However 
this concept is broadly recognised in many enactments and it has been adopted in numerous 
                                      
28
 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 15 above,  p. 1805.  See also Peter Kaye, The New Private International Law 
of Contract of  the European Community (Dartmouth, UK, 1993), p. 145.  
29
  Peter Kaye, n. 28 above,  p. 145. 
30
 Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal,,n. 21 above,  p. 721. 
31
 Mario Giuliano and Paul Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations, [1980] OJ C282/17, Article 3, Comment 4. 
32
 The Karsten Report, n. 15 above, prag 159, p. 47, explains: "The words ‘in so far as’ are designed to cover 
a variety of possible situations in which the law specified by Article 5 is not applicable. They include cases where 
the parties have made no choice of law at all, where they have made only a partial choice, for instance, by choosing 
a law to govern only certain aspects of their agency relationship, and where their choice is ineffective."  
33
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 14 above,  p. 207. 
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international conventions, such as the Hague Convention 1986 on the Law Applicable to Trusts 
and on their Recognition, and the Hague Convention 1986 on the International Sale of Goods. 
However, according to this jurist, the use of partial choice must not disrupt the internal 
relationship.
34
 
 In the UAE, the Explanatory Memorandum of the Civil Code, in its commentary on 
Article 19, explains that this Article guarantees the unity of the law applicable to the contract. 
Such unity would not be guaranteed by the idea of analysing the elements of the contract and the 
choice of a law appropriate to the nature of each of them.
35
 This means that the Explanatory 
Memorandum has adopted the principle of unitary choice of law with respect to international 
contracts.  
 Nevertheless, some argue
36
 that UAE law permits the parties to international contracts to 
choose several laws to govern different parts of their contract. In other words, the court may 
apply the principle permitting partial choice of law. It is argued that the justification for Article 
19, which is to achieve predictability and certainty in choice of law, is consistent with and 
requires adaptation to the principle of partial choice of law. The UAE legislator also admits the 
principle of partial choice of law with respect to contracts where it subjects the parties’ capacity 
to another law; and the court may also split the applicable law when applying a mandatory rule 
of forum country  to some aspects of a contract. It is further argued that it is unacceptable to rely 
on the position adopted in the Explanatory Memorandum, since its drafters were influenced by 
the Egyptian Explanatory Memorandum and they did not follow recent developments and new 
                                      
34
 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 14 above, p. 207. 
35
  UAE Ministry of Justice, Explanatory Memorandum of the Federal Act No 5 of 1985 (Civil Transactions 
Act). 
36
  Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal, n. 21 above, p. 721. 
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approaches in the field of the conflict of laws in relation to contracts. In addition, the 
Explanatory Memorandum admits that the legislator chose an elastic formulation, so as not to 
prevent the court from exercising its good sense and not to preclude the court from following and 
utilizing recent developments in jurisprudence.
37
 Consequently, it seems that the better view is 
that UAE law permits the principal and the agent to choose different laws to govern different 
parts of their internal relationship. 
 
Implied choice 
 In cases when the principal and the agent have not expressly chosen the applicable law, 
the court must consider whether the parties have made an implied choice. This approach is 
accepted by the Hague Agency Convention, the Rome I Regulation and the UAE Civil Code.  
 Article 5 of the preliminary draft of the Agency Convention proposed that a court should 
infer the implied choice of the parties by considering the terms of the contract and the 
circumstances of the case, and seeking a choice made "by necessary implication". However, after 
discussion the special commission decided that the words, "by necessary implication", were too 
inflexible. Thus, the special commission preferred the words "with reasonable certainty" instead 
of "by necessary implication". This would give the court a certain degree of freedom to discover 
the parties' implied choice. Thus, Article 5 of the Convention as adopted requires that an implied 
choice of the law governing the agency relationship between the principal and the agent must be 
“such that it may be inferred with reasonable certainty from the terms of the agreement between 
the parties and the circumstances of the case.” A similar formula was used by the Rome 
                                      
37
 Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal, n. 21 above, p. 721.  
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Convention. Pursuant to Article 5 of the Convention, the court may deduce an implied choice 
from the terms of the contract and circumstances of the case, either together or separately.
38
 
 Under the Rome Convention 1980, Article 3(1) allowed the court to discover an implied 
choice where it was demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the agreement 
between the parties or the circumstances of the case. Different wording is used in Article 3(1) of 
the Rome I Regulation,
39
 which requires that the choice must be "clearly demonstrated” instead 
of "demonstrated with reasonable certainty".
40
 However, it seems this change in the wording was 
not intended to change the meaning. This was confirmed in Lawlor v Sandvik Mining,
41
 where 
the English Court of Appeal (per Lord Toulson) explained that the change of language was not 
intended to involve a change of meaning, but was simply intended to bring the English and 
German texts into line with the French text of the Convention. Although this ruling is not 
binding on the European Court, it seems likely that the European Court adopt this approach.   
 In the UAE, Article 19(1) of the Civil Code provides for implied choice where "it is 
apparent from the circumstances that the intention was, that another law should apply". On a 
literal reading, this would permit the court to infer an implied choice from the circumstances, 
without any requirement of reasonable certainty or clear demonstration. Nonetheless, some argue 
that an implied choice should be clearly or certainly demonstrated by reference to the terms of 
the contract or the circumstances of the case. This would ensure that the court does not apply a 
                                      
38
 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 14 above, p. 203.  
39
 Article 3(1) of Rome I Regulation provides that "a contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the 
parties. The choice shall be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances 
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 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 15 above, p.1805. See also Peter Stone, n. 24 above, p. 305.  
41
           [2013] EWCA Civ 365.  
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law which might prejudice the parties’ expectations.42 A contrary argument, that Article 19 
merely requires the implicit choice to be inferred from the circumstances, without a restriction 
that the intention must be certain, is certainly possible. Nonetheless, it seems to the present writer 
that the better view is that the UAE court should only infer the parties’ intention from clear 
circumstances, in view of Articles 19 and 23 of the Civil Code.  
 
EXAMPLE OF FACTORS RELEVANT IN THE DETERMINATION OF IMPLIED CHOICE 
 The jurists mention many factors that may amount to a clear indication of an implied 
choice. For instance, where there were several previous contracts between the principal and the 
agent, under which the agent acted on behalf of the principal, and they were governed by a 
particular law, this law may govern their internal relationship in a case where there is no express 
choice.
43
 Another factor is a jurisdiction clause, as where the agent and principal in their contract 
choose the courts of a particular country; thus, the substantive law of this country may be applied 
on the basis of an implied choice.
44
 However, some argue that in this case there should be 
another factor in support of the jurisdiction clause to justify the discovery of the implied choice, 
as in the field of conflict law it is necessary to distinguish between choice of law and 
jurisdiction.
45
 
 
                                      
42
 Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal, n. 21 above, p. 710. 
43
 Karsten Report, n. 16 above, prag, 46, p. 20. 
44
 Peter Stone, n. 24 above, p. 306. 
45
 Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal, n. 21 above, p. 712.  
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 Moreover, if the parties include in their contract a term that the contract shall be 
interpreted or construed according to a particular law, it should be understood from this term that 
the parties intend to choose this law as the law applicable to their agreement.
46
 The Giuliano-
Lagarde Report provides as an example of implied choice the inclusion by the parties in their 
contract of a reference to specific provisions in a particular system of law. Although there is no 
express choice of this law, such referencing may amount to a clear indication of implied choice. 
However, an express choice of the law to govern a part of contract cannot demonstrate an 
implied choice for whole contract, because if the parties had wanted this law to govern their 
whole contract, they could have said so in the agreement.
47
 Some argue that the internal 
relationship may be subjected to the law which governs a contract that an agent is to conclude 
with a contractor, on the basis that this is a clear indication of implied choice.
48
 
 In English case law, an indication of implied choice may arise when the contract and all 
its terms are valid according to one connected law, whereas the effect of another connected law 
would be to invalidate the whole or a part of the contract. Consequently, the factor of validation 
will be considered the clearest indication of an implied choice.
49
 Another instance may arise 
where the type of contract is familiar to one connected law, which has detailed rules on the 
interpretation and supplementation of the contract terms, while the application of another 
connected law to such a contract would lead only to the broadest speculation.
50
 Hence, it is 
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 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 14 above, p. 205. 
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 Giuliano and Lagarde Report, [1980] OJ C282/17, Article 3, Comment 3. 
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 Okasha Mohamed Abdel-aal, n. 21 above,  p. 713.   
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  See Coast Lines v Huding & Veder [1972] 2 QB 34. Cf. Hathurani v Jassat [2010] EWHC 2077 (Ch) 
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necessary, in order to enable the contract to achieve sufficient certainty, that an implied choice of 
the law which has useful supplementary rules should be recognised. Where the parties have used 
a standard form which originated in a particular country, the law of this country may apply, by 
way of an implied choice. The same applies where they have used a form generally used in a 
particular market.
51
 Furthermore, when the contract is one of a group of similar contracts 
concluded by the principal with numerous agents, the law of the country of the principal’s 
residence (as the party common to all the contracts) may govern all of the contracts.
52
 
 Nonetheless, it is  preferable to discover an implied choice on the basis of more than one 
factor, and not merely from a single factor. For instance, the French Court of Cassation 
discovered an implied choice in the case of a commercial agency between a French principal and 
a German agent, who acted in Germany, by considering many factors, including that the contract 
had been concluded in France, the contract was drafted in French, and there was a jurisdiction 
clause in favour of the French court. Consequently, the court applied French law.
53
 
 Furthermore, according to the Rome I Regulation, ordinary factors - such as the places of 
negotiation, contracting, performance of various applications under the contract, and the parties' 
residences- cannot on their own be considered a clear indication of an implied choice, since these 
factors must of necessity exist for every contract. They may however be considered as 
indications of a closest connection under Article 4.  
                                      
51
  See Wasa International Insurance v Lexington Insurance [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 286 (Simon J), affirmed 
sub nom. Lexington Insurance v AGF Insurance [2009] UKHL 40. 
52
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 In contrast, in UAE law the legislator has not explicitly authorised the use of a test of 
closest connection. Thus, two possibilities are open to a UAE court which wishes to avoid 
following the default rules in favour of the common residence or (more frequently) the place of 
contracting. It may take a wide view of implied choice; or it may refer to the closest connection 
by way of a general principle of private international law in accordance with Article 23. While 
both approaches will usually lead to the same result, it seems preferable for practical reasons to 
adopt a wide view of implied choice under Article 19. This may be more acceptable to the UAE 
court, since it avoids disregarding any explicit provisions of the Civil Code. 
 
The default rules  
 In the absence of an express or implied choice of law by the principal and the agent, the 
court will apply the default rules. With respect to the internal relationship between the principal 
and the agent, potentially relevant connections include the residence of the principal, the 
residence of the agent, the place where the agent was authorised to act, and the place where the 
agency agreement was negotiated and concluded. The currently prevailing view is that the law of 
the country where the agent has his business establishment or habitual residence should in most 
cases be applied, subject to certain exceptions.  
 
EARLY DRAFTS 
 The 1950 and 1952 drafts from the International Law Association proposed to give much 
greater weight to the residence of the principal than do the measures ultimately adopted by the 
Hague Conference and the European Union. 
108 
 
 According to Article 3 of the 1950 Copenhagen draft of the International Law 
Association, where the principal and agent had not chosen an applicable law, and the agent was a 
professional agent, the court would apply the law of the country where the professional agent had 
his place of business, provided that the principal had granted authority to the agent there. In other 
words, to apply the law of country where the professional agent had his place of business, it 
would have been necessary that the authority should have been given to the agent in that country. 
In all other cases, the court would apply the law of the country where the principal had his 
habitual residence or his relevant place of business.
54
  
 However, pursuant to Article 3 of the 1952 Lucerne draft of the International Law 
Association, in the absence of an agreed choice of law, the court would apply the law of the 
country where the principal had his habitual residence or relevant place of business. But the law 
of the country where the agent had his habitual residence or relevant place of business would 
apply in the case of an independent professional agent.
55
 
 Obviously, the general principle adopted in the Copenhagen and Lucerne drafts required 
application of the law of the principal’s habitual residence or relevant place of business, and the 
application of the law of the agent’s habitual residence or relevant place of business occurred by 
way of an exception. Nevertheless, the Copenhagen draft required that authority had been 
granted to the agent in his place of business in order to make applicable the law of the country 
where his place of business was located, while the Lucerne draft stipulated the application of that 
law without requiring the granting of authority in that place, it being made sufficient that the 
agent should be independent and professional.  
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  Gamal Moursi Badr, n. 1 above, p. 133. 
55
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 In the case of a commission agent, Article 2 of the 1950 draft of the committee of the 
International Law Institute would have referred to the commission agent's habitual residence or 
place of business to determine the law governing the internal relationship. By way of exception, 
the law of the country where the principal had his habitual residence or place of business would 
apply if the commission agent received his order from his principal in that country.  
 However, the Eighteenth Committee of the International Law Institute’s final draft (1961) 
would have excluded the application of the law of the principal’s habitual residence or place of 
business, and provided for the application of the law of the place of the agent's habitual residence 
or place of business.
56
  
 These early texts are not in themselves important, but they formed part of the background 
to the negotiations which led to the adoption of the Hague Agency Convention.   
  
THE HAGUE CONVENTION 1978 
 Under Article 6(1) of the Agency Convention, the internal relationship is regarded as 
having its centre of gravity at the place where the agent has his business establishment, or his 
habitual residence if he does not have a business establishment. Consequently, in the absence of 
express or implied choice, the internal relationship is usually governed by the law of the country 
in which the agent has his business establishment, or his habitual residence when he does not 
have a business establishment.
57
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 Gamal Moursi Badr, n. 1 above, p. 137. 
57
 Article 6(1) provides: "In so far as it has not been chosen in accordance with Article 5, the applicable law 
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 In the preliminary draft which led to the Convention, this provision was applicable to all 
internal relationships, without exception. However, some argued that reference solely to the 
agent's establishment or residence to determine the applicable law was too rigid and could lead to 
unacceptable results in cases where it was apparent from the circumstances that another law had 
a closer connection to the contract. Thus, an amendment to the preliminary draft was suggested, 
so as to displace the law of the agent’s residence where another law had a closer connection to 
the internal relationship.
58
 
 Ultimately, in the Convention as adopted, Article 6(2) makes an exception to the 
application of the law of the agent's business establishment or habitual residence. This applies 
the law of the country of the principal’s business establishment or, if he has none, his habitual 
residence, where the agent is primarily to act in that country.
59
 But there is no general exception 
in favour of the law of the country of closest connection. An additional rule, specified by Article 
6(3), deals with the case where either party (the principal or the agent) has more than one 
business establishment. Preference is then given to the law of the business establishment that is 
most closely connected with the internal relationship.
60
 
 Article 6(1) makes it clear that it is the business establishment or habitual residence at the 
time of the formation of the contract which should be considered in determining the applicable 
law.  
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THE ROME I REGULATION 
 Under the Rome I Regulation, the contract between the principal and the agent is 
regarded as a contract for the provision of services, and it is the agent’s obligation to provide the 
service. Thus, under Article 4(1)(b),
61
 in the absence of an express or implied choice by the 
parties, the internal relationship will be governed by the law of the country where the agent, who 
is the service provider, has his habitual residence.
62
 In the case of a corporate agent, this will 
usually be the country where the agent's central administration was located at the conclusion of 
the contract. In the case of an individual agent acting in the course of his business, it will usually 
be that of his principal place of business. But where the agent acts through a branch, two cases 
must be distinguished, in each of which the branch will count as the relevant residence of the 
agent. The first case is where the branch is involved in the conclusion of the contract. The second 
instance is where the branch is to be involved in the performance of the contract.
63
 Nonetheless, 
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if several branches are involved in the conclusion or performance of the contract, it seems likely 
that one must revert to the main rules referring to the agent’s central administration or principal 
place of business. For instance, where a company has its central administration in the UAE, and 
has a branch in Paris, through which the contract was concluded, and another branch in London, 
from which the contractual performance is required, it seems likely that the law of the country 
where the central administration is located will apply.
64
 
 The general rule in the Rome I Regulation in favour of the law of the country where the 
agent has his habitual residence is subject to an exception specified by Article 4(3). This 
provides an escape clause where it appears to the court from all the circumstances of the case 
that the contract between the principal and the agent is obviously more closely connected to a 
country other than the country of the agent's habitual residence. The law of that other country 
then governs the internal relationship.
65
 This exceptional character of this provision must be 
emphasised. It is not expected to be frequently applied.
66
 
                                                                                                                       
2. Where the contract is concluded in the course of operation of a branch, agency or any other establishment, or if, 
under the contract, performance is the responsibility of such an establishment, the place where the branch, agency or 
any other establishment is located shall be treated as the place of habitual residence.  
3. When determining the habitual residence the relevant point of time shall be the time of the conclusion of the 
contract."  
64
  Peter Stone, n. 24 above, p. 310.  
65
 Article 4(3) provides: "Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is 
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 Some
67
 argue that in most cases the agent's habitual residence coincides with the place 
where the agent acts, so that applying the general rule accords with the closest connection. 
Nonetheless, in the case when the agent acts in a country where he has no place of business, the 
application of the law of the agent's habitual residence is less persuasive.  In such cases, the court 
may apply the law of the country where the principal has his habitual residence instead of the 
agent’s habitual residence, on the ground that it is more closely connected to the agency contract, 
especially if the agent sought out the principal in that place and the negotiation and conclusion of 
the agency contract took place in that country.
68
 Preference may also be given to the place of 
performance when both parties are to perform in a country other than that of the agent's habitual 
residence.
69
 
 
THE POSITION IN THE UAE  
 In the UAE, the default rule specified by Article 19(1) of the Civil Code subjects an 
international contract to the law of the country that is the common residence of the parties (the 
principal and the agent). Article 19(1) also provides for application of the law of the country 
where the parties concluded the contract, where each of the parties had a different country of 
residence.
70
 As the relationship between the principal and the agent is considered a contract, 
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logically this Article must apply. Thus, the internal relationship is governed by the law of the 
country where the principal and the agent resided; or if they did not have a common residence, 
by the law of the country where the agency contract was concluded. 
 Nevertheless, there are arguments against the application of this provision to the internal 
relationship. These are considered below, after the various provisions presented above have been 
examined and evaluated to determine the best solution with respect to choice of law in the field 
of agency internal relationships.  
 
WHICH OF THE VARIOUS SOLUTIONS IS PREFERABLE?  
 As regards the default rules in the field of the internal relationship between the principal 
and the agent, many approaches have been suggested; but preference for the agent's residence 
(business establishment or habitual residence) is the currently prevailing approach. This solution 
does indeed appear to have more advantages than other approaches, and other approaches are 
open to various objections. 
 It may be argued that the principal and the agent do not always reside in the same 
country; thus, it is difficult to apply the law of common residence to the internal relationship.
71
 
The location of the place of contracting may be determined by an accidental event, and it may 
                                                                                                                       
state, but if they are resident in different states the law of the state in which the contract was concluded shall apply 
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have no substantial connection with the contract.
72
 Moreover, there may be difficulty in 
determining the place of contracting, particularly when the principal and the agent conclude a 
contract by communications across borders, as the rules for determining the place of contracting 
in such cases are not uniform in all legal systems.
73
 
 The application of the law of the country where the agent acts may face some difficulty, 
particularly when the agent acts in numerous countries, and it may be unclear which place should 
be considered to determine the applicable law.
74
 Some argue also that the dispute may arise 
before the agent has acted; therefore, it is difficult to rely on the place of acting.
75
 However, this 
could be resolved by considering the place in which the agent is intended to act. Furthermore, it 
is difficult to accept the application of the law of the country where the agency is to be 
performed, because the agent may perform his obligations in a country other than the country in 
which the principal performs his obligations.
76
 Moreover the principal’s habitual residence is not 
a centre of gravity in the internal relationship, and the principal’s performance is not considered 
a characteristic performance of the internal relationship. The principal’s main performance is to 
pay remuneration, and a payment is not usually regarded as a characteristic performance because 
it is common to numerous types of contract.
77
 
                                      
72
 Hisham Sadek, قع ىلع قيبطتلا بجاولا نوناقلا(ةيلودلا ةراجتلا دو)  The Law Applicable to International Trade 
Contracts (Dar Alfekr Aljamae,  Alexandria, 2001), p. 554.  
73
 Walter Breslauer, Agency in Private International Law, (1938) 50 Juridical Review, p. 284. See also 
Hisham Sadek, n. 72 above, p. 555. 
74
 Hisham Sadek, n. 72 above, p. 561. See also Foad Mohammed Alodaini, n. 71 above, p. 76. 
75
 Hisham Sadek, n. 72 above, p. 561. 
76
 Walter Breslauer, n. 73 above, p. 284.   
77
 Alexander J. Belohlavek, n. 9 above, p. 565. 
116 
 
 It seems inappropriate to adopt any of the various approaches criticised above as a 
general rule with respect to the default choice of law in the field of agency contracts. 
Nevertheless, exceptionally a law can be considered for application when it is most closely 
connected with the internal relationship. 
 However, for many sound reasons, it seems appropriate to adopt the prevailing approach, 
based on the agent's habitual residence. According to the Special Commission which negotiated 
the Hague Agency Convention, this place was considered to be a permanent and easily 
ascertainable connecting factor that the principal and the agent could reasonably predict. 
Moreover the agent’s performance is regarded as the characteristic performance of the agency 
contract,
78
 as the principal’s obligation to provide remuneration is common to numerous 
contracts, while the agent's obligation is to provide a service. Consequently, the law of the 
country of the agent’s habitual residence is the law of the party whose performance is the 
characteristic performance.
79
 
 Moreover, the agent's place of habitual residence is likely to coincide with the country in 
which the agent acts.
80
 In addition, the reference to the law of the agent’s habitual residence may 
ensure the application of mandatory rules, such as protective provisions for the agent. Finally, in 
the internal relationship, the agent is at the centre of the relation; hence the application of the law 
of the agent’s habitual residence reflects the agent's pivotal role.81 
 However, some argue that exclusive reference to the agent's residence to determine the 
applicable law is too rigid and may lead to unacceptable results in some cases, such as when it is 
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apparent from the circumstances that there is another law that has a closer connection to the 
contract. In addition, when the agent acts in a country other than that of his habitual residence, 
the application of the law of his habitual residence may lead to the application of a law which 
lacks a substantial connection with the contract.
82
 
 To avoid this weakness, two approaches are possible. One, adopted by the Hague Agency 
Convention, is the application of the law of the country in which the principal has his habitual 
residence when the agent acts primarily in that country (Article 6(2)). The second, adopted by 
the Rome I Regulation, is the application of the law of the country that has a closer connection to 
the internal relationship (Article 4(3)). 
 In respect of preference between the Rome I Regulation approach and that of the Hague 
Convention, it is noteworthy that the Regulation solution is more flexible, and that leads to 
application of the most appropriate law. In contrast, the Convention approach is much more 
rigid; and thus may lead to the application of a law other than the law with the closest connected 
to the internal relationship, apparent from all the circumstances of the case. 
 In the UAE, the question arises regarding whether the court should apply Article 19(1) of 
the Civil Code, which specifies the default rules, or whether it is possible to substitute a solution 
derived from the provisions of the Rome I Regulation by virtue of Article 23 of the Civil Code. It 
can be argued that in a case when the principal and the agent did not choose expressly or 
impliedly the applicable law, the court may ignore the default rules specified in Article 19(1) and 
instead apply the law of the country in which the agent has his habitual residence or that of the 
country which has the closest connection to the contract.  
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 This is for many reasons. In the UAE, the legislator has not directly regulated by specific 
rules the question of choice of law with respect to the agency internal relationship. Some argue 
that the default rules in Article 19(1) are inflexible and unsuitable to be applied to certain 
contracts which have a special nature.
83
 The Explanatory Memorandum of the Civil Code points 
out that the legislator chose an elastic formulation to allow the court some scope for creativity, 
and to enable the use of recent developments in jurisprudence.
84
 Consequently, pursuant to 
Article 23 of the Civil Code, the court may consider the provisions adopted by the Rome I 
Regulation. If this approach, applied in an unlimited way, is considered to accord insufficient 
respect to the clear wording of Article 19, it may be given a more limited role, by means of a 
broad interpretation of implied choice so as to equate to closest connection, or by a narrow 
interpretation of the concept of the place of contracting, so as to create a gap in the rules 
specified by Article 19 where there is no common residence and the contract is negotiated by 
means of cross-border communications.  
 
The Scope of the Normal Choice of Law Rules  
 The law that governs the internal relationship, whether determined by parties (expressly 
or impliedly) or by default rules will apply to most issues related to this relationship. 
Nonetheless, there are certain contracts of agency that are considered employment, consumer or 
carriage contracts, and these kinds of agency are excluded from the scope of the normal choice 
of law rules. In addition, some issues are excluded from this scope. Consequently, we shall first 
consider agency contracts which are also employment contracts. After which we shall examine 
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agency contracts which are also consumer contracts or carriage contracts. Thereafter, we shall 
proceed to address various issues that are excluded from the scope of the applicable law. Finally, 
we will consider the matters within the scope of the applicable law.  
 
Contracts of Employment  
 In some cases an agent may be an employee of his principal.
85
 Thus, the question arises 
of whether this type of agency is within the scope of the normal choice of law rules, discussed 
above, which usually apply to the internal relationship. Some argue that the notion of an 
employment contract should be interpreted widely.
86
 As the Karsten Report explained, the 
concept of a contract of employment should not be construed too restrictively,
87
 because the 
contract of employment in one legal system may have characteristics that are unfamiliar to other 
legal systems.
88
 According to Article 10 of the Hague Agency Convention, when the agent deals 
with the principal as his employee and their agency relationship is created by a contract of 
employment, this contract will be excluded from the scope of the Chapter II of the Convention. 
In other words, the law that normally governs the internal relationship will not govern the 
relationship between the principal and the agent when it arises from an employment contract.
89
 
The reason behind this provision is that the Special Commission which negotiated the 
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Convention aimed to prevent conflict between the choice of law rules in the Convention and 
mandatory rules in employment law.
90
 
 The Rome I Regulation provides a special rule for individual employment contracts in 
Article 8, which excludes or overrides Articles 3 and 4. Consequently, the law governing the 
agency internal relationship, as determined by the default rules specified by Article 4(1)(b) or 
4(3), does not apply where the agency contract is regarded as an employment contract. The 
Giuliano-Lagarde Report explains that Article 8 is designed to grant adequate protection for the 
employee (agent) who is considered a weaker party in the contract, according to the socio-
economic point of view.
91
 
 According to Article 8(1) of the Rome I Regulation, the parties, the principal (employer) 
and the agent (employee), have a right to determine the law governing their relationship pursuant 
to Article 3.
92
 Nonetheless, the protection mandatorily provided to the employee under the law 
that would be applied in the absence of choice cannot be excluded by the choice of another law 
by the parties.
93
 In the absence of party choice, the law of the country where the agent habitually 
carries out his work will be applied. This country will not be changed where the employee works 
temporarily in another country (Article 8(2)). If the applicable law cannot be determined 
                                      
90
 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 14 above, p. 249.  
91
  Giuliano and Lagarde Report, n. 31 above, p. 25.  
92
 Article 8(1) of the Rome I Regulation provides: "An individual employment contract shall be governed by 
the law chosen by the parties in accordance with Article 3. Such a choice of law may not, however, have the result 
of depriving the employee of the protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by 
agreement under the law that, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 
4 of this Article." 
93
  Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 15 above, p. 2113. 
121 
 
according to Article 8(2), the court may apply Article 8(3), which refers to the law of the country 
of the place of business by which the employee was engaged. Nonetheless, if the court discovers 
through the circumstances that another country is more closely connected to the contract than 
that determined under Article 8(2) and (3), the law of this other country will apply (Article 
8(4)).
94
 
 In the UAE, it should be noted that the UAE legislation does not contain any provisions 
specifying which law governs an agency contract when it is considered an employment contract. 
Thus, the question arises of whether this kind of contract will be governed by Article 19 of the 
Civil Code or whether it is outside the scope of this Article. It can be argued that the parties in 
the agency employment contract may select expressly or impliedly the applicable law. 
Nonetheless, in the absence of choice some argue that Article 23 of Civil Code enables the court 
to apply the provisions of the Rome I Regulation relating to such contracts. In other words, 
Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation should be applied to the internal relationship between the 
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principal and the agent when the agreement is regarded as an employment contract in accordance 
with general principles of private international law.
95
 
 
Consumer Contracts 
 In essence a consumer contract is a contract whereby a person who is not acting in the 
course of business (the consumer) acquires goods or services from another person who is acting 
in the course of business (the supplier). An agency contract is a contract whereby the principal 
obtains the services of the agent. It is not uncommon for the principal to be acting outside his 
trade or profession,
96
 for example when a holiday-maker concludes a contract with a travel 
agency to act in his behalf in the booking of a hotel and flight. In this case the agency contract is 
considered a consumer contract. Thus, the question arises as to the law which governs this 
contract. 
 Some argue that an agency consumer contract is within the scope of Article 5 of the 
Hague Agency Convention. In other words, the agency consumer contract will be governed by 
the law that governs normal agency contracts, which in the absence of a choice by the parties is 
usually the law of the country in which the agent has his business establishment or if he has 
none, his habitual residence. In this context, the principal may be able to rely upon the protective 
provisions in the law of the country in which he has his residence, insofar as they are regarded as 
overriding mandatory rules within Article 16 of the Convention.
97
 But it must be borne in mind 
that the operation of Article 16 is at the discretion of the forum, and that it is confined to 
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situations in which the protective law attempts to insist on the application of its protective rules 
in certain transnational situations including the instant case. 
 In contrast, under the Rome I Regulation a consumer agency contract which fulfils 
certain conditions is excluded from the normal conflict rules for agency contracts, and is 
regulated instead by Article 6, which lays down particular provisions in respect of the choice of 
law for consumer contracts in order to protect the consumer, who is regarded as the weaker party 
to the contract. The principal must be acting outside his trade or profession, and the other party 
(the agent) must be acting within his trade or profession.
98
 
 According to Article 6(1) of the Regulation, in the absence of choice, a consumer 
contract will be subjected to the law of the country in which the consumer habitually resides. 
However, the application of the law of this country requires that the other party (the professional) 
must have conducted commercial or professional activities in this country, or have directed such 
activities to this country. Alternatively, this country may be one of several countries to which the 
professional directed such activities. Moreover the contract in question must fall within the scope 
of these activities. In addition, in accordance with Article 6(2), the parties may determine the 
applicable law, but the chosen law will operate subject to the application of the mandatory 
protective provisions of the law of the consumer’s habitual residence. The requirements of 
paragraph 1 must also be fulfilled in the case where the parties choose the applicable law. On the 
other hand, pursuant to Article 6(3), if the requirements in paragraph 1 are not fulfilled, the 
consumer contract will be governed by the law determined by the normal conflict rules specified 
by Articles 3 and 4 of the Regulation. 
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 In the UAE, the parties may choose the law to govern a consumer contract by virtue of 
Article 19 of the Civil Code. However, in the absence of choice, the court should ignore the 
default rules specified by this Article and instead use the general principles of private 
international law referred to in Article 23 of the Civil Code, in order to apply rules derived from 
Article 6 of the Regulation.   
 
Carriage of Goods Contracts 
 In some cases, a principal may conclude an agency contract with an agent for the carriage 
of the principal’s goods. UAE legislation refers to this kind of agency contract as a commission 
agency for carriage, and regulates it by Articles 341 to 352 of the Commercial Code. Article 341 
provides that: 
 "(1) Commission agency for carriage is a contract by which the agent undertakes to enter 
 into a carriage contract in his own name and for the account of his principal, and where 
 necessary, the commission agent should operate what is appropriate related to this 
 transportation from commission paid by the principal. A commission agent for carriage 
 shall be as concerns the consignor in the same status as a carrier.
99
  
 (2) Where the commission agent undertakes carriage by his own means, he shall be 
 governed by the provisions of the carriage contract, unless otherwise agreed upon." 
 According to this Article, the commission agent for carriage may conclude the contract of 
carriage with the carrier on behalf of the principal or use his own means to execute the carriage. 
                                      
99
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 In respect to private international law, the question may arise about the law governing 
this relationship between the principal and the commission agent for carriage. To determine the 
applicable law of this relationship, it is necessary to determine whether this relationship is a 
contract of agency or a contract of carriage.  
 Pursuant to Article 341(2), it is clear that if the agent uses his own means to execute the 
carriage, the relationship is considered a contract of carriage. Moreover, when the commission 
agent for carriage concludes the contract with the carrier on behalf of his principal, it could be 
argued that the relationship between the principal and the commission agent is considered a 
contract of carriage in respect to the choice of law; this is so for many reasons. According to 
Article 345, the commission agent should guarantee the goods’ safety, and this is the task of the 
carrier. In addition, pursuant to Article 446, the commission agent is liable for any damage to all 
or part of the goods. He is also liable for any delay in receiving the goods; this kind of liability is 
the carrier’s responsibility. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 350, if the commission agent pays 
the freight to the carrier, he will replace him in his rights. Moreover, the principal is only aware 
of the commission agent, and will address him about any question relating to the carriage of 
goods.  
 Therefore, because the commission agent’s task is to perform the carriage of goods in his 
own name, whether by concluding a contract with the carrier or by his own means, he is 
considered as the carrier for the principal; consequently, he is subject to the law governing the 
carriage of goods contract. 
 Under the Rome I Regulation, by Article 5(1), in the absence of a choice of law, a 
contract of carriage of goods will be subject to the law of the country in which the carrier has his 
habitual residence, but only if this law is also the law of the country of receipt, the country of 
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delivery, or the consignor’s habitual residence. If this requirement is not met, the laws of the 
country of delivery will apply. If all the circumstances of the case point to another country as 
more closely connected to the contract, the law of that country will apply.  
 It should be noted that in the Rome Convention Article 4(4) provided for the application 
of the carrier's principal place of business, rather than his habitual residence. The Rome I 
Regulation also provides for the application of the law of the place of  delivery in cases where 
the law of the carrier’s residence does not apply, while in such cases the Convention merely 
applies the test of the closest connection directly.
100
 Both measures specify that single-voyage 
charterparties and other contracts the main purpose of which is the carriage of goods should be 
treated as contracts for the carriage of goods.
101
  
 On 23 October 2014, in Haeger & Schmidt GmbH v Mutuelles du Mans Assurances 
102
 
the European Court dealt with a contract whereby a principal engaged a commission agent to 
arrange a carriage of goods on behalf of the principal. It indicated that the contract fell within 
Article 4(4) of the Rome Convention and Article 5(1) of the Rome I Regulation, since its main 
purpose was the carriage of goods.  
 UAE legislation does not contain any provisions dealing specifically with choice of law 
in respect of a contract of carriage of goods. Thus, such a contract will be governed by Article 19 
of the Civil Code, and the parties may expressly or impliedly choose the applicable law. In the 
absence of choice, the law of the common residence will apply. However, if the parties have 
different places of residence, it could be argued  that Article 23 of the Civil Code should be 
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invoked, so as to enable the court to apply the provisions of the Rome I Regulation, rather than 
the law of the place of contracting.  
 
Issues excluded from the scope of the applicable law 
 Some issues are excluded from the scope of the law governing the internal relationship 
between the principal and the agent. These issues will be examined as follows. 
 
FORMAL VALIDITY  
 The formal validity of the agency contract between the principal and the agent is 
excluded from scope of the Hague Agency Convention by virtue of Article 2(b).
103
 In other 
words, the law governing the internal relationship, as determined by Articles 5 or 6, will not 
apply to the formal validity of this contract.
104
 The matter will instead be left to the conflict rules 
of the forum country. 
 Moreover, the Rome I Regulation partly removes this issue from the scope of the law 
governing the internal relationship, as determined by Articles 3 and 4. Instead Article 11(1) and 
(2) regulate formal validity. 
 Pursuant to Article 11(1) of the Regulation, the formal validity of an agency contract 
entered into between parties who are in the same country will be governed by the law governing 
the internal relationship, as determined by Articles 3 or 4 of the Regulation, or by the law of the 
country in which the contract is concluded. Whichever of these laws is more favourable to the 
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formal validity of the contract will apply. By Article 11(2), when the parties are in different 
countries, the formal validity will be governed by the law governing the internal relationship, or 
by the law of any country in which one of the parties was present at the time of conclusion, or 
was habitually resident at that time. Again, whichever of these laws is more favourable to the 
formal validity of the contract will apply. 
 In the UAE, formal validity is explicitly referred to in Article 19 of the Civil Code as 
falling within its scope. Thus, the parties may choose expressly or impliedly the law governing 
the formal validity of the internal relationship. However, in the absence of choice, the law of the 
parties’ common residence is applied, but in respect to the agency contract the principal and the 
agent do not always live in the same country. Moreover, in cases where there is no common 
residence, the law of the country where the contract was concluded is applied. It is obvious that 
the legislator in the UAE overlooked cases where the contract was concluded by means of 
correspondence across borders. This has become particularly problematic in relation to cross-
border electronic transactions. Hence, the court may apply Article 11(2) of the Regulation in this 
case, pursuant to Article 23 of the Civil Code.  
 Furthermore, in respect of the preference between the Rome I Regulation approach and 
that of the UAE Code, it is noteworthy that the Regulation solution is more flexible, in that it 
enables application of the most validating of the various laws referred to; while under the UAE 
Code, the court must apply a single specified law.  
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 CAPACITY 
 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Hague Agency Convention, the principal and the agent’s 
capacity is excluded from the scope of the law governing the internal relationship.
105
 Thus, the 
matter is left to the conflict rules of the forum country. 
 The Rome I Regulation also excludes the capacity of both companies and individuals 
from the scope of the Regulation pursuant to Article 1(2)(a) and (f).
106
 Nonetheless, Article 13 of 
the Regulation provides an exception where the parties (principal and agent) are in the same 
country when they conclude the contract and both have capacity according to the law of this 
country. In such a case a party who is an individual (rather than a company) cannot rely on the 
law of another country to invoke his own incapacity. However this barrier applies only if the 
other party was aware of this incapacity at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, or he was 
unaware because of his negligence.
107
 Some argue that the purpose of Article 13 is to protect the 
party who concludes the contract in good faith.
108
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 Since capacity is for the most part excluded from the scope of the Regulation, the court 
should apply the traditional conflict rule of the forum country to determine the law governing the 
capacity of the principal and the agent. As regards an individual (as distinct from a company),  
English law recognises a rule of alternative reference to determine the law that is applicable to 
capacity. This refers to the proper law of the internal relationship, as determined by the 
Regulation, to govern the capacity of the principal and the agent. However, if an individual lacks 
capacity according to the proper law, his capacity will be subjected to his personal law. In other 
words, it is sufficient in the English approach that each party (the principal and the agent) has 
capacity either according to the proper law of the internal relationship, or according to the 
personal law of that party. In contrast, a company must have capacity both under the law 
governing the contract and under the law of country where the company is incorporated.
109
 
 In the UAE, pursuant to Article 11(1) of the Civil Code, the capacity of the principal or 
the agent is governed by the law of his nationality. However, the legislator provides an exception 
to this provision in the case when the agency contract is transacted and its results materialise in 
the UAE, and one party lacks capacity according to the law of his nationality, and it is not easy 
for other party to discover the incapacity. In such a case this incapacity will be disregarded.
110
 
According to Article 11(2), a company's capacity will be subjected to the law of the country 
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where its main administrative centre is located. But insofar as the company conducts activities in 
the UAE, the UAE internal law will apply.
111
 
 In respect to the preference between the English approach and that of the UAE law, it is 
noteworthy that the English solution is more flexible than the UAE approach, and it is more 
suitable to international agency contracts for many reasons. The English approach adopts an 
alternative solution between the law of the internal relationship and the party’s personal law, and 
makes it sufficient that the party has capacity according to one of these two laws. In contrast the 
UAE law provides a general provision in favour of the application of the law of a party’s 
nationality, but makes includes an exception to this provision to avoid the application of this law 
to the party's lack of capacity, and then subjects his capacity to the UAE internal law.  
 To avoid the application of the personal law, UAE law requires that the agency contract 
should be transacted and materialised in the UAE, while according to the English law, it is not 
required that the agency contract be transacted in the UK. Additionally, the UAE requires that 
the lack of capacity be a result of a hidden cause which is difficult for the other party to discover. 
The English approach does not have such a requirement. Moreover, pursuant to the UAE conflict 
rule regarding the lack of capacity, the UAE internal law will apply to consider the party capable, 
whereas, in accordance with the English approach, the law governing the internal relationship 
will apply.  
 Some argue that it is more adequate for international transactions that the parties' 
capacities be subjected to the law of the country in which the contract was concluded.
112
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Nevertheless, this opinion may lead to difficulty in determining the place of contracting, 
particularly when the contract was concluded by means of correspondence across borders. 
 
The issues within the scope of the applicable law  
 The law that governs the internal relationship, whether determined by the parties or by 
reference to default rules, will apply to the whole contract between the principal and the agent 
from the creation of the contract to its termination.
113
 However, some specific issues that fall 
within the scope of the applicable law merit specific attention as follows. 
 
THE EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF THE INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP  
 The formation of the contract between the principal and the agent is governed by the law 
which is putatively applicable to the contract.
114
 This rule is adopted both by Article 10(1) of the 
Regulation
115
 and by Article 8(1) of the Agency Convention
116
 Some argue that the main 
problem which may arise in relation to the formation of the internal relationship is where a party 
(principal or agent) did not expect to be bound by the law governing the internal relationship. 
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This includes, for instance, cases when the applicable law would consider silence as an 
acceptance of an offer, and the party did not respond to the other party's offer; with the result that 
the silent party will be bound in circumstances where under the law of his residence he would 
not be bound.
117
 The Regulation solves this problem by means of an exception specified by 
Article 10(2), which enables the party to rely on the law of the country of his habitual residence 
to avoid his liability under the contract. To do so he must establish that in all the circumstances it 
would be unreasonable to determine the effect of his words and conduct, as giving rise to his 
consent, in reference to the law governing the internal relationship. 
 Moreover, the essential or substantive validity of the agreement between the principal 
and the agent is within the scope of the law that is applicable to the internal relationship. This 
rule is adopted by Article 8(1) of the Agency Convention
118
 and Article 10 (1) of the Regulation. 
Thus defects in consent, such as fraud, error or duress fall within the scope of the applicable law. 
In other words, whether any party was influenced by factors vitiating his consent when he 
entered into the agency contract, and whether the contract can therefore be annulled, are 
governed by the law governing the internal relationship.
119
 But questions of substantive validity 
and defects in consent may be affected by the overriding mandatory rules or the public policy of 
the forum.
120
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THE PARTIES' OBLIGATIONS AND THE EXTINCTION OF THESE OBLIGATIONS 
 The law governing the internal relationship will determine the principal's obligations, 
such as paying the agent's remuneration, and the agent’s obligations, such as his duties of care, 
skill and loyalty. It also governs the validity, interpretation and effects of exclusion clauses.
121
 
Moreover, the agent's authority to appoint a sub-agent is also governed by the law governing the 
internal relationship.
122
    
 The extinction of the principal and the agent's obligations is within the scope of the law 
governing the internal relationship. Thus, this law will govern a variety of ways of extinguishing 
obligations, such as performance, discharge, frustration of the contract, and waiving of rights.
123
 
The Agency Convention, by Article 8(1), subjects the extinction of such obligations to the law 
applicable to the internal relationship.
124
 The Regulation also adopts this rule by Article 12(1)(d). 
Furthermore, both the Agency Convention and the Rome I Regulation provide for prescription  
and time-limitation of rights to be subjected to the law governing the agency agreement between 
the principal and the agent.
125
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 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 14 above, p. 265. 
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 See Article 8(1) of the Agency Convention, and Article 12(1)(d) of the Rome I Regulation.  
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INTERPRETATION 
 When interpreting an agency contract to discover the principal and the agent’s intentions, 
the court should do so in accordance with the law governing the internal relationship.
126
 The 
Regulation adopts this rule in Article 12(1)(a), which provides that "The law applicable to a 
contract by virtue of this Regulation shall govern in particular: (a) interpretation". Although the 
Agency Convention does not explicitly so provide, it is clear that the interpretation of the agency 
contract between the principal and the agent should be governed by the law that governs this 
contract.
127
 
 
THE MANNER OF PERFORMANCE 
 In relation to the manner of performance, a question arises regarding which law governs 
this issue. Pursuant to Article 9 of the Agency Convention, the court should take into account the 
law of the country of performance in regard to the manner of performance.
128
 But this only 
means that the law of this country should be taken into account, and not that the issue of the 
manner of performance of the internal relationship must be subjected to the law of the place in 
which the contract is carried out.
129
 Consequently, the manner of performance will be subjected 
to the law governing the internal relationship, and the provisions of the law of the place of 
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 Gralf Peter Calliess, n. 9 above, p. 251. 
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 Article 9 of the Regulation provides: "Whatever law may be applicable to the agency relationship, in regard 
to the manner of performance the law of the place of performance shall be taken into consideration."  
129
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performance will be considered as factual data taken into account to assess the extent of the 
agent's duties and rights.
130
 
 For example, an agent instructed to buy shares on a stock exchange will be justified in 
following the procedures which are laid down by the law of the country in which the exchange is 
located. 
 By virtue of Article 12(2) of the Regulation, when determining the law governing the 
manner of performance, account should be taken of the law of the country where the 
performance is carried out. Furthermore, in the case of a defective performance, this law will be 
taken into account to determine the steps that should be taken.
131
 It should be noted that the 
substance of a party's obligation will not be affected by the law of the country of performance, 
but this law will be referred to in order to regulate the minor details of the performance.
132
 
 In the UAE, the legislator does not specifically regulate the question of the law applicable 
to the manner of performance. Thus, the court may have regard to the law of the country of 
performance in this case under Article 23 of the Civil Code. 
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 Karsten Report, n. 16 above, parg. 196, p. 54. 
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 Article 12(2) of the Regulation provides: "In relation to the manner of performance and the steps to be 
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF NON-PERFORMANCE 
 Pursuant to Article 8(1) of the Agency Convention, the consequences of non-performance 
are governed by the law governing the internal relationship.
133
 Thus, whenever any party 
(principal or agent) has not performed his obligation properly, legal consequences will arise, 
which are governed by the law of the internal relationship. Moreover the concept of non-
performance covers many situations, such as when the party does not perform at all, when the 
party performs too late, or when the performance is defective.
134
  
 The Rome I Regulation also refers non-performance to the proper law of the contract 
according to Article 12(1)(b).
135
 And by Article 12(1)(c), the proper law also governs, within the 
limits of the powers conferred on the court by its procedural law, the consequences of a total or 
partial breach of obligations, including the assessment of damages in so far as it is governed by 
rules of law. 
 
ACTUAL AUTHORITY 
 It is clear that under the Rome I Regulation the existence of actual authority, between the 
principal and the agent, should be governed by the proper law of the agreement between them, 
determined in accordance with the Regulation.
136
 In addition, Article 8(2)(a) of the Agency 
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Convention provides that the existence and extent of the agent’s authority are determined by the 
law that governs the internal relationship. The modification and termination of the agent’s 
authority are also governed by this law.
137
 
 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF NULLITY 
 It was apparently on the basis that the consequences of nullity fall within the law of 
restitution or quasi-contract that the UK made a reservation against applying Article 10(1)(e) of 
the Rome Convention, which referred this issue to the proper law of the contract. Some argue 
that the provision of this Article is inappropriate in such cases when the parties expressly choose 
an applicable law, because it might not have a factual connection to the situation.
138
 But no 
reservation is possible in relation to Article 12(1)(e) of the Rome I Regulation, which echoes 
Article 10(1)(e) of the Rome Convention.
139
 Thus, even in the UK a claim for the recovery back 
of money paid under a void contract is now governed by the law governing the contract.
140
 
 Although the Agency Convention does not contain a provision similar to Article 12(1)(e) 
of the Rome I Regulation, some argue that the law governing the internal relationship should 
govern the consequences of the nullity of the agency contract between the principal and the 
agent, because these consequences are most closely connected to the agency contract.
141
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Conclusion 
 As previously discussed in this section, it is clear that, in enabling the parties to make an 
express or implied choice of the law governing their contract, Article 19(1) of the UAE Civil 
Code has adopted a modern approach with respect to choice of law in respect of international 
contracts, and that this applies to the internal agency relationship between the principal and the 
agent. This approach is recognised by Article 5 of the Hague Convention 1978, as well as by 
Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation. Nonetheless, it would be desirable for the UAE legislator 
to enact a specific provision addressing the question of choice of law with respect to agency 
contracts. 
 It is also clear the UAE legislation does not contain any provision explicitly regulating 
some particular issues in respect of express or implied choice of the law applicable to a contract; 
thus, the court may use Article 23 of the Civil Code to adopt solutions for these issues. For 
instance, in respect of express choice, to establish that the parties may choose the law governing 
their contract at any time; and that the parties may choose another law to replace the law that 
they had previously chosen. Nevertheless, the subsequent choice should not prejudice the 
contract’s formal validity, and it should not affect negatively the rights of third parties. Article 23 
may also be used to permit the parties to choose several laws to govern different parts of their 
contract. Furthermore, in regard to implied choice, the court may use Article 23 to adopt a wide 
view of the implied choice equivalent to a test of the closest connection. Nevertheless, it would 
be preferable for the legislator in the UAE to amend Article 19 to address these issues. 
 However, Article 19(1) of the Civil Code also establishes default rules, applicable to all 
types of international contract, in favour of the law of the country that is the common residence 
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of the parties, or (where there is no common residence) the law of the country where the parties 
concluded the contract. This approach is in contrast to the modern approach, as recognised by the 
general rule specified by Article 6(1) of the Agency Convention (which refers to the agent's 
business establishment or his habitual residence) and the exception specified by Article 6(2) 
(which refers to the principal's business establishment or his habitual residence), or by Article 
4(1)(b) of the Rome I Regulation (which refers to the agent's habitual residence) and Article 4(3) 
(which refers to the law of the country that is obviously more closely connected to the internal 
relationship than the agent's habitual residence). Thus, commentators argue that Article 23 of the 
Civil Code may be used to apply the law of the country where the agent has his habitual 
residence, or the principle of closest connection, in the absence of a choice by the parties. 
Nevertheless, it would be preferable for the UAE legislator to enact an amendment adopting 
default rules reflecting those of the Rome I Regulation, since (in the present writer’s opinion) the 
Rome I Regulation approach provides better solutions than the Hague Convention approach.. 
Moreover an explicit amendment would be more helpful to the courts than leaving them to utilise 
general principles of private international law (under Article 23), as courts may be reluctant to 
depart from apparently clear express provisions in order to apply general principles.  
 Consequently, it could be argued that the UAE legislator should regulate choice of law 
with respect to the internal agency relationship by a specific article that adopts a modern 
approach, respecting the parties’ freedom to choose expressly or impliedly the applicable law 
and establishing suitable the default rules for cases where no choice has been made by the 
parties. 
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 It is also clear the UAE legislation does not contain any provisions specifying which law 
governs an employment or consumer contract, or an agency contract when it is considered an 
employment or consumer contract; consequently, some argue in favour of the application of 
Article 23 of the Civil Code. Nevertheless, it could be argued that it would be preferable if the 
Civil Code were amended by the addition of provisions regulating these questions. 
 As regards choice of law with respect to agency contracts, the operation of the normally 
applicable law may be excluded by the public policy of the forum country, and may also be 
displaced by overriding mandatory provisions. These questions will be examined in the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PUBLIC POLICY AND 
OVERRIDING MANDATORY PROVISIONS 
 
Introduction 
 In regard to conflict law, there is a generally accepted principle whereby the application 
of the normally applicable law may be excluded because it offends the public policy of the forum 
country. This principle extends to choice of law in respect of agency contracts. Additionally, 
many countries recognise the existence of overriding mandatory provisions that should be 
applied regardless of the normally applicable law. Examples of such provisions include EEC 
Directive 86/653 on the co-ordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed 
commercial agents,
1
 which is transposed in Great Britain by the Commercial Agents (Council 
Directive) Regulations 1993. It seems that all the Articles of the Directive should be regarded as 
overriding mandatory provisions, and not only Article 17 and 18, which give the agent certain 
rights in relation to the termination of the contract by the principal.
2
 Similarly, in the UAE the 
provisions of Federal Act 18/1981 on the Regulation of Commercial Agencies (the Agency 
Code) appears to be overriding mandatory provisions, as generally understood for conflict 
purposes. 
 These two concepts are important, since (in the first place) the law applicable to the 
relationship between a principal and an agent, as determined in accordance with the rules which 
                                      
1
  [1986] OJ L382/17. 
2
  See Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, UK, 15th edition, 2012), p. 2120. 
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we have examined in Chapter Four, will be set aside if its content is incompatible with the 
forum's public policy. Secondly, the operation of the normally applicable law may be displaced 
so as to give effect to overriding mandatory provisions. Consequently we need to examine these 
two questions to understand how these issues impact on the law applicable to agency 
relationships. 
 With regard to public policy and overriding mandatory provisions, we shall first consider 
the possible impact of public policy on the applicable law. Thereafter, we shall proceed to 
address the possible impact of overriding mandatory provisions on the applicable law. Next we 
shall examine Directive 86/653 and the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 
1993, to determine the application of the Directive as overriding mandatory provisions in the EU 
Member States in respect of agency contracts. Finally, we shall examine the UAE Regulation on 
Commercial Agencies. 
 
ycilbu cilbuP  
 The Hague Agency Convention, like many other conventions, recognises the principle of 
public policy. Thus, under Article 17 of the Agency Convention,
3
 the court should refuse to 
apply the normally applicable law if such application would infringe essential values of the legal 
system of the forum. In other words, the applicable law will be set aside its provisions are 
manifestly incompatible with the forum's public policy.
4
 
                                      
3
 Article 17 of the Convention provides that "The application of a law specified by this Convention may be 
refused only where such application would be manifestly incompatible with public policy (ordre public)." 
4
 H.L.E. Verhagen, Agency in Private International Law: The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Agency (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Netherland, 1995), p. 248. 
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 A similar saving in favour of the forum’s public policy is made by the Rome I Regulation 
in Article 21. Consequently, application of the normally applicable law will be refused in rare 
cases where its provisions are inconsistent with the concepts of essential justice of the forum 
country.
5
 In other words, when the application of the law governing the internal relationship 
between the principal and the agent is manifestly incompatible with the forum's public policy, it 
will be set aside. Under both the Hague Convention and the Rome I Regulation, the effect of the 
public policy proviso is to exclude the relevant substantive rule of the normally applicable law in 
favour of the corresponding rule of the lex fori. 
 By Article 27 of the Civil Code, the UAE legislator has adopted the doctrine of public 
policy in the context of choice of law rules. This article states that "It shall not be permissible to 
apply the provisions of a law specified by the preceding Articles if such provisions are contrary 
to Islamic Shari'a, public order, or morals in the State of the United Arab Emirates." Thus, public 
policy plays a significant role in the exclusion of offending provisions in the applicable law in 
the light of the basic concepts and fundamental values underpinning the UAE community. The 
exclusion is limited to the provision that is contrary to public policy, and consequently, the court 
will apply other provisions of the applicable law that are not inconsistent with public policy. The 
lex fori will apply instead of the provision which is excluded by reference to public policy.
6
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
5
 See Peter Stone, EU Prvate International Law (Elgar European Law, UK, 3rd edition, 2014), p. 335. 
6
 Okasha  Mohamed  Abdel-aal, (نيناوقلا عزانت يف طيسولا) Conflict of law (Dubai Police Academy, 2008), p. 402. 
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Overriding Mandatory Rules 
 The Rome I Regulation defines the concept of overriding mandatory provisions in Article 
9(1):   
"Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial 
by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social, or economic 
organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their 
scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation." 
 It should be noted that the Regulation uses the expression “mandatory provision” instead 
of “mandatory rule” which is used in Article 7 of the Rome Convention.7 The Hague Agency 
Convention also uses the expression “mandatory rule”. But this change in terminology does not 
appear to have any significance. 
 The aim of these provisions is to safeguard public interests of a country that are related to 
its economy or its social or political arrangements, or to protect weaker contracting parties, such 
as consumers or employees. As regards the Hague Agency Convention, the preliminary draft 
provided for mandatory rules which aimed to protect the agent; but in the final version this 
limitation has been removed.
8
 
 Under Article 16 of the Hague Agency Convention,
9
 the law governing agency, whether 
in regard to an internal or external relationship, is potentially subjected to an exception in favour 
                                      
7
 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 2 above, p. 1828.  
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 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 4 above, p. 226.  
9
 Article 16 provides: "In the application of this Convention, effect may be given to the mandatory rules of 
any State with which the situation has a significant connection, if and in so far as, under the law of that State, those 
rules must be applied whatever the law specified by its choice of law rules." 
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of overriding mandatory rules of a country that has a significant connection with the situation. 
Under the Convention, the court has an option to apply such a rule, because the Convention uses 
the expression: "effect may be given". In other words, the wording of Article 16 indicates that 
the application of this rule is at the discretion of the court. Moreover, to permit the operation of a 
mandatory rule under Article 16, the rule must have overriding character under the law of the 
country to which the rule belongs.
10
 
 Thus, according to the Hague Agency Convention, the overriding mandatory rules of the 
forum country or of a third country may be applicable when there is a significant connection. In 
addition, the mandatory rules of the law governing an agency contract will apply under the 
normal conflict rules as part of the normally applicable law. Further, the mandatory rules of the 
forum country may also be applied pursuant to public policy under Article 17.
11
 
 Under Article 9(2) of the Rome I Regulation, the application of the forum’s overriding 
mandatory provisions is not restricted by the law determined by the provisions of the Regulation. 
However, Recital 37 indicates that the forum’s overriding mandatory provisions should be 
applied only in exceptional circumstances.
12
  
 In contrast, Article 9(3)
13
 provides that the overriding mandatory provisions of a third 
country may be applied where the contractual obligations have been or have to be performed in 
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 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 4 above, p. 226. 
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 Peter Stone, n. 5 above, p. 338.  
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  Article 9(3) provide: "Effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country 
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147 
 
that country, and the performance is unlawful according its law (country of performance). It is 
also required that the court, when deciding on the application of Article 9(3), should take into 
account the purpose, nature, and consequences of the overriding mandatory provisions in 
question.
14
 In any event, in view of the features required by Article 9(3), it seems likely that this 
provision will rarely have any effect on issues concerning agency.  
 From the foregoing discussion, it appears that the Hague Agency Convention requires a 
significant connection between the agency contract and the country whose overriding mandatory 
rule is under consideration, whether these rules are from the lex fori or from a third country. In 
contrast, the Regulation gives general respect to the lex fori, but otherwise it focuses on unlawful 
performance with a view to applying the law of the country of performance. It must be noted 
that, as regards overriding mandatory rules of third countries, the Rome Convention resembled 
the Hague Convention, and merely required a close connection between the third country and the 
contract.
15
 Moreover, under the Hague Agency Convention, the Rome Convention, and the 
Rome I Regulation, the overriding mandatory provisions of any country will only apply in a 
                                                                                                                       
provisions, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-
application."  
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 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 2 above, p.1836. See also Peter Stone, n. 5 above, p. 341; and Geert Van 
Calster, European Private International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013), p. 147. 
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 Article 7(1) of the Convention  provides: "When applying under this Convention  the law of a country, 
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nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application." 
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situation where the law of the country to which the provisions belong asserts an interest in their 
application and insists that they be given overriding effect.
16
 
 In the UAE, the legislature does not stipulate expressly for the application of overriding 
mandatory rules in the manner of the Hague Agency Convention and the Rome I Regulation. 
Nonetheless, some argue that a UAE court may apply such rules on the basis of the public policy 
proviso specified by Article 27 of the Civil Code.
17
 While this would enable a UAE court to 
apply overriding mandatory provision of UAE law on the basis of public policy, it would be 
difficult to use Article 27 of the Civil Code to apply the overriding mandatory provisions of a 
third country. That is because the public policy proviso differs from respect for overriding 
mandatory provisions in some aspects. Firstly, public policy functions by excluding the 
application of foreign rules which are inconsistent with the public policy of the forum country, 
while a saving for overriding mandatory provisions is applied directly to safeguard the interest of 
the country in question. In other words, in the case of public policy, the court initially applies its 
conflict rules to determine the applicable law, after which the applicable foreign law will be 
excluded because it is inconsistent with the forum’s public policy. In contrast overriding 
mandatory provisions apply directly without the application of the normal conflict rules. Another 
difference is that public policy, whether it is determined by the court or the legislator, does not 
operate by way of a list of cases where foreign law is regarded as contrary to public policy, 
whereas overriding mandatory provisions are sometimes indicated by a legislature in specifying 
the territorial scope of the substantive rules. Despite these differences, some argue that the UAE 
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 In this sense, see H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 4 above, p. 229. 
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 Okasha  Mohamed  Abdel-aal, n. 6 above, p. 367. 
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courts may apply mandatory provisions of a third country if it has a close connection with the 
dispute on the basis of general principles of private international law under Article 23.
18
 
 
EEC Directive 86/653 and the (GB) Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 
1993. 
 EEC Directive 86/653, which is designed to harmonise the laws of the EU Member States 
in regard to the internal relationship between the principal and the agent, is implemented in 
England and Scotland by the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993/3053 (as 
amended). It is clear that this Directive is a mandatory provision in the Member States.
19
 The 
European Court, in Ingmar v Eaton Leonard,
20
 decided that the Directive must be applied in the 
case where an agent performed his activities in a Member State, even if the principal was 
established in a non-member country, and (under the normal conflict rules) the agency contract 
was governed by the law of that country. 
 The Directive’s aim is to unify and harmonise domestic law in the EU Member States in 
relation to the internal relationship between the principal and the agent,
21
 so as to protect the 
weaker party (the agent)
22
 and to maintain the security of commercial transactions.
23
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 Okasha  Mohamed  Abdel-aal, n. 6 above, p. 367. 
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 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 2 above, p. 2116. See also Peter Stone, n. 5 above, p. 339. 
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International Instruments and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2012), p. 350. See also 
H.L.E. Verhagen, p. 230. 
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 Peter Stone, n. 5 above, p. 338. See also H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 4 above, p. 230. 
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 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 4 above, p. 230. 
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 The Directive regulates the rights and obligations of the commercial agent and the 
principal, the agent's remuneration, the conclusion of the agency contract, and its termination. It 
also deals with the compensation or indemnity payable to an agent as a result of the termination 
of the agency contract.
24
 
 As discussed above, the overriding mandatory provisions of any country will apply in 
that country in a situation which is determined according to the law of that country. In other 
words, the scope of application of the overriding mandatory provision will be determined 
according to the law of the enacting country. In the case of the Directive, the relevant country in 
the European Union. Thus, in all the Member States the courts will have to apply the Directive in 
the cases where the European Court rules that it is applicable. In terms of the Rome I Regulation, 
one may ascribe this result to Article 9(2), on the overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori, 
or to Article 23, which gives primacy to other provisions of European law which deal with 
particular matters. 
 Thus, in examining the scope of the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations, 
the starting point should be the scope of the Directive. The GB regulations must, so far as 
possible, be interpreted so as to accord with the requirements of the Directive, as interpreted by 
the European Court. Insofar as such an interpretation of the GB regulations proved to be 
impossible, the UK would be in breach of its obligations under EU law. Thus, in this respect the 
precise wording of the GB Regulations should be treated as of secondary importance, especially 
as it is clear that their drafting offers an excellent example of how not to proceed.  
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 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 2 above, p. 2116. See also Fergus Randolph and Jonathan Davey, The 
European Law of Commercial Agency  (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 3rd edition, 2010), p. 55; and Roy Goode, Herbert 
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 According to Article 1(2),
25
 the 1993 Regulations apply to the internal relationship 
between the principal and the commercial agent; however, the external relationship, whether 
between the principal and the contractor or between the agent and the contractor, is outside the 
scope of the Regulation.
26
 Additionally, pursuant to Article 2(1),
27
 the scope of the Regulations 
is confined to self-employed agents who act on behalf of the principal, so that if the agent is an 
employee of the principal the Regulations will not apply.
28
 The provisions are also confined to 
agents who negotiate the sale or purchase of goods (as distinct from services and intangible 
assets, such as shares, bonds and patents). 
 Article 1(2) of the Regulations provides that "These Regulations govern the relations 
between commercial agents and their principals and, subject to paragraph (3), apply in relation to 
the activities of commercial agents in Great Britain". Thus, the Regulations will apply when the 
commercial agent carries out his activities in Britain.
29
 The Regulations do not define the term 
"activities"; however, some rely on the definition of commercial agents in Article 2(1)
30
 in order 
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 Article 1(2) provides: "These Regulations govern the relations between commercial agents and their 
principals and, subject to paragraph (3), apply in relation to the activities of commercial agents in Great Britain." 
26
 See Peter Watts and F.M.B. Reynolds, Bowstead and  Reynoldson on Agency (Thomson Reuters, UK, 19th 
edition, 2010), p. 682. 
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 Article 2(1) provides: " In these Regulations-- “commercial agent” means a self-employed intermediary 
who has continuing authority to negotiate the sale or purchase of goods on behalf of another person (the 
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 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 2 above, p. 2117. 
29
 Peter Watts and F.M.B. Reynolds, n. 26 above, p. 682. 
30
 Article 2(1) provides: ‘… “commercial agent” means a self-employed intermediary who has continuing 
authority to negotiate the sale or purchase of goods on behalf of another person (the “principal”), or to negotiate and 
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to define the term "activities", and conclude that activities include all acts of negotiation or 
conclusion of a sale or purchase of goods contract on behalf of the principal.
31
 On the other hand, 
the question may arise whether the agent acting on behalf of the principal is selling or buying a 
service, rather than goods, and thus acting outside the scope of the Regulation. It was held in 
Crane v Sky In-home Services
32
 that the agency contract in question (involving the sale of Sky 
Television digital packages) was related to a service; and therefore was outside the Regulation's 
scope. 
 The requirement for the application of the Regulations is that the activity should be 
carried out in Britain; however, geographically, it is not explicitly required that the agent, being 
an individual, should be physically present in Britain, or, in the case of a legal entity, should 
maintain any place of business therein. Therefore it is arguable that the Regulations will cover 
the case where the agent conducts his activities in Great Britain by correspondence, such as 
telephone, electronic mail or telex.
33
 
 However, it can also be argued that the Directive should be interpreted as applying where 
the agent’s establishment, at or from which he is wholly or mainly to carry out the activities 
envisaged by the agency contract, or his habitual residence (as defined by the Rome I 
Regulation), is situated within the European Union. Some support for this approach may be 
drawn from the decision of the European Court in Ingmar GB Ltd. v Eaton Leonard 
                                                                                                                       
conclude the sale or purchase of goods on behalf of and in the name of that principal; but shall be understood as not 
including in particular: …’. 
31
 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 2 above, p. 2117.  
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 [2007] EWHC 66 (ChD), at para 11. 
33
 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 2 above, p. 2117. See also Peter Watts and F.M.B. Reynolds, n. 26 above, p. 
683.  
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Technologies Inc.
34
 On this basis, references in the GB Regulations to the place of the agent’s 
activities should be interpreted accordingly. 
 Moreover, the Regulations do not require the agent and the principal to be established in  
different Member States, and do not specifically refer to the case where one or both are 
established in a non-member country. Nonetheless it is indicated in the Recitals to the Directive 
that its provisions will apply when the commercial agent and the principal are established in 
different Member States. Dicey argues that such a restriction cannot be accepted since it will 
prejudice the achievement of harmonisation of the law in the area and will not achieve protection 
for the agent. They further argue that the Regulations will apply when the agent carries out his 
activities in Great Britain regardless of the place of either the agent’s or the principal’s 
establishment.
35
 Nonetheless, the better view appears to be that the Directive should be 
interpreted as applying where the agent’s establishment, at or from which he is wholly or mainly 
to carry out the activities envisaged by the agency contract, or his habitual residence (as defined 
by the Rome I Regulation), is situated within the European Union. This approach seems to 
accord best with the reasoning of the European Court in Ingmar GB Ltd. v Eaton Leonard 
Technologies Inc., where it ruled that Articles 17 and 18 of the Directive should be applied 
where the agent's activities are conducted in a Member State, although the principal is 
established in a non-member country (in casu, California), and the contract terms indicate 
                                      
34
 Case C-381/98, [2000] ECR I-9305.  
35
 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 2 above, p. 2119. 
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expressly that the law of that country should apply.
36
 It follows that the Regulations will apply 
even though the parties choose the law of a non-Member State.
37
  
 Nonetheless, Article 1(3)(a)
38
 of the Regulations provides that if the commercial agent 
and the principal choose the law of another Member State to govern their internal relationship, 
the Regulations will not apply, even though the agent carries out his activities in Great Britain.
39
 
In this respect the question may arise about the application of the Regulations in the following 
case: a French agent, who has his habitual residence in Paris, carries out his activities in Great 
Britain, and the parties do not choose, expressly or impliedly, the applicable law; but the default 
rules indicate the application of French law (that of a Member State) in this case. Following the 
literal meaning of the words, "the parties have agreed", it can be argued the Regulations will be 
applied. Nonetheless, the Directive is satisfied if the law of any Member State is applied, and the 
GB Regulations indicate that that the UK is happy to give effect to a choice of the parties, or a 
default solution under Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation, which leads to the application of the 
law of any Member State in a case to which the Directive applies. 
 Moreover, some
40
 argue that the Regulations will not apply when an English agent carries 
out his activities in the territory of another Member State, even though the parties choose English 
law to govern their contract. However, as an exception, if the parties choose English law to 
                                      
36
 Case C-381/98, [2000] ECR I-9305.  
37
  Peter Watts and F.M.B. Reynolds, n. 26 above, p. 687. 
38
 Article 1(3)(a) provides: "A court or tribunal shall … apply the law of the other member State concerned in 
place of regulations 3 to 22  where the parties have agreed that the agency contract is to be governed by the law of 
another member State." 
39
 Peter Watts and F.M.B. Reynolds, n. 26 above, p. 687. 
40
  Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 2 above, p. 2118.   
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govern their contract, according to Article 1(3)(b),
41
 the Regulations will apply when the law of 
that Member State (the place of activities) includes provisions enabling the parties to choose the 
law of another Member State as an applicable law.
42
 
 Nonetheless, some argue that if the parties choose to include the provisions of the 
Regulations in their contract, the Regulations will apply irrespective of where the agent conducts 
his activities.
43
 
 If the agent is established or habitually resident, and accordingly to be treated as 
conducting activities, outside Europe, the Directive does not apply. However there seems to be 
no reason why the parties should not agree that their rights and obligations should be determined 
as if the Directive applied. This would amount effectively to incorporation by reference, and the 
validity of such incorporation would be subject to the law governing the contract. If English law 
is the proper law, such incorporation appears to be acceptable. 
 It is necessary also to consider the situation where a Member State has extended the 
scope of its legislation transposing the Directive beyond the scope of the Directive itself; for 
example, so as to apply to an agent who sells the principal’s services (rather than goods). This 
situation was addressed by the European Court in Unamar v Navigation Maritime Bulgare,
44
 
where it ruled that such a Member State may permissibly invoke Article 9(2) of Rome I, on 
                                      
41
 Article 1(3)(b) provides: "A court or tribunal shall … (whether or not it would otherwise be required to do 
so) apply these regulations where the law of another member State corresponding to these regulations enable the 
parties to agree that the agency contract is to be governed by the law of a different member State and the parties 
have agreed that it is to be governed by the law of England and Wales or Scotland." 
42
 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 2 above p. 2118.  
43
 Ibid. 
44
  Case C-184/12, [2014] 1 All ER (Comm) 625.  
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overriding mandatory provisions, to apply its extended provisions to a contract governed by the 
law of another Member State. 
 
Regulation of Commercial Agencies in the UAE 
 The UAE legislator considers agency contracts to involve a public interest. In addition, it 
has desired to provide protection to local agencies against foreign principals.
45
 Consequently, 
Federal Act 18/1981, on the Regulation of Commercial Agencies, was enacted. It has been 
amended many times: by Act 14/1988, Act 13/2006 and Act 2/2010. This enactment (which may 
also be referred to as the Agency Code) regulates the internal relationship between a commercial 
agent and his principal by providing many protective provisions for the agent. Nonetheless, there 
are many requirements which must be fulfilled to enable these provisions to be applied, and these 
are stated hereinafter. 
  The first requirement, provided by Article 2, is that the agent should be an individual 
with UAE nationality or a company that is wholly owned by individuals with UAE nationality.
46
 
Additionally, according to Article 3, the commercial agent must be registered in the Commercial 
Agents Register,
47
 and the agency contract should be written and the contract should be ratified
48
 
                                      
45
 See Adil Sinjakli, Commercial Agency Disputes and Related Court Judgments in the UAE [2001] 
International Business Lawyer 458.  
46
 Article 2 provides: "Carrying out the activities of commercial agency in the state shall be restricted to 
national individuals or companies wholly owned by national physical persons".  
47
 Article 3 provides that "the activities of the commercial agency in the state shall only be performed  by 
persons whose names are inscribed in the commercial agents' register provided for this purpose in the Ministry; any 
commercial agency not registered in this register shall not be considered, nor lawsuit therefore shall be heard."  
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pursuant to Article 4.
49
 If these requirements are fulfilled, any dispute related to the agency will 
be subject to the protective provisions of the Agency Code and will be heard by a UAE court. 
Furthermore, according to Article 1, which defines an agency contract and an agent, it is clear 
that this Regulation will apply to all of an agent's activities, such as distribution, sale, and 
providing services, on behalf of the principal.  
 
Protective  Provisions 
 The Regulation of Agency imposes many protective provisions, which are considered 
mandatory, and which apply regardless of the law otherwise governing the internal relationship 
between the principal and the agent. Some of these provisions will now be examined. 
 Although the principal may choose to appoint a single agent for all territories of the 
country or a different agent for each emirate, the registered agent has an exclusive right in his 
agency's territory.
50
 The exclusive agency grants the agent a right to claim a commission for all 
transactions concluded within his territory, even if the transaction was concluded by the principal 
                                                                                                                       
48
  The words (ratified contract) in Article 4 mean that the commercial agent must be registered in the 
Commercial Agents Register.  
49
       Article 4 provides that "for the validity of the agency at the time of registration, the agent must be directly 
bound to the original principal by a written and ratified contract."  
50
 Article 5 provides: "The original principal may resort to the services of one agent in the state like one area, 
as he is allowed to resort to one agent in each Emirate, or in several Emirates, provided that the distribution of goods 
and services object of the agency is restricted to him inside the agency area". 
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or a third party, and even if the agent did not seek to conclude the transaction.
51
 Furthermore, 
pursuant to Article 23 of the Regulation, the importation by others of any products within the 
ambit of a registered commercial agency is prohibited. In that regard, the agent has a right to 
obtain the assistance of UAE authorities to prohibit the importation of any product within the 
scope of the agency.
52
 
 Moreover, under Article 8, an agency contract may not be terminated or left unrenewed 
by the principal without a substantial reason to justify the termination or non-renewal, whether it 
be on the agency’s expiration date or during the agency’s contract term.53 In addition, pursuant to 
                                      
51
        Article 7 provides that "the agent shall be entitled to commissions for the transactions concluded by the 
agent himself or by other persons in the area of agency, even if the transactions were not concluded as a result of the 
effort of the agent". 
52
 Article 23 provides: "It is not allowed for any person to enter goods, products, manufactures, materials or 
other assets object of any commercial agency registered in the Ministry in the name of another person, for the 
purpose of trading through other than the agent. The customs departments must not release these goods not imported 
by the agent unless approved by the Ministry or the agent. The customs departments and the competent authorities 
each within his concern and upon the application of the agent through the Ministry are required to seize these 
imports and consign them in the ports’ warehouses and the importers’ warehouses until this dispute is adjudicated, 
except for the materials which are decided to traded freely by resolution given by the Council of Ministers, and the 
Ministry is required to erase the commercial agencies related to these materials from the commercial agencies 
register." 
53
 Article 8 provides: "Subject to the provisions of Articles 27 and 28  hereof, the principal may not terminate 
the agency contract or refrain from the renewal thereof unless there is a fundamental reason for the termination or 
non- renewal. Furthermore, the agency may not be re-registered in the register of commercial agents under the name 
of another agent, even if the previous agency's contract was of definite term, unless they said agency has been 
rescinded upon the mutual consent of the agent and the constituent, or if there is a fundamental reason for the 
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Article 9, the injured party, who was damaged by termination of the agency contract, is entitled 
to claim compensation to remedy the damage incurred.
54
 
 
Unregistered Agency 
 Even though registration is required to carry out an agency's activities in the UAE, in 
practice there are many unregistered commercial agents conducting business in the country. 
Moreover, foreign principals often prefer to work through unregistered agents to avoid the 
protective provisions of the Regulation of Commercial Agencies.
55
 Thus, a question may arise in 
regard to the situation of unregistered commercial agents under Article 3, particularly in view of 
the words: ''any commercial agency not registered in this register shall not be considered, nor 
lawsuit therefore shall be heard." 
 Some argue that, in the case of an unregistered agency, the UAE courts should not hear 
any claim according to Article 3.
56
 Older UAE court decisions adopted this viewpoint.
57
 
Nevertheless, it is arguable that this strict interpretation of Article 3 is not equitable. It should be 
interpreted more broadly to allow the court to hear a claim related to an unregistered agency. 
However, in this case the agent would not enjoy the benefit of the protective provisions which 
                                                                                                                       
termination of the agency or its non-renewal that convinces the committee, or subsequent to the issuance of a final 
judicial ruling to cancel the said agency." 
54
 Article 9 provides: "If the termination of an agency contributed to cause damage to any of its parties, the 
prejudiced person is allowed to demand compensation for the damages sustained." 
55
 See Howard, L. Stovall, Recent Revisions to Commercial Agency Law in the United Arab Emirates (2008) 
22 Arab Law Quarterly 313. 
56
 Ibid.       
57
 See the Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation decision in Case 227/1998, 31 May 1998. 
160 
 
are imposed by agency law for a registered agency.
58
 Therefore, the court should apply the 
general rules under the Commercial Code and the Civil Code to solve any dispute between the 
principal and agent in the case of unregistered agency.
59
 The UAE courts have admitted this 
viewpoint in many recent decisions. For instance, the Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation has decided 
in numerous cases
60
 that if a dispute is related to the application of the provisions of the 
Regulation of Commercial Agency, the court would not apply this regulation in the case of 
unregistered commercial agencies in view of Article 3, and it will apply general rules to the 
dispute. The court should take into account Article 22, which provides that a fine in the amount 
of 5000 AED will be imposed on any person practising a commercial agency activity in the state 
contrary to the provisions of agency law. However, no fine can be imposed on the principal. 
 As mentioned above, it appears that the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) 
Regulation 1993 and the UAE Regulation of Commercial Agencies 1981 (with its amendments) 
constitute mandatory provisions which apply regardless of the law normally governing the 
internal relationship between the principal and the agent. Both of the regulations are confined to 
the internal relationship. In respect to the preference between the English approach and the UAE 
approach in regard to determining the regulation’s scope of application, it is noteworthy that the 
English solution provides more protection to the agent and to the commercial interest of the 
country. The UAE approach is confined to a registered agency, which means that an unregistered 
agent receives no protection, particularly when a foreign principal prefers to deal with an 
                                      
58
 Howard L. Stovall, n. 55 above, p. 314. 
59
 See Richard Briggs and Armita Araghi, Franchising in the United Arab Emirates (2009) 7/1 International 
Journal of Franchising Law 6. 
60
 See the Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation decisions in Case 487/2012, 7 November 2012; and Case 875/2009, 
10 September 2009. 
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unregistered agent. Further, UAE legislators desire to provide protection to the weaker local 
agents in order to protect the public interest; the public interest is the most important 
consideration, not the interests of the agent. Consequently, following the English approach may 
provide more protection to the public interest.   
 
Conclusion  
 The public policy proviso plays a significant role in setting aside the normally applicable 
law wherever its provisions are inconsistent with the concepts of essential justice of the forum 
country; or, in other words, where the application of its provisions lead to an infringement of the 
essential values of the legal system of the forum. Thus, the proviso is adopted by various legal 
systems, such as by Article 27 of the UAE Civil Code. Moreover, numerous international 
conventions and regulations recognise the principle of public policy, such as Article 17 of the 
Hague Agency Convention and Article 21 of the Rome I Regulation.  
 Moreover, the law governing the internal agency relationship cannot displace the forum 
country’s overriding mandatory rules. In the UAE, a court may use Article 27 of the UAE Civil 
Code to apply any overriding mandatory provisions of UAE law as a matter of public policy. 
However, some argue the court may apply the overriding mandatory provisions of other 
countries using Article 23. Nonetheless, it could be argued that it is desirable that the legislator 
enact an amendment to the Civil Code, by adding a new Article that provides explicitly for the 
application of overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori. 
 Furthermore, the UAE Federal Act 18/1981 on the Regulation of Commercial Agencies 
(as amended) constitutes overriding mandatory provisions in the UAE, applicable when the 
agency has been registered in the Commercial Agents Register. This approach may be criticised 
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because in practice, there are not many registered agencies, as the principal prefers not to register 
the agency contract to avoid the application of the protective provisions. Consequently, it seems 
that the legislator should amend the Regulation of Commercial Agencies, by specifying that the 
Regulation applies when the agent carries out his activity in the UAE or is established therein, 
and also adding a provision enabling a financial penalty to be imposed on a principal who does 
not register an agency. 
 In this and the previous chapters, we have discussed the law normally governing the 
internal relationship and the exceptional role of public policy and overriding mandatory 
provisions. The law governing the external relationships will be addressed in the next two 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE PRINCIPAL AND THE CONTRACTOR 
 
Introduction 
 Agency contracts differ from other contracts because they involve a triangular 
relationship between three parties: a principal, an agent and a contractor. This relationship is 
further divided into an internal relationship between the principal and the agent, and two external 
relationships, one being an inter praesentes relationship between the agent and contractor, and 
the other an inter absentes relationship between the principal and the contractor. The external 
relationships arise when the agent acts on behalf of the principal and concludes the contract with 
the contractor.
1
 In this chapter, we will examine the law applicable to the external relationship 
between the principal and the contractor. In Chapter 7 we will turn to the external relationship 
between the agent and the contractor. 
 The agency concept involves a person (the agent) acting on behalf of another (the 
principal) to conclude a contract with a third person (the contractor). Thus, the question arises as 
to whether the acts of the agent are effective to bind his principal toward the contractor. In other 
words, whether the agent has authority to create a direct contractual relationship between the 
principal and the contractor. This question is important to all of the parties. The principal needs 
to know when he will be bound towards the contractor. The agent needs to ensure he will not be 
                                      
1
  See H.L.E. Verhagen, Agency in Private International Law: The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Agency (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Netherland,1995), p.2. See also Alexey V, Kostromov, International 
Unification of the Law of Agency (Institute of Comparative Law, McGill University, Montreal, 1999), p. 41.  
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liable towards the contractor. The contractor needs to ensure that he is able to claim against the 
principal. Consequently, we need sound rules of conflict of laws to facilitate such transactions, 
so as to enable parties to achieve the co-operation aimed at. 
 Most legal systems recognise the notions of agency and authority. However, there is an 
important difference in the substantive rules adopted by these systems, particularly between 
those of civilian law and those of common law, as to whether it is necessary for this purpose that 
the agent should act in the name of his principal. This difference in substantive law, and its 
effects in private international law, will in due course be examined under the heading, the 
Position of an Undisclosed Principal, below.
2
  
 As regards the external relationship between the principal and the contractor, we shall 
first consider the various solutions which have been adopted or suggested to the general problem 
in private international law of identifying the law which should govern the agent’s authority for 
the purpose of this external relationship. Thereafter we shall proceed to address in turn the more 
specific problems in relation to the choice of law in respect of that relationship which relate to 
actual authority, apparent authority, ratification, and the position of an undisclosed principal. In 
Chapter 7 we will consider the relationship between the agent and the contractor. 
 
Choice of law 
 In regard to private international law, when an agent acts on behalf of a principal, a 
question arises regarding which law is applicable to determine whether the agent has the 
authority to bind his principal to the contractor, so as to create a direct relationship between the 
                                      
2
  See p. 188 et seq. below. 
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principal and the contractor. In other words, the question is which law governs the authority of 
the agent in relation to the relationship between the principal and the contractor. 
 Many solutions have been suggested to answer this question.
3
 Some believe that the 
principal needs more protection, and others believe the contractor needs more protection. Some 
argue that determination of the applicable law should involve some kind of balance between the 
principal’s interests and the contractor’s interests. Furthermore, reasonably foreseeability, 
workability, clarity and simplicity are necessary requirements in the determination of the law 
which governs the agent’s authority in the context of the relationship between the principal and 
the contractor.
4
 
 It should be noted that UAE legislation does not contain any provision specifying which 
law governs the agent’s authority in context of the relationship between the principal and 
contractor. Moreover, by virtue of Article 1(2)(g) of the Rome 1 Regulation, the question of 
whether an agent is able to bind a principal is excluded from the scope of the Regulation. Thus, it 
is necessary to examine the most important solutions which have been suggested to determine 
which law should govern this problem. 
 
Choice by the parties on this specific issue  
 Some who do not distinguish between representation and the agency contract claim that 
the parties do not have a right to choose which law governs this aspect of the external 
                                      
3
  See Peter Hay and Wolfram Muller-Freienfels, Agency in the Conflict of Laws and the 1978 Hague 
Convention (1979) 27 American Journal of Comparative Law at p. 16. 
4
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 277. 
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relationship between the principal and contractor.
5
 This view relies on the provision in the 
Copenhagen (1950) and Lucerne (1953) drafts of the International Law Association in favour of 
the lex loci actus, and interprets this as excluding the parties’ right to choose the law.6 This 
opinion is not acceptable because the parties' right to choose which law governs their 
relationship is generally recognised in private international law, at least regarding ordinary 
obligation, such as in contracts or torts.   
 Others accept that the parties have a right to choose which law governs the agent’s 
authority in the context of the relationship between the principal and the contractor. However, 
some argue that only the principal has this right to choose the applicable law, without any right 
to the contractor or the agent.
7
This view cannot be accepted, since it excludes the contractor who 
in fact is part of the relationship.  
 The prevailing view is that the principal and the contractor have the right to choose, by 
agreement between them, the law which governs the agent’s authority for the purposes of their 
relationship.
8
 In the Hague Convention 1978, Article 14 gives the parties (the principal and the 
contractor) the right to choose which law governs the agent’s authority for the purposes of their 
                                      
5
  See Gamal Moursi Badr, (اهماكحأو اهتعيبط ةينوناقلا تافرصتلا يف ةباينلا ) The Representation in the Legal Actions 
(Dar Alnahda Alaarbia, Cairo, 2nd edition, 1968), p. 311. See also Foad Mohammed Alodaini ( ةينوناقلا دعاوقلا ديدحت
يلودلا عباطلا تاذ نييراجتلا ءاطسولا دوقع ىلع قيبطتلا ةبجاولا) Determination of the Legal Rules Applicable to International 
Commercial Agency (Cairo University, 2012), p. 103.  
6
  Gamal Moursi Badr, n. 5 above, p. 312. 
7
  Ibid, p. 311. 
8
  Foad Mohammed Alodaini, n. 5 above, p. 104.  
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relationship, but also requires that such a choice must be in writing.
9
 It is obvious that the 
Convention authorises an express choice but not an implied choice. The Karsten Report explains 
the requirement of writing as designed to avoid a conflict of evidence in respect of existence of a 
choice, and to ensure that the other party accepted the choice.
10
 
 English law almost certainly accepts the same solution on this as the Hague Convention, 
except that English law would not require writing and would permit an implied choice (for 
instance, where the agreement contained a London arbitration clause). 
 Usually, however, there will be no agreement between the principal and the contractor as 
to the law governing the agent’s authority for the purposes of their relationship. Thus, we must 
proceed to consider the default rule for this problem, as to which many solutions have been 
suggested. 
 
The principal’s business establishment or domicile  
 Some argue that the principal should be protected against a law which is not foreseeable 
by him by applying the law of the country where he has his business establishment or domicile. 
This view appeared in the nineteenth century.
11
 It is arguable that if the principal were actually to 
choose a governing law, he would usually choose that of his domicile.
12
  
                                      
9
  Article 14 of the Convention stipulates that "Notwithstanding Article 11, where a written specification by 
the principal or by the third party of the law applicable to questions falling within Article 11 has been expressly 
accepted by the other party, the law so specified shall apply to such questions." 
10
  See I.G.F., Karsten Report: Explanatory Report, Actes et documents of the 13
th
 Session of the Hague 
Conference (hereafter “the Karsten Report"), parg. 69, p. 26 et seq.  
11
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p.71. 
12
  Foad Mohammed Alodaini, n. 5 above, p. 110. 
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 Others argue against the applicability of this law on the grounds that favouring the 
principal’s interests over the contractor’s interests is not based on a sound reason. Thus, it is not 
acceptable to ignore the contractor’s interests when determining which law should be applied. In 
addition, the internal rules in the law of the principal's business establishment will not 
necessarily provide more protection to the principal than some other law.
13
 This law may also not 
be easily accessible to the contractor.
14
 
 
The law governing the internal relationship 
 Traditional French and Italian jurists, who do not differentiate between the internal 
relationship and the external relationship, regard the agent’s authority as one of the consequences 
of the contract of mandate. Hence, even in the context of the relationship between the principal 
and the contractor, the agent’s authority should be governed by the law which governs the 
internal relationship, so as to ensure that the law governing the internal relationship will govern 
all the consequences of this relationship. In other words, the law which governs the relationship 
between the principal and the agent should apply to the agent’s authority in the context of the 
relationship between the principal and the contractor.
15
 
 However, this solution has an intrinsic defect, which is that it ignores the present theory 
of representation which is based on the principle of separation between the internal and external 
                                      
13
  Foad Mohammed Alodini, n. 5 above, p. 111. 
14
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 109. 
15
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 68. 
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relationships.
16
 Furthermore, the contractor is not part of the internal relationship; thus, it may be 
difficult for him to ascertain the law which governs this relationship.
17
 
 However, reference to the law which governs the internal relationship seems justifiable in 
respect of  actual authority. If the agent acts within his actual authority, determined under the law 
governing the internal relationship, it seems at the very least arguable that he should therefore 
necessarily have authority to establish the external relationship. 
18
 
 
The agent's business establishment or residence  
 Some writers argue that the place of the agent’s business establishment or residence is a 
suitable connecting factor in regards to the agent’s authority. Consequently, the agent’s authority 
for the purpose of the relationship between the principal and the contractor might be governed by 
the law of the country where the agent has his business establishment or habitual residence. The 
Hague Convention 1978 adopts this approach in Article 11(1), which provides: “As between the 
principal and the third party, the existence and extent of the agent’s authority and the effect of 
the agent’s exercise or purported exercise of his authority shall be governed by the internal law 
of the state in which the agent had his business establishment at the time of his relevant acts”. 19  
 In his report, Karsten explains the advantages of applying the law of the country in which 
the agent has his business establishment to the agent’s authority as achieving a balance between 
                                      
16
  Gamal Moursi Badr, n. 5 above, p. 334. 
17
   H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p.108. 
18
  See Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, UK, 15th edition, 2012), p.217. 
See also Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (Elgar European Law, UK, 3rd edition, 2014), p. 327. 
19
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above p. 75. 
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the principal’s interests and those of the contractor, because of its intermediate position between 
the principal and the contractor. Both parties would foresee and accept this law equally. The 
agent’s business establishment is the factor most closely connected with the agent, whose 
authority is in question. Furthermore, in many cases this law will govern both the external and 
the internal relationships and thus provide a convenient coincidence.
20
 Others add that reference 
to the law of the agent’s business establishment would prevent manipulation with respect to 
choice of law. This law also accords with the characteristic performance doctrine and is most 
closely connected with the agent’s authority.21 
 However, some argue against the application of the law of the country where the agent 
has his business establishment or habitual residence, on the ground that the contractor might face 
some difficulty in determining its content, particularly when the agent and the contractor act in 
another country. It may also be an unsuitable connecting factor when the agent acts in another 
country. Consequently, the desired certainty might not be achieved.
22
 It was on the ground that 
this law is not appropriate for all cases that the Japanese and the Scandinavian delegates to the 
special commission of the Hague Conference sought to modify the rule in Article 11(1).
23
 
Moreover it is not necessary that the law which governs the internal relationship should also 
govern the external relationship to achieve a reasonable balance between the principal’s interests 
and those of the contractor. 
 
 
                                      
20
  Karsten Report, n. 10 above, parg. 77, p. 29 et seq. 
21
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, pp. 76 and 111. 
22
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 114. 
23
  Peter Hay and Wolfram Muller-Freienfels, n. 3 above, p .45. 
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The lex loci actus  
 Some argue in favour of the law of the country where the agent acts or exercises his 
authority. In other words, the agent’s authority, for the purpose of the relationship between the 
principal and the contractor, should be governed by the lex loci actus. This is in order to protect 
commercial intercourse. Some also add that the exercising of the agent’s authority is at the centre 
of the tripartite relationship of the principal, the agent and the contractor. When the agent 
exercises his authority, he executes his obligation to the principal, transacts with the contractor, 
and at the same time creates the relationship between them. This law is easily accessible to and 
foreseeable by the contractor, particularly when the agent exercises his authority and concludes 
the contract with the contractor in the place where the contractor has his domicile. Therefore, the 
application of this law is fair to the contractor.
24
   
 Nonetheless, reference to this law has been criticised for several reasons. For instance, 
the place where authority is exercised might be fortuitous,
25
 as when this place is not in the 
country in which the business establishment or habitual residence of the contractor, the agent or 
the principal is located.
26
 This law might be easily ascertainable by the contractor when his 
business establishment or habitual residence is in the country where the agent is acting. But the 
lex loci actus may be unforeseeable by the principal.
27
       
 Consequently, some proponents of the lex loci actus claim that the place where the agent 
exercises his authority is not alone sufficient to determine which law should govern the agent’s 
                                      
24
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 74. 
25
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 110. 
26
  Foad Mohammed Alodaini, n. 5 above, p. 119. 
27
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 110. 
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authority for the purposes of the relationship between the principal and the contractor. It should 
coincide with the country of the business establishment or habitual residence of the agent, the 
contractor or the principal.
28
 The Hague Convention follows this approach. By Article 11(2), the 
law of the place of acting (lex loci actus) will be applied when the agent acts in a different 
country from that of his business establishment in each of the following instances: where the 
principal has a business establishment or habitual residence in the country of acting and the agent 
acts in the name of the principal (Article 11(2)(a)); where the contractor has a business 
establishment or habitual residence in the country of acting (Article 11(2)(b)); where the agent 
acts at an exchange, such as a stock exchange, commodity exchange, charter exchange or 
auction, and therefore the law of the country where the auction or exchange is located applies 
(Article 11(2)(c)); and where the agent does not have a business establishment (Article 11(2)(d)). 
 Nonetheless, Article 11(2) itself might be criticised because it might lead to difficulties 
for the principal or the contractor with respect to the applicable law because of the impossibility 
of predicting with any certainty whether the law of a state where the agent has his business 
establishment, or of a state where the principal has his business establishment, or of a state where 
the contractor has his business establishment, will be applied. 
 Moreover, it can be argued that if one is going to use the agent’s establishment as the 
primary rule,  there is no reason to subject it to the exceptions contemplated by Article 11(2)(a) 
and (b). 
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  Gamal Moursi Badr, n. 5 above, p. 335.  
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The law which governs the main contract 
 English jurists believe that the law governing the main contract concluded by the agent 
with the contractor should apply to the agent’s authority for the purposes of the mutual rights and 
liabilities of the principal and the contractor. In other words, the question of whether the agent 
can bind his principal to the contractor should be subjected to the law governing the main 
transaction.
29
 The majority of Italian jurists also support application of the law of the main 
contract to authority for the purpose of the relationship between the principal and the 
contractor.
30
 In France, Henri Batiffol, once the leading expert on private international law, 
claimed that all relationships which arise from agency contracts, whether internal or external, 
should be subjected to the law which governs the main contract.
31
  
 In Germany, Spellenbery gives many reasons for referring the agent’s authority to the law 
which governs the main contract. In substantive law there is a functional coherence between the 
main contract and the agent’s authority. An agent’s authority is connected to a particular legal 
system, where its effects are deployed, and not to a particular place. This legal system is the law 
which applies to the main contract. Between the agent’s authority and the main contract there is 
an identity of purpose; thus both should be governed by the same law. The application of this law 
does justice to the interests of all parties: the principal, the agent and the contractor. It is easy for 
the contractor to refer to this law in order to ascertain whether the agent has authority, since the 
contractor is himself involved in the choice of the law which governs the main contract, and (in 
the absence of a party choice) the default rules will assist him in ascertaining the applicable law. 
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  Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 18 above, p. 2125. See also Peter Stone, n. 18 above, p. 327. 
30
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 78. 
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  Foad Mohammed Alodaini, n. 1 above, p. 15. 
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The contractor also has the option of refraining from concluding the main contract if the agent’s 
authority is suspect. For the principal, this law is fair because it is foreseeable for him on the 
basis of choice of law rules or default rules. The agent also cannot reasonably claim that the 
application of the law governing the main contract to the authority is a surprise for him, since he 
may co-select this law or he may aware of the choice of law problem. In other words, the parties 
can balance their interests when they choose the applicable law. There is also a balance when the 
applicable law determined by the default rules, which respect all interests.
32
 Some support this 
view by arguing that if the agent’s authority is governed by the law which applies to the main 
contract, then all questions that arise between the principal and the contractor will be governed 
by the same law. Thus, the parties will come to court preparing to address one law and not two.
33
 
 A preliminary draft of the Hague Convention had endorsed the application of the law 
governing the main contract to the agent’s authority. Its Article 11 provided: “The relationship of 
the principal (and the agent) with the third party is governed by the law which is applicable to the 
contract (negotiated or) entered into by the agent with the third party or, if no contract is intended 
or no contract results, by the law governing the act of the agent.” The Karsten Report explains 
that the special commission experts argued in the first stage that distinguishing between the 
question of the agent’s authority and other questions related to the main contract in respect of the 
applicable law would be impracticable and inconvenient. Consequently, subjecting the agent’s 
authority to the law governing the main contract would be more practical and simpler. They 
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  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 79. 
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  Karsten Report, n. 10 above,  parg. 71, p. 27. 
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noted that in practice a dispute as to the agent’s authority arises in the context of a dispute arising 
out of the contract that the agent concluded with the contractor, rather than on its own.
34
 
 Nonetheless, some argue against the applicability of the law governing the main contract 
on the grounds that the identification of this law relies on the existence of the agent’s authority. 
Thus, the determination of the applicable law is susceptible to manipulation. This is because the 
agent and the contactor choose the applicable law, thus enabling them to affect the scope of the 
authority.
35
  If this does occur, the principal might protect himself by relying on the law of the 
state where he has his business establishment or habitual residence. This is by analogy with the 
provision of Article 10(2) of the Rome I Regulation.
36
 
 It is arguable that an important disadvantage of the application of the law governing the 
main contract is that if it cannot not be decided which law will govern the main contract during 
the negotiation stage, this will lead to a legal vacuum in terms of the agent’s authority. In 
addition, subjecting the agent’s authority to this law might create an obstacle in choosing which 
law governs the main contract.
37
 This objection might be answered by noting that if the parties 
do not choose the applicable law during the negotiation stage or when they conclude the contract, 
the applicable law governing the main contract will be determined according to the default rule.  
 Nonetheless the difficulty is that the law chosen, or arising from the default rule, might in 
some cases be unexpected by the principal. This is no doubt an exceptional case, and the best 
way of dealing with it is an exception, utilizing some concept of reasonableness, analogous to 
Article 10(2) of the Rome I Regulation. 
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  Karsten Report, n. 10 above, parg. 71, p. 27. 
35
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 119. 
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  Ibid. 
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  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 120. 
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Conclusion  
 Various solutions have been suggested regarding which law should govern the agent’s 
authority, as regards the relationship between the principal and the contractor. However, 
reference to the law governing the main contract seems the most appropriate and convenient 
solution, because it is practicable, foreseeable, workable, clear and simple. Moreover, it provides 
a balance between the parties’ interests. 
 
Actual Authority 
  It is largely accepted in English law that, even in relation to the external relationships, the 
existence and scope of the actual authority of an agent (whether express or implied) is governed 
by the law which governs the internal relationship; in other words, the law which governs the 
contract between the principal and agent. The rationale is that if the agent’s acts are fully 
justified, as between the agent and the principal, so that the agent is entitled to his promised 
reward from the principal, and is not liable to his principal for any breach of his duties, then it is 
right that they should also be effective to create a valid contract between the principal and 
contractor, both of whom have obtained exactly what they wanted.
38
   
 However this approach is not accepted by the Hague Convention, which insists on 
subjecting all forms of authority, including actual authority, for the purpose of the external 
relationships, to a law which may differ from that applicable to the internal relationship.
39
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Apparent authority (or ostensible authority) 
 In English internal law, apparent authority (also known as ostensible authority) arises 
where an agent concludes a contract with a contractor on behalf of a principal without any actual 
authority, or in excess of his actual authority, but the contractor relies on a representation by the 
principal as to the agent’s authority when entering into the contract. In other words, the principal 
represents by his words or conduct to the contractor that the agent has authority, and in reliance 
on the representation the contractor concludes the contract with the agent.
40
 Since the doctrine of 
apparent authority is based on estoppel,
41
 it enables the contractor to sue the principal, but the 
principal does not have a right to make counterclaims against the contractor on the basis of 
apparent authority. However, if the principal ratifies the agent’s acts, then he may sue the 
contractor based on subsequent actual authority, rather than apparent authority.
42
 Although 
implied actual authority and apparent authority are both determined in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances, these authorities differ from each other in terms of the person 
towards whom the principal's conduct is directed: whereas in actual authority this conduct is 
                                      
40
  See Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties(Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2Q.B. 480 at 503; C R Ogden & 
Co Pty Ltd v Reliance Fire Sprinkler Co Pty Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 7; Arctic Shipping Co Ltd v  Mobilia AB (the 
Tatra) [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep 51, 59.See also Roderick Munday, Agency, Law and Principles (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2nd edition, 2013), p. 61; and  Cheng-Han Tan, Unathorised Agency in English Law, in The 
unauthorised Agent, perspective from Europeam and Comparative Law, edited by Busch and Macgregor  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1st  edition , 2012), p. 188. 
41
  See Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA (The Ocean Frost) [1986] AC 717,777. See also Nicholas Ryder, 
Margaret Griffiths, and Lachmi Singh, Commercial Law, Principles and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), p. 20. 
42
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p.27. L.S. Sealy and R.J.A. Hooley, Commercial Law, Text, Cases and 
Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, 2005), p. 122. 
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towards the agent, in apparent authority it is towards the contractor.
43
 Additionally, there is a real 
consent of the principal in the case of implied actual authority; while in cases of apparent 
authority the principal does not intend to authorise the agent to act on his behalf. 
 A similar concept of apparent authority exists in many internal laws, including that of the 
UAE. Although the UAE legislature has not fully regulated the doctrine of apparent authority, 
the concept appears to underlie Article 155 of the Civil Code, which ensures that if the agent and 
contractor conclude a contract without knowing about the termination of the agency, the agent’s 
act will bind the principal and his successors towards the contractor. However, Article 155 
requires both the agent and contractor to conclude the contract in good faith.
44
 Moreover the 
UAE courts have admitted apparent authority in many decisions. For instance, the Dubai Court 
of Cassation has decided in numerous cases
45
 that a contractor is a stranger to any relation 
between agent and principal; and therefore the contractor should be sure of the availability of a 
representative characteristic in the person with whom he deals. Nevertheless, if the principal 
contributes by his conduct or his words to representing to the contractor that the agent has 
authority to act on his behalf, then the contractor may sue the principal based on apparent 
                                      
43
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 27. 
44
  Article 155 of the Civil Code states: “If the agent and the person contracting with him are both ignorant at 
the time the contract is made of the agency having been terminated, the effect of the contract made by the agent will 
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  See the Dubai Court of Cassation decisions in Case 136/2007, 28 October 2007; Case 260/2005, 5 February 
2006; Case 359/2004, 28 January 2006; Case 258/2005, 22 January 2006; Case 128/2005, 27 November 2005; Case 
89/2005, 2 July 2005; Case 549/2003, 23 May 2004; Case 173/1999, 20 June 1999; Case 379/1997, 22 February 
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authority. The contractor must deal in good faith in order to have this right; he must not know at 
the time of contracting that the agent does not have real authority. 
 In private international law, a question arises about the law governing apparent authority 
and determining the requirements of its existence, its effect, its duration, and other related issues. 
 Some jurists argue that the arbitrary references and unpredictable results might arise from 
distinguishing between actual and ostensible authority in respect to choice of law in the context 
of the external relationship between the principal and the contractor; consequently, they state that 
both authorities (actual and apparent) should be governed by the same law.
46
 This approach is 
adopted by the Hague Convention 1978 in its Chapter 3. 
 By virtue of Article 11(1) of the Hague Convention, the law of the country where the 
agent has his business establishment at the time of his relevant acts governs the relation between 
the principal and the contractor with respect to the “existence and extent of the agent's authority 
and the effects of the agent's exercise or purported exercise of his authority”. 47 Karsten, in his 
                                      
46
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, pp. 301 and 307. 
47
  The initial proposal of the EC Commission which led eventually to the adoption of the Rome I Regulation 
included in Article 7(2)-(3) a provision closely resembling Article 11 of the Hague Convention, but this Article was 
omitted from the Rome I Regulation as finally adopted. Article 7 of the Rome I Proposal provided:  
"1. In the absence of a choice under Article 3, a contract between principal and agent shall be governed by the law of 
the country in which the agent has his habitual residence, unless the agent exercises or is to exercise his main 
activity in the country in which the principal has his habitual residence, in which case the law of that country shall 
apply. 
2. The relationship between the principal and third parties arising out of the fact that the agent has acted in the 
exercise of his powers, in excess of his powers or without power, shall be governed by the law of the country in 
which the agent had his habitual residence when he acted. However, the applicable law shall be the law of the 
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Report, explains the advantages of applying the law of the country of the agent's business 
establishment to the agent’s authority (actual and apparent): reference to this law would achieve 
a kind of balance between the interests of the principal and the contractor because of its 
intermediate position between the principal and the contractor. Both of them would foresee and 
accept this law equally. The agent's business establishment is a factor closely connected with the 
agent whose authority is in question. Furthermore, this law might in many cases govern both the 
external relationship and internal relationship and thus provide a convenient coincidence.
48
 
Others add that reference to the law of the agent's business establishment would prevent 
manipulation with respect to choice of law. Reference to this law also accords with the 
characteristic performance doctrine.
49
 
 Nonetheless, the reference to the law of the agent's business establishment might be 
criticised, primarily on the grounds that distinguishing between actual and ostensible authority 
with respect to choice of law is extremely important. This is because the two kinds of authority 
differ from each other in terms of the person towards whom the principal's conduct is directed 
(as stated above). In addition, in actual authority (express or implied), the principal’s consent to 
                                                                                                                       
country in which the agent acted if either the principal on whose behalf he acted or the third party has his habitual 
residence in that country or the agent acted at an exchange or auction. 
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2, where the law applicable to a relationship covered by that paragraph has been 
designated in writing by the principal or the agent and expressly accepted by the other party, the law thus designated 
shall be applicable to these matters. 
4. The law designated by paragraph 2 shall also govern the relationship between the agent and the third party arising 
from the fact that the agent has acted in the exercise of his powers, in excess of his powers or without power." 
48
  Karsten Report, n. 10 above, parg. 77, p. 29 et seq. 
49
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, pp. 76 and 111. 
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granting an agent the authority to act on his behalf exists; however, this consent does not exist in 
the case of apparent authority. As a result, apparent authority is related to the principal and 
contractor; hence, the agent’s business establishment is at most not a connected factor and might 
not be relevant to this relation, especially if the agent acts in another place. Moreover, it cannot 
be said that both the principal and the contractor would foresee and accept this law equally. It 
might be true for the principal in the context of actual authority, but in the context of apparent 
authority the principal might not expect to incur liability by reason of his words or conduct as 
evaluated under another law when pursuant to the law of his own business establishment or 
habitual residence no such liability would arise from such words or conduct.  
 Moreover, because the law of the agent’s establishment was not regarded as appropriate 
for all cases, the Japanese and the Scandinavian delegates in the special commission of the 
Hague Conference sought to modify the rule in Article 11(1).
50
 As a result, Article 11(2) of the 
Convention provides for certain exceptions to the reference to the law of the agent's business 
establishment in favour of the law of the country in which the agent acted. 
 By Article 11(2) of the Hague Convention, the law of the country where the agent's 
business establishment is located is set aside in favour of the law of the place of acting (lex loci 
actus) when the agent acts in a different country in each of the following cases: where the 
principal has a business establishment or habitual residence in the country in which the agent 
acts, and the agent acts in the name of the principal (Article 11(2)(a)); where the contractor has a 
business establishment or habitual residence in the country in which the agent acts (Article 
11(2)(b)); where the agent acts at an exchange, such as a stock exchange, commodity exchange, 
charter exchange or auction, and therefore the law of the country where the auction or exchange 
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  Peter Hay and Wolfram Muller-Freienfels, n. 3 above, p. 45. 
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is located applies (Article 11(2)(c)); or where the agent does not have a business establishment 
(Article 11(2)(d)). Nevertheless, the law of the country of the agent’s business establishment will 
apply when the agent acts by communicating with the contractor by message, telex, telegram, 
telephone, or similar means, sent from one country to another country (Article 13). 
 In justifying the applicability of the law of the country where the agent acts, Karsten 
emphasises that the place of the agent’s acts is the place where the agent has exercised or 
purported to exercise his authority which is in question.
51
 Others claim that the application of this 
law, particularly on apparent authority, would provide adequate protection for the contractor.
52
 In 
addition, with respect to application of the law of the state where an exchange or auction is 
located, Karsten claims that this law would be expected by the parties, and a real connection 
between this law and the transaction justifies the application of this law.
53
 
 However, some argue against the application of the lex loci actus on the grounds that it is 
difficult for a principal to foresee this law, and the identification of this law might be susceptible 
to fraud.
54
 Moreover, the application of Chapter 3 of the Hague Convention on apparent 
authority might be burdensome to the principal in view of the impossibility of predicting with 
any certainty whether the law of the country where the agent has his business establishment, or 
that of the country where the principal has his business establishment, or that of the country 
where the contractor has his business establishment, or the lex loci actus would be applied. This 
might discourage the principal from engaging in international trade, for fear of the possibility of 
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  Karsten Report, n. 10 above, parg. 79, p. 30. 
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  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 74. 
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  Karsten Report, n. 10 above, parg. 81, p. 31. 
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being bound towards a contractor by considering his conduct or words as authorising an agent to 
act on his behalf and thus binding him towards the contractor contrary to his intention and desire. 
 Other views that differentiate between actual authority and apparent authority with 
respect to choice of law also disagree with the Hague Convention. Some argue that apparent 
authority should be governed by the law which is applicable to the contract that the agent 
concluded or purported to conclude with the contractor, by the law which governs the main 
contract.
55
 Some support this view by noting that if the agent’s (apparent) authority is governed 
by the law which applies to the main contract, then all questions that arise between the principal 
and the contractor will be governed by the same law; thus, the parties would come to court 
preparing one law and not two laws.
56
  It has also been argued that the adoption of this solution 
does justice to the fact that apparent authority in most legal systems is subjected to the same 
principles to which the formation of a contract is subjected.
57
 
 Nonetheless, some argue against applicability of the law governing the main contract on 
the grounds that this law is often uncertain for the contractor and the principal and difficult to 
predict in advance. This is because the law of the main contract would be determined by the 
Rome I Regulation, and in the absence of a choice of law by the parties, the applicable law under 
the default rules would differ from case to case.
58
 Moreover the application of the law of the 
main contract relies on the assumed existence of the agent’s authority. Thus, the determination of 
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  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 80. 
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the applicable law is susceptible to manipulation, since the agent and the contactor choose the 
applicable law, and are thereby enabled to affect the scope of the apparent authority.
59
 
 Nonetheless, to avoid some of the disadvantages of applying the law governing the main 
contract to the agent’s apparent authority, there could be an exception enabling the principal to 
rely on the law of the country in which he had his habitual residence in order to avoid his direct 
liability to the contractor, where he could establish that in all the circumstance it would be 
unreasonable to determine the effect of his words and conduct, as giving rise to apparent 
authority, by reference to the law governing the main contract. This exception would apply by 
analogy the provision of Article 10(2) of the Rome I Regulation, which itself dealt directly with 
the validity of a party’s consent to a contract or term. 
 A good example to support the application of such an exception to apparent authority is 
this. Suppose that the principal has his business establishment in the UAE, and writes on his 
website, which discloses that he is based in the UAE, “A is my commission agent in” England 
(or some other common law country) where the agent and the contractor have their business 
establishments. In such a case, the words of the principal, construed under UAE law, would not 
indicate that the agent had any authority to bind the principal towards the contractor, since a 
commission agent cannot bind a principal to a contractor under UAE law. Nonetheless, if the 
agent’s authority in this case is governed by the law of the agent’s business establishment, or that 
of the contractor’s business establishment, or the lex loci actus, or the law governing the main 
contract, this would lead to application of common-law rules under which the principal is bound 
by his commission agent's acts, even though in this case these acts are not acceptable to or 
predictable by the principal. Thus, the principal might rely on the law of the country in which he 
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has his habitual residence to avoid his direct liability to the contractor by analogous application 
of the rule specified by Article 10(2) of the Rome I Regulation. 
 
Ratification 
 Under English internal law, an agent cannot bind a principal towards a contractor if the 
agent acts without any authority. However, in this case the principal has the right to ratify an  act 
performed by the agent in the name of the principal, or alternatively to disavow the transaction.
60
 
Ratification is equivalent to antecedent authority. Thus, the principal is bound from the moment 
when the agent acted on his behalf to conclude the contract with the contractor, and not merely 
from the time of ratification.
61
 Even though the principal has initially refused to ratify the agent's 
unauthorised acts, he may be able to ratify them later within a reasonable time, if he finds that 
this would benefit him.
62
 Ratification by the principal is a unilateral act of will, and may be 
expressed or implied.
63
 
 The ratification must be by the principal on whose behalf the agent acted. Thus, the 
principal does not have a right of ratification if the agent acts on his own behalf.
64
 Nevertheless, 
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the principal may ratify unauthorised acts through an agent, by authorising him to ratify such  
unauthorised acts on his behalf.
65
 
 Apparent authority exists when an agent concludes a contract with a contractor on behalf 
of a principal without actual authority, but the contractor relies on a representation by the 
principal when entering into the contract.
66
 The contractor may sue the principal based on 
apparent authority, but the principal does not have a right to make counterclaims against the 
contractor upon this basis. However, if the principal ratifies the agent’s acts, then he may sue the 
contractor based on the subsequent actual authority, rather than on the apparent authority.
67
  
 By Article 930 of the Civil Code the UAE legislator has adopted the doctrine of 
ratification as part of the UAE internal law. This article states that "the subsequent ratification of 
the act shall be considered as a prior mandate". Thus, the principal has the right to ratify the 
unauthorised act or refuse it. The effect of ratification would be effectuated from the moment the 
agent acts. In other words, the effect of ratification is retrospective to the date of the agent’s act. 
 As regards private international law, the ratification by a principal of an agent's 
unauthorised act falls within the scope of Article 11 of the Hague Convention 1978.
68
 Thus under 
the Convention ratification is usually governed by the law of the country where the agent has his 
business establishment, but there are four exceptions in which this rule is displaced in favour of 
the law of the place of acting (lex loci actus).
69
 This is confirmed by the Karsten report, which 
states that "in the case of acts which were originally outside the agent's powers to bind his 
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principal, it [the scope of Article 11] includes the effect, as the between principal and a third 
party, of ratification by the principal of his agent's unauthorised act."
70
 Some commentators 
support this approach by emphasizing the connection between apparent authority and ratification, 
as necessitating that they should be governed by the same law to avoid incongruities. Thus, 
ratification and its legal consequences are governed by the law specified by Article 11.
71
 
Accordingly in several cases the Dutch courts have applied the Article 11 to ratification.
72
 
 However, in the UK (which has not ratified the Hague Convention), jurists tend to apply 
the law governing the main contract which the agent has concluded with the contractor to govern 
the question of ratification. Thus, ratification will be subjected to the law which applies to the 
main contract under the Rome I Regulation. The English courts have adopted this view.
73
 
 Nonetheless, it seems arguable that the application of the law governing the main contract 
concerning the ratification requires the exception contemplated earlier in this chapter,
74
 which 
would enable the principal to rely on the law of the country in which he habitually resides to 
avoid direct liability to the contractor where it would be unreasonable to evaluate the principal’s 
words and conduct by reference to the law governing the main contract. The exception would be 
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2497 (CA); and SEB Trygg v Manches [2005] 2 Lloyd's Rep 129 (Gloster J), affirmed [2006] 1 WLR 2276 (CA). 
Cited in Peter Stone, n. 18 above, at p. 327. 
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based on an analogy with the provision of Article 10(2) of the Rome I Regulation. It might 
apply, for example, where an agent (being aware of his possible lack of authority to conclude the 
contract into which he has entered in the name of the principal) sends a message to the principal, 
inviting the principal to ratify the transaction, and the principal does not answer the message or 
take any other step; and under the law governing the main contract, but not under the law of the 
principal’s residence, the principal’s silence is treated as amounting to ratification.  
  In the UAE, the legislator has not directly regulated the question of choice of law in 
respect of  the ratification of an agent’s unauthorised act by the principal. Commentators in the 
UAE and Egypt argue that the court ought to apply the provision of Article 23 of the UAE Civil 
Code (which corresponds to Article 24 of the Egyptian Civil Code).
75
 Article 23 provides: "The 
principles of private international law shall apply in the absence of a relevant provision in the 
foregoing Articles governing the conflict of laws." Consequently, the UAE courts might derive 
principles from the English model, and thus apply the law which governs the main contract 
concluded by the agent with the contractor, to the existence of ratification and its legal 
consequences. There are however as yet few judicial decisions applying Article 23. Thus its 
operation will be dependent on a developing case-law. 
 
The Position of an Undisclosed Principal 
 It is necessary first to consider the difference in the substantive rules as to the position of 
an undisclosed principal adopted in common law systems from those adopted in civilian legal 
                                      
75
  See Okasha  Mohammed  Abdel-aal,  (نيناوقلا عزانت يف طيسولا) Conflict of law (Dubai Police Academy, 2008), 
p. 40. See also Samia Rashid,  ةدملا رود(24  نيناوقلا عزانت تلاكشم لح يف يندم) The role of Article 24 civil to solve the 
problems of conflict of laws  (Cairo University), p. 7. 
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systems. Then we will proceed to address the problems which arise in private international law 
from this difference in substantive law. 
 
The substantive law in common law systems (such as English law) 
 Under common law systems (such as English law), the agent may create a direct 
relationship between the principal and the contractor not only where he acts in the name and on 
behalf of the principal and reveals the identity of the principal to the contractor (so that there is a 
disclosed principal), but also where the agent acts in his own name on behalf of the principal (so 
that there is an undisclosed principal). In both instances, the principal can sue and be sued by the 
contractor.
76
 Thus, the agent has the authority to bind his principal whether the principal is 
disclosed or undisclosed. 
 Under English law, an undisclosed agency arises when an agent creates a direct 
relationship between an undisclosed principal and a contractor, although he acts on behalf of the 
principal in his own name; thus, the  undisclosed principal can sue a contractor and be sued by 
him.
77
 The agent may hide the fact that he is acting on behalf of the principal for many reasons. 
For instance,  the agent may be afraid that if the contractor knows the identity of the principal, he 
may ignore the agent and deal with the principal directly. The principal also might prefer to 
remain unknown. This situation also arises when no one bothers to reveal the principal to the 
                                      
76
  Roderick Munday, n. 40 above, p. 236. 
77
  See Siu Yin Kwan v Eastern Insurance Co. Ltd [1994] 2A.C. 199 at 207(Illustration 12) per Lord Lloyd of 
Berwick. 
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contractor because the agent has become used to acting in his own name on behalf of the 
principal.
78
 
 Historically the doctrine of the undisclosed principal originated in the eighteenth century 
in English cases in which a principal had entrusted an agent to sell the principal's goods to a 
contractor,  the agent had sold these goods, and the contractor had paid the price for them. But 
before the agent had transferred the price to the principal, the agent became insolvent. Thus, a 
question arose as to whether the price belonged to the principal or to the agent (and his 
creditors). As a result the courts established the doctrine of the undisclosed principal to protect  
principals against the bankruptcy of their agents.
79
   
  In the case of agency for an undisclosed principal, the principal is entitled to sue the 
contractor and is liable to be sued by him. The agent may also sue and be sued by the 
contractor.
80
 However, if the principal decides to intervene on the contract and sue the 
contractor, the agent's right to sue the contractor is lost.
81
 Moreover, if the contractor has any 
defence against the agent, it is also available against the principal.
82
 But, although the contractor 
has a right to choose whether to sue the agent or the principal, the doctrines of election and 
merger insist that if he sues one of them, he will not be permitted to sue the other.
83
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  Roderick Munday, n. 40 above, p. 249. 
79
  Roderick Munday, n. 40 above, p. 250. See also H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 38. 
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  Nicholas Ryder, Margaret Griffiths, Lachmi Singh, n. 41 above, p. 53. 
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  Roderick Munday, n. 40 above, p. 268. 
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  See Siu Yin Kwan v Eastern Insurance Co. Ltd [1994] 2A.C. 199 at 207(Illustration 12) per Lord Lloyd of 
Berwick. 
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  See Kendall v Hamilton (1879) 4 App. Cas. 504 at 544. 
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 The requirements of the doctrine enabling an undisclosed principal to sue and be sued by 
the contractor are that the agent must act within scope of his actual authority, and that his 
intention must be to conclude the contract with the contractor on behalf of the principal.
84
 
Moreover, if the agent intends to act on behalf of an undisclosed principal, but does not have 
actual authority to act on behalf of the principal, it is not open to the principal to ratify the 
agent’s act. For ratification is only possible where the contractor was aware that the agent was 
acting on behalf of the principal, and in the case of an undisclosed principal, the contractor 
believed that the agent was himself the counterparty. The existence of an undisclosed principal is 
also inconsistent with the existence of apparent authority.
85
 
 In some exceptional situations the undisclosed principal does not have a right to intervene 
on the contract which the agent concludes with the contractor. For example, where the terms of 
the contract between the agent and the contractor expressly or impliedly exclude the undisclosed 
principal's right to sue and to be sued on the contract; or where the agent's personality is a matter 
of importance to the contractor.
86
 
 Under English law, one must also distinguish between an undisclosed principal and an 
unnamed principal. In the case of an unnamed principal, in contrast to the case of an undisclosed 
principal, the agent conceals the identity of his principal, but not his existence. This distinction is 
important in relation to the liability of the agent.
87
 In the case of an unnamed principal, the agent 
will incur personal liability on the contract alongside the principal, unless a contrary intention 
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  See Rolls Royce Power Engineering Pl v Ricardo Consulting  Engineers Ltd [2003] EWHC 2871 (TCC). 
85
  Roderick Munday, n. 40 above, p. 254. 
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  See  J.A. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 A.C. 418 at 516. 
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appears; while in the case of an undisclosed principal, the contractor is entitled to sue the 
principal or the agent, but if he chooses to sue one of them, he cannot sue the other.
88
  
 
The substantive law in civilian legal systems 
 In civilian legal systems, in order to bind his principal towards a contractor, the agent 
must act in the name of the principal, and reveal that he acts as a representative on his behalf. 
The publicity principle does not require that the agent should expressly mention that he is 
concluding the contract in the name of the principal. It is sufficient that the contractor is aware 
the agent is acting in the name of the principal from the circumstances of the case.
89
  
 Thus, when the agent concludes a contract with a contractor in his own name on behalf of 
a principal, he does not create a direct relationship between his principal and the contractor. 
Consequently, the principal cannot sue the contractor or be sued by him. Where the agent acts in 
his own name, the situation is referred to as indirect representation. Such a situation arises in the 
case of a commission agent. Thus, although the contract between a commission agent and his 
principal is an agency contract, the contractor cannot sue the principal, whether or not he was 
aware that the agent was acting on behalf of the principal.
90
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  Peter Watts and F.M.B. Reynolds, Bowstead and  Reynolds on Agency (Thomson Reuters, UK, 19th 
edition, 2010), p. 605. 
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  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 32. 
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  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 36. See also, Danny Busch, Unauthorised Agency in Dutch Law, in  The 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1st  edition , 2012), p. 138. 
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The substantive law in the UAE 
 The civilian approach is adopted by the UAE legislation. Thus the definitions of contracts 
proxy in Article 217 of the UAE Commercial Code,
91
 and of the commercial representation 
contract in Article 245,
92
 refer to the entry into transactions by the agent or representative in the 
name and for the account of his principal. By Article 247, the principal is bound by acts of his 
representative within the latter’s authority.93 Thus, upon the conclusion of the transaction by the 
agent, he will drop out of the contract, and a direct relationship will arise between the principal 
and the contractor, so that each will have a right to sue the other for any breach of the contractual 
terms. Moreover Article 249 requires that the representative should indicate he is acting as such 
                                      
91
  Article 217 of the UAE Commercial Code provides: "A contracts proxy is a contract pursuant to which a 
person undertakes to carry on continuously against remuneration, in a specific area of activity, instigation and 
negotiation in order to enter into transactions for the benefit of the principal and in return of a fee. The agent's task 
may include the execution and implementation of transactions in the name of the principal and for his account."  
92
  Article 245 provides: "The commercial representation is a contract pursuant to which the commercial 
representative undertakes to enter into transactions in the name and for the account of his principal, on a permanent 
basis and within a specific area." 
93
  Article 247 provides:  
"1. The trader shall be liable for any transactions and contracts entered into by his representative within the limits of 
the authority conferred to him by the trader.  
2. Where the representative is delegated by several traders, they shall be jointly responsible.  
3. If the representative is delegated by a company, the company shall be responsible for his action and the partners' 
responsibility shall depend on the type of company.” 
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when signing the contract with the contractor; and specifies that if he does not, he will be 
personally liable, without prejudice to the contractor’s right to sue the principal directly.94 
 In the UAE, as in other civilian legal systems, when the agent concludes a contract with a 
contractor in his own name but on behalf of a principal, he does not create a direct relationship 
between his principal and the contractor. Thus, the principal cannot sue the contractor or be sued 
by him. In the UAE such indirect representation arises in the case of a commission agent.
95
 In 
such a case, under Article 237(1) of the UAE Commercial Code, the contractual obligations must 
be fulfilled by the agent and the contractor. Thus, any breach of contractual terms by either party 
(the agent or the contractor) creates the right to sue by the other party. Article 237(2) prevents 
any direct claim between the contractor and the principal based on a commission contract, which 
is regarded as concluded between the commission agent and the contractor.
96
 This provision has 
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  Article 249 provides: "The commercial representative shall carry on in the name of the trader who 
delegated him the commercial activities which he has been authorized to undertake; when signing he shall place next 
to his name in full, the full name of the trader and shall indicate his capacity as commercial representative; otherwise 
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  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 36. 
96
  Article 237 of the UAE Commercial Code provides:  
"1. A commission agent shall be directly bound to the third party with whom he entered into contract; such third 
party shall also be directly bound to the commission agent. 
2. A third party with whom the commission agent has entered into contract may not have direct recourse against the 
principal, neither may this latter have direct recourse against such third party unless there is a legal provision to the 
contrary.” On commission agents more generally, see Articles 229-44. 
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been applied by UAE courts in numerous decisions, especially those of the Dubai Court of 
Cassation.
97
  
 An exceptional provision, specified by Article 242 of the UAE Commercial Code, applies 
in the case of a commission agent’s insolvency where the main contract is for the sale of goods. 
It enables the principal to make a direct claim for the price against the buyer, or for delivery of 
the items bought against the seller.
98
 A question may arise as to whether Article 242 can be 
extended by analogy to a contract for services. Such an expansive interpretation appears to be 
excluded by Article 30 of the Civil Code, which provides that exceptions may neither be applied 
by analogy, not receive extended interpretations.  
 Article 242 resembles Articles 7:420 and 7:421 of the Dutch Civil Code. Other civilian 
countries, such as France and Germany, recognise that in the case of a commission agent's 
bankruptcy, the principal and the contractor may sue each other. Such provisions in civil law 
systems are designed to protect the principal and the contractor against the agent's bankruptcy, or 
more precisely, to protect them against the agent's creditors.
99
 
 By Article 2 of the UAE Commercial Code, in the commercial sphere the court should 
apply "the provisions pertaining to civil matters as long as they do not contradict the general 
                                      
97
  See the Dubai Court of Cassation decisions in Case 173/2007, 17 September 2007; and Case 37/2003, 3 
May 2003.  
98
  Article 242 provides:  
"1. Where the commission agent who is assigned to sell is declared bankrupt before cashing in the price, the 
principal may claim payment of the price directly from the buyer.  
2. Where the commission agent who is assigned to buy is declared bankrupt before he received the item bought, the 
principal may claim delivery of the item bought directly from the seller.” 
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  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, pp. 34-53. See also, Danny Busch, n. 90 above, p. 140. 
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principles of the commercial activity.” Thus, it seems possible for a court to apply Article 392 of 
the Civil Code to a commission agency.
100
 Accordingly, under Article 392(1), the principal could 
exercise an indirect claim to sue the contractor in the agent's name, but the proceeds of this claim 
would be paid to the agent's estate. The contractor could also exercise a corresponding claim 
against the principal.
101
 The reason for granting this right to make an indirect claim is that the 
failure by the debtor (the agent) to make a direct claim could lead to or aggravate his insolvency, 
and thus be detrimental to the creditor (the principal or the contractor). In France a similar 
provision  is made by Article 1166 of  the Civil Code, which grants the principal and the 
contractor the right to sue each other by means of an indirect claim, which is known as an action 
oblique.
102
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101
  Article 392 of Civil Code provides: 
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  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 51. 
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 Outside the commercial sphere, UAE law is more willing to recognise the rights and 
liabilities of an undisclosed principal. Article 154 of the UAE Civil Code
103
 does not apply to a 
commercial agent, but in the case of a non-commercial agent, it recognises a kind of agent 
known as an agent as nomine. In this kind of agency, the principal asks the agent to conceal from 
the contractor that he is acting on behalf of the principal, and to conclude the contract in the 
agent's name. In such cases in general the principal and the contractor cannot exercise direct 
claims against each other, and such claims exist between the contractor and the agent.  
 But Article 154 provides two exceptions in which a direct relationship between the 
principal and the contractor may arise. The first exception applies when the contractor knows at 
the time of contracting that the agent is acting on behalf of the principal. Although some have 
argued that this exception should be confined to cases where the contractor intends to deal with 
the principal and not the agent,
104
 on its face Article 154 only requires that the contractor should 
know that the agent is acting on behalf of the principal, without any further requirement of the 
contractor's intention to deal with the principal. Moreover the wider interpretation has been 
confirmed by a decision of the Dubai Court of Cassation,
105
 holding that the contractor may sue 
the principal if he knows at the time of contracting that the agent is acting on behalf of the 
principal, without reference to the contractor’s intention.  
                                      
103
  Article 154 of the Civil Code: "If the party making a contract does not state at the time the contract is made 
that he is contracting in his capacity as agent, the effect of the contract will not attach to the principal either as 
obligee or obligor unless it is conclusively presumed that the person with whom the agent contracted knew that he 
was an agent or if it was a matter of indifference for him whether he was contracting with the principal or the agent." 
This corresponds to Article 106 of the Egyptian Civil Code.  
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  Abdul Razak Alsanhoori, n. 100 above, p. 622. 
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 Case 420/1997, 28 March 1998. 
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 The second exception specified by Article 154 applies where the contractor is indifferent 
as to the person with whom he concludes the contract. In this case a direct relationship between 
the principal and the contractor arises and they can sue each other by direct claims. This 
exception is analogous to the German doctrine of “whom the matter concerns”. According to this 
doctrine,  although the agent acts in his own name, he creates a direct relationship between the 
principal and the contractor, and he himself drops out of the contract, in cases where it is 
immaterial to the contractor who is the counterparty.
106
 
 In the UAE, a further exception to the principle of indirect representation is made by 
Article 349 of the Commercial Code, which grants the principal and the contractor the right to 
sue each other by direct claim in the case of a commission agency for carriage.
107
 
 From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the feature common to cases involving 
an undisclosed principal, a commission agent, and an agent as nomine, is that the agent acts in 
his own name on behalf of the principal. The main difference between these is that, under the 
English doctrine of the undisclosed principal, the principal can sue the contractor and be sued by 
him, since a direct relationship between the principal and the contractor arises at the time of 
contracting. But under the UAE law relating to a commission agent, the principal and the 
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  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 52. 
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  Article 349 provides:  
"1. The principal and passenger shall each have direct recourse against the carrier to claim the rights arising from the 
carriage contract. The carrier shall also have direct recourse against each of the principal and passenger to claim 
such rights. In all cases, the commission agent must be intromitted in the case. 
2. The passenger in the carriage contracts of persons and the consignee in the carriage contract of things shall have 
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carriage contract." 
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contractor cannot sue each other by way of a direct claim unless the agent is faced with 
bankruptcy. However under the UAE law relating to an agent as nominee, the principal and the 
contractor have the right to make direct claims against each other if the contractor is aware at the 
time of contracting that the agent is acting on behalf of the principal, or if the contractor is 
indifferent as to the person with whom he concludes the contract; but not otherwise. 
 
Private international law 
 Where the agent acts in his own name on behalf of an undisclosed principal, a question of 
private international law arises as to which law is applicable to determine whether the agent’s act 
creates a direct contractual relationship between the principal and the contactor, so as to enable 
the principal to sue and be sued by the contractor on the main contract.  
 This issue falls within the scope of the Hague Convention 1978, since Article 1(3) 
specifies that the Convention applies "whether the agent acts in his own name or in that of the 
principal". Moreover, when the agent exercises his authority and creates or fails to create a direct 
relationship between the undisclosed principal and the contractor, this creation or its absence is 
an effect of the exercise of the agent's authority, and thus falls within Chapter III of the 
Convention. The agent's liability to the contractor in the case of undisclosed agency is also 
governed by Chapter III, since (under Article 15) the agent's liability arises from the fact that he 
has acted in the exercise of his authority.
108
 Thus, under Chapter III the consequences of the fact 
that the agent acted in his own name on behalf of an undisclosed principal, as regards the 
relationship between the principal and the contractor, and as regards the relationship between the 
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  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 375. See also Chapter 7 below. 
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agent and the contractor, are governed by the law of the country in which the agent has his 
business establishment, or in some exceptional cases by the law of the country in which the agent 
acted, in accordance with Article 11. 
 The solution adopted by the Hague Convention differs from that envisaged by the 
Benelux Treaty 1969 concerning a Uniform Law on Private International Law. Article 18 of that 
Treaty would subject the agent's authority to the lex loci actus, and this would include the 
question of whether a principal can sue and be sued on the main contract when the agent acts in 
his own name.
109 The treaty, however, has not entered into force and it is unlikely to do so, since 
the harmonisation of private international law in Benelux level has bonded in favour of the 
harmonisation of European private international law. 
 Some English commentators who consider that apparent authority should be governed by 
the law which is applicable to the main contract which the agent concluded or purported to 
conclude with the contractor, also consider that this law should govern the question of whether a 
principal can sue and be sued on the main contract when the agent acts in his own name.
110
 Then 
all questions which arise between the principal and the contractor will be governed by the same 
law.
111
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   Article 18 of Benelux Treaty provides: " The right to represent a person by virtue of a power of attorney 
shall with respect to third parties be governed by the law of the country where the representative acts.  
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 In the UAE, the courts could use Article 23 of  the Civil Code to decide which law should 
govern indirect representation and the position of an undisclosed principal. On this basis the 
court might follow the English model and subject the question of whether a principal can sue and 
be sued on the main contract when the agent acts in his own name to the law which governs the 
main contract. It might also admit an exception derived by analogy from Article 10(2) of the 
Rome I Regulation. The following example will illustrate this exception. A principal, who has 
his business establishment in the UAE, appoints a commission agent, who has his business 
establishment in France, to act on his behalf in European countries in the agent’s own name. The 
agent concludes a contract in his own name with a contractor in England, and the law governing 
this contract is English law. Thus if English law applies in determining whether the principal can 
sue and be sued, the contractor may sue the principal directly. Nonetheless, using the analogy of 
Article 10 of the  Rome Regulation, the principal might rely on the law of the country in which 
he has his habitual residence (UAE law) to avoid his direct liability to the contractor.  
 As we have seen, laws such as English law which in general recognise the direct 
relationship between the undisclosed principal and the contractor often give the contractor, 
where he discovers that he has dealt with an agent for an undisclosed principal, an option of 
suing either the agent or the principal on the main contract. It seems clear that this right must be 
governed by the law which applies to the position of the undisclosed principal. In other words, 
the doctrine of election should be governed by the law which is applicable to the position of the 
undisclosed principal. Nonetheless, under laws such as English law, when the contractor sues 
one of them (the principal or the agent), he cannot sue the other; this is called the doctrine of 
merger. Some have argued that this issue should be regarded as a matter of procedure, and 
therefore governed by the lex fori. But others have pointed out that in such cases the doctrine of 
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merger is most closely linked to and affects the application of the doctrine of the undisclosed 
principal, and to the doctrine of election. Thus, merger should also be governed by the law which 
governs the position of the undisclosed principal.
112
 
 
The exceptions under civilian laws 
 In a civilian legal system, when the agent acts in his own name on behalf of the principal, 
there are many legal consequences which may arise. Thus one must consider how far these legal 
consequences should be considered  as effects of the agent's exercise of his authority, and thus 
subjected to the law applicable to the external authority, or whether they should be otherwise 
characterised and thus subjected to another law.   
 The most important of these questions relates to the agent’s bankruptcy. This is because 
in the case of agent’s insolvency civilian laws (including UAE law) often recognise the existence 
of a direct relationship between the principal and the contractor. It seems arguable that this 
creation of a direct relationship should be considered as an effect of the agent's exercise of his 
authority, as well as an exception to the general rule on indirect representation. Thus, the legal 
consequences should be governed by the law applicable to the agent’s authority in connection 
with the external relationship between the contractor and the undisclosed principal,
113
 whether 
this law is determined under Chapter III of the Hague Convention or is the law which governs 
the main contract. 
 On the other hand, a different approach seems appropriate in relation to provisions such 
as Article 392(1) of the UAE Civil Code and Article 1166 of the French Civil Code, which 
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enable the principal and the contractor to sue each other by way of an indirect claim.. This is 
because they enable the principal or the contractor to bring an indirect claim against the 
contractor or the principal in the agent's name, and the proceeds of this claim will be payable to 
the agent's estate.
114
 Consequently, if the principal sues the contractor on this basis, the law 
which governs the relationship between the contractor and agent would be applied. However, if 
the contractor sues the principal, the law which governs the relationship between the principal 
and agent would be applied. 
 
Exclusion by agreement 
 As we have noted above,
115
 it is in principle possible for the undisclosed principal's right 
to sue and liability to be sued by the contractor to be excluded by agreement between the agent 
and the contractor. Thus, the question of which law governs the existence, validity and 
interpretation of such an agreement arises. It seems clear that such agreements should be 
governed either by the law which applies to the position of the undisclosed principal under 
Chapter III of the Hague Convention, or by the law which applies to the main contract. Which of 
these should applied must depend on the general approach adopted by the forum’s conflict rules 
to the position of the undisclosed principal. Nonetheless, some argue that difficulty may arise 
when the internal law referred to does not have a specific rule for this situation. They suggest 
that in this case the court should apply the corresponding provision of the law in question which 
deals with the assignability of contractual rights.
116
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 As regards actions brought in the UAE courts, it seems necessary to distinguish between 
two scenarios. In the first situation, the position of the undisclosed principal is governed by a law 
such as English law which in general provides for a direct relationship between the undisclosed 
principal and the contract, but which also enables the agent and the contractor to eliminate this 
relationship by agreement. In such a case the UAE court should give effect to the exclusionary 
agreement. In the second situation, UAE law is the law governing the position of the undisclosed 
principal, and the agent and contractor agree to exclude the principal and the contractor’s rights 
to sue each other directly in the case of the agent’s insolvency under Article 242 of the UAE 
Commercial Code. In this case the UAE court should disregard the exclusionary agreement 
because it is contrary to the internal public policy of the UAE. This is because Article 242 is an 
exceptional provision designed to protect the principal and the contractor against the agent’s 
insolvency, and is regarded as an imperative commercial text which may not be prejudiced by 
the parties’ agreement according to Article 2(1) of the Commercial Code.117 
 
Set-off 
 The question of set-off between the undisclosed principal and the contractor may arise in 
cases where the undisclosed principal intervenes and sues the contractor on the main contract, or 
the contractor discovers that the agent was acting on behalf of an undisclosed principal and 
chooses to sue the principal rather than the agent on the main contract.
118
 There are differences in 
                                      
117
  Article 2(1) of UAE Commercial Code provides: "Traders and commercial activities shall be governed by 
the agreement entered into by the two contracting parties unless such agreement contradicts an imperative 
commercial text." 
118
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 393. 
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the concept of set-off in different countries, especially between the English concept of set-off 
and the concept in continental European legal systems.
119
 Thus a question of private international 
law arises as to the identification of the law which governs the existence and extent of the rights 
of the undisclosed principal and the contractor to invoke a set-off against each other. 
 Some have argued that such set-off should not be governed by the law applicable to the 
position of the undisclosed principal, determined under Chapter III of the Hague Convention or 
by reference to the law governing the main contract. Instead the law applicable to such set-off 
would be determined in the same way as in the case of assignment or subrogation.
120
 Article 17 
of the Rome I Regulation enables the parties to make a substantive agreement about set-off. Such 
an agreement would be governed by the law applicable under the Regulation. Where they make 
no such agreement, set-off is governed by "the law applicable to the claim against which the 
right to set-off is asserted". 
 
Conclusion   
 In the tripartite situation which exists where an agent contracts or purports to contract on 
behalf of a principal with a contractor, there are two external relationships: one between the 
principal and the contractor, and the other between the agent and the contractor.  
 The question of the law applicable to the agent’s authority for the purpose of the 
relationship between the principal and the contractor has been the subject of much debate and 
has led to the proposal or introduction of several ways to determine the applicable law. These 
solutions include reference to the law of the principal’s business establishment or domicile, to 
                                      
119
  Alexander J. Belohlavek, Rome Convention: Rome I Regulation (Juris, USA, 2010), p. 1811. 
120
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 394. 
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the law governing the internal relationship, to the law of the agent’s business establishment or 
residence, to the lex loci actus, and to the law governing the main contract. In the present writer’s 
opinion, the most appropriate solution is to subject the agent’s authority for the purpose of the 
relationship between the principal and the contractor to the law which govern  the main contract, 
since this solution is practicable, foreseeable, workable, clear and simple, and because it provides 
a balance between the parties’ interests. 
 It is possible to distinguish various issues which may arise in connection with such 
authority, which may give rise to conflict problems as a result of the differences in the internal 
substantive rules of different countries. These include the position of the undisclosed principal, 
which arises when the agent acts in his own name, and is concerned with whether in this 
situation the principal can sue and be sued by the contractor on the main contract. Another issue 
is that of apparent authority or ostensible authority, which arises where an agent concludes a 
contract with a contractor on behalf of a principal without actual authority, and the contractor 
relies on a representation by the principal as to the agent’s authority when entering into the 
contract, thus raising a question regarding which law is applicable to this authority and its effect. 
Yet another issue concerns ratification by the principal when the agent has acted without 
authority or in excess of his authority.  
 Although many solutions and opinions have been presented in this chapter, the present 
writer takes the view that all of these issues should be governed by the same law because they 
are connected with each other, and that it is best to unify the applicable law on all questions 
arising between the principal and the contractor. However, there should be an exception enabling 
the principal to rely on the law of the country in which he has habitual residence to avoid his 
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direct liability to the contractor, in circumstances analogous to those contemplated by Article 
10(2) of the Rome I Regulation. 
 These matters are not adequately addressed in most of the legislative texts examined. The 
Rome I Regulation, by virtue of Article 1(2)(g),excludes the question of whether the agent is 
able to bind the principal from the scope of the Regulation. The UAE legislation also does not 
contain any provision dealing specifically with the law applicable to the agent’s authority in the 
context of the relationship between the principal and the contractor.  
 Consequently, it seems desirable, in the interests of international trade, that Article 
1(2)(g) of the Rome I Regulation should be repealed, and that the question whether an agent is 
able to bind a principal to a contractor should be brought within the scope of the Regulation. 
Provisions could be included specifying that the matter is included in the issues to which the law 
governing the main contract applies, but an exception should also be specified, enabling the 
principal to rely on the law of the country in which he habitually resides to avoid direct liability 
to the contractor, where it would be unreasonable to subject the interpretation and effect of his 
words and conduct to the law governing the main contract, by analogy with the provision of 
Article 10(2) in respect of a person’s consent to a contract in non-agency situations. 
 In the UAE the courts should adopt a general principle, in accordance with Article 23 of 
the Civil Code, so as to make the law which governs the main contract concluded by the agent 
with the contractor applicable in determining the agent’s authority for the purpose of the 
relationship between the principal and the contractor. This should apply to the question of 
whether the agent is able to bind the principal), and to related issues, such as indirect 
representation (the position of an undisclosed principal), ratification of the agent's unauthorised 
acts, and apparent authority. The court could also apply Article 23 to admit an exception 
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enabling the principal to rely on the law of the country of his habitual residence to avoid his 
direct liability to the contractor in certain cases. Nevertheless, it would be preferable for the 
legislator in the UAE to amend Article 19 so as to add specific provisions addressing these 
issues. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE AGENT AND THE CONTRACTOR 
 
Introduction  
 As discussed in Chapter 6 above, it is obvious that the external relationships which arise 
when an agent acts on behalf of a principal and concludes a contract with a contractor consists of 
two relationships, one being an inter praesentes relationship between the agent and the 
contractor, and the other an inter absentes relationship between the principal and the contractor.
1
 
Moreover, in most legal systems, it is generally accepted that when the agent acts in the name of 
the principal  in concluding  the contract with the contractor, the agent drops out of the contract, 
and the contractor can neither sue nor be sued by the agent.
2
 Nonetheless, there are various 
exceptions to this: where the terms of the contract concluded between the agent and the 
contractor provide that  the agent is to be liable to the contractor; where the agent has acted 
without authority or in excess of his authority; or where the agent has committed a tortious act 
causing damage or loss to the contractor. It is submitted that in general the law which governs 
the external relationship between the principal and the contractor should also govern the external 
relationship between the agent and the contractor. However, the question may arise as to whether 
                                      
1
  See H.L.E. Verhagen, Agency in Private International Law: The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Agency (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Netherland,1995), p. 2. See also Alexey V. Kostromov,  International 
Unification of the Law of Agency (Institute of Comparative Law, McGill University, Montreal, 1999), p. 41.  
2
  See Roderick Munday, Agency, Law and Principles (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2013), 
p. 309.  
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it is convenient to subject the agent’s liability in these exceptional instances to the law governing 
external authority. 
 As regards the external relationship between the agent and the contractor, we will first 
address the differences which may exist in the substantive rules adopted in various countries. We 
will note an important substantive difference between civilian legal systems and those based on 
common law in respect of the agent’s liability to the contractor based on the terms of the 
contract. We shall then proceed to look at the various substantive rules that apply in civilian legal 
systems and common-law systems when the agent exceeds his authority or acts without 
authority. Thereafter, we will examine the substantive rules as to the agent’s liability when he 
acts in his own name. Finally, we will consider the substantive rules on the agent’s liability in 
tort. Then, in  the light  of these discussions of substantive rules, we will consider the various 
solutions which have been adopted or suggested to identify the law that should govern the 
external relationship between the agent and the contractor. 
 
The agent’s liability under the main contract 
 Under English law, the general rule is that when an agent concludes a contract with a 
contractor on behalf of a principal, he drops out of the contract and the principal acquires rights 
and incurs obligations towards the contractor. Nonetheless, in exceptional circumstances, the 
agent may incur liabilities and acquire rights by virtue of the terms of the contract which he 
concluded with the contractor on behalf of the principal or under a collateral contract. In such 
cases, the agent may be solely, jointly, or jointly and severally liable. For instance, when creating 
a contract between the principal and the contractor, the agent may agree to become a party to the 
contract. In such a case the contractor will be entitled to sue the principal or the agent on the 
211 
 
contract. Another possible situation is for the agent to create a contract between himself and the 
contractor, but not between the principal and the contractor. In other words, in his relationship 
with the contractor, the agent will be a principal, but in his relationship with the principal, he will 
be an agent. In such a case the agent will be the only person who can sue or be sued by the 
contractor.
3
 
 In determining whether the agent is to be liable and acquire rights, the parties’ intentions 
are crucial. The relevant guiding principles were set out in by Brandon J in The Swan,
4
 as 
follows: 
Where A contracts with B on behalf of a disclosed principal C, the question whether both 
A and C are liable on the contract or only C depends on the intention of the parties. That 
intention is to be gathered from (1) the nature of the contract, (2) its terms and (3) the 
surrounding circumstances... The intention for which the Court looks is an objective 
intention of both parties, based on what two reasonable businessmen making a contract of 
that nature, in those terms and in those surrounding circumstances, must be taken to have 
intended.    
 Similarly, in civilian legal systems, the agent is not liable to the contractor when he 
concludes the contract in the name of and on behalf of his principal. His act simply creates a 
direct relationship between the principal and the contractor, and he (the agent)  drops out of the 
contract. Nonetheless, it is arguable that the agent and the principal may agree that, in addition to 
                                      
3
  See Peter Watts and F.M. B. Reynolds, Bowstead and  Reynolds on Agency (Thomson Reuters, UK, 19th 
Edition, 2010), p. 541. See also Roderick Munday, n. 2 above, p. 309. 
4
  [1968] 1 Lloyd's Rep 5. 
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concluding the contract, the agent’s task is the implementation of the contract.5 For instance, 
Article 802 of the Lebanese Civil Code provides that the contractor has a right to sue the agent in 
order to force him to accept the implementation of the contract when the contract is within the 
agency of the agent.
6
  
 
The agent’s liability where he acts without authority or in excess of his authority 
Under common-law systems 
 Under  English principles, the agent acts on behalf of the principal when the principal 
grants him the authority to bind him towards the contractor; thus, when the agent acts without 
any authority, actual or apparent, he cannot bind his principal. Nonetheless, the agent may incur 
personal liability to the contractor if the principal does not ratify the agent’s unauthorised act.7  
The agent may also be liable when he exceeds his authority.
8
 In other words, when a person 
represents by his words or conduct, that he is acting with authority on behalf of another, and the 
contractor relies on this in concluding the contract, so that, without that representation, the 
contract would not be concluded,
9
 the agent may be liable to the contractor by virtue of a breach 
                                      
5
  See Gamal Moursi Badr, (اهماكحأو اهتعيبط ةينوناقلا تافرصتلا يف ةباينلا ) The Representation in the Legal Actions 
(Dar Alnahda Alaarbia, Cairo, 2nd edition, 1968), p. 266. See also Abdul Razak Alsanhoori,(  اقلا حرش يف طيسولانون  
يندملا  )The Explanation of Civil Law ( Al-Halabi, Beirut, 3rd edition, 1998), p. 584. 
6
  Gamal Moursi Badr, n. 5 above, p. 266.  
7
  Roderick Munday, n. 2 above, p. 135. 
8
  See Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, UK, 15th edition, 2012), p. 2136. 
9
  Peter Watts and F.M.B. Reynolds, n. 3 above, p. 581.  
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of warranty of authority for any damage that has been caused to the contractor.
10
 As Lord Esher 
MR explained in Firbank’s Executors v Humphreys:11  
 Where a person by asserting that he has the authority of the principal induces another 
 person to enter into any transaction which he would not have entered into but for that 
 assertion, and the assertion turns out to be untrue, to the injury of the person to whom it is 
 made, it must be taken that the person making it undertook that it was true, and he is 
 liable personally for the damage that has occurred. 
 The agent can incur liability for breach of warranty of his authority, irrespective of 
whether he was acting in good faith or was guilty of a fault in representing that he had the 
authority to act on behalf of the principal.
12
 The application of the doctrine of warranty of 
authority is not restricted to the contract itself but extends to all transactions which the contractor 
enters into while relying on the agent’s assertion that he has authority.13 
 Furthermore, the agent’s liability arising under the warranty of authority has been 
determined by the English courts to be contractual, rather than tortious, in nature. The warranty 
amounts to a collateral contract. But the liability under the warranty is less extensive than full 
liability under the main contract would be. The agent warrants only that he has authority, not that 
                                      
10
  See Mocatta J in Rasnoimport V/O v Guthrie & Co Ltd [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1 at 10. 
11
  (1887) 18 QBD 54, at 60. 
12
  See Collen v Wright (1857) 7 E. & B. 301; Yonge v  Toynbee [1910] 1 K.B. 215. See also Basil S 
Markesinis and Roderick Munday,  An Outline of The Law of Agency (Butterworths, London, 4th edition, 1998), p. 
84.  
13
  Roderick Munday, n. 2 above, p. 137.  
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the main contract will be performed by the principal. The distinction is important where, for 
example, the principal’s insolvency reduces the value of its promises.14  
 
Under civilian legal systems 
 In civilian law systems, when the agent acts without authority or exceeds his authority, 
and the principal does not ratify, the principal is not liable beyond the limits of the authority 
conferred on the agent;
15
 and in such a case, the agent is liable to the contractor. Nevertheless, if 
the contractor is aware that the agent is acting without authority or in excess of his authority, the 
agent may not be liable.
16
 However, there are questions surrounding the nature of agent’s 
liability when he acts without authority or in excess of his authority and the principal has not 
ratified his unauthorised acts.    
 Some argue that when the agent exceeds his authority or acts without authority, he still 
concludes the contract in the name of the principal and not in his own name; and thus that his 
liability cannot be classified as contractual since he was not a party in the contract. On this basis 
it is argued that the agent’s liability should be regarded as tortious. However tortious liability 
                                      
14
  Peter Watts and  F.M.B. Reynolds, n. 3 above, p. 583. See also Basil S Markesinis and Roderick Munday, 
n. 12 above, p. 84; and Dicey, Morris and Collins, n. 8 above, p. 2136. 
15
            Article 247(1) of the UAE  Commercial Code states: “The trader shall be liable for any transactions and 
contracts entered into by his representative within the limits of the authority conferred to him by the trader...". 
16
 Abdul Razak Alsanhoori. n. 5 above, p. 587. See also Martin Severine Saintier, Unauthorised Agency in 
French Law, in The Unauthorised Agent, perspective from Europeam and Comparative Law, edited by Busch and 
Macgregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1st  edition , 2012), p. 52.  
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may not provide complete protection to the contractor in a case where he cannot prove fault on 
the part of the agent.
17
 
 Others argue that agent’s liability in this case should be classified as arising from a 
collateral contract, by way of an implied agreement requiring a party to a contract who causes 
the invalidity of a contract to compensate the other party for the mistake in the formation of the 
contract.
18
  However, it seems that the application of this theory in the UAE would require its 
adoption by the legislator, in the form of a measure resembling Article 39 of the Swiss Civil 
Code and Article 1398 of the Italian Civil Code of 1943.
19
     
 Nevertheless, the German legislator has adopted unique rules in respect of cases where 
the agent acts without authority or in excess of his authority, as per Article 179 of the Civil 
Code.
20
 This Article distinguishes between two instances. In the first, the agent is aware that he 
is acting in excess of his authority or without authority. In this case, the contractor has the right 
to sue the agent in order to implement the contract or to sue him in compensation for damages. In 
                                      
17
  Gamal Moursi Badr, n. 5 above, p. 194. 
18
  Ibid. 
19
  Gamal Moursi Badr, n. 5 above, p. 195. 
20
  Article 179 of German Civil Law provides:  
"(1) A person who has entered into a contract as an agent is, if he does not furnish proof of his power of agency, 
obliged to the other party at the other party’s choice either to perform the contract or to pay damages to him, if the 
principal refuses to ratify the contract.  
(2) If the agent was not aware of his lack of power of agency, he is obliged to make compensation only for the 
damage which the other party suffers as a result of relying on the power of agency; but not in excess of the total 
amount of the interest which the other or the third party has in the effectiveness of the contract. 
(3) The agent is not liable, if the other party knew or ought to have known of the lack of power of agency. The agent 
is also not liable if he had limited capacity to contract, unless he acted with the consent of his legal representative."  
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other words, the contractor has an option to sue the agent based on contractual or tortious 
liability.
21
 Some argue that the agent’s liability in this case is considered semi-contractual.22 In 
the second instance, when the agent is unaware that he is acting without authority or in excess of 
his authority, the agent’s liability may be considered tortious. Therefore, the contractor may sue 
for compensation in respect of the benefit he lost from entering into the main contract.
23
    
 Nonetheless, through extrapolation of judicial decisions in the UAE, it could be said that 
when the agent acts without authority or in excess of his authority, and the principal fails to ratify 
the unauthorised act, the agent’s liability would be considered tortious liability rather than 
contractual liability, although in some cases the court may ask the agent to fulfill the contractual 
obligations. For instance, the Dubai Court of Cassation has held that when the agent, in 
concluding a second loan contract, exceeded his authority, the principal did not have obligations 
in respect of this contract and that the agent should fulfill the contractual obligations.
24
 
 
The agent’s liability when he acts in his own name  
 Under common law systems (such as in English law), in the case of agency for an 
undisclosed principal, when the agent acts in his own name, he may sue and be sued by the 
contractor.
25
 However, if the principal decides to intervene in the contract and sue the contractor, 
                                      
21
  Gamal Moursi Badr, n. 5 above, p. 199. See also Martin Schmidt- Kessel, n. 16 above, p. 106. 
22
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 402. 
23
 Gamal Moursi Badr, n. 5 above, p. 199. See also Martin Schmidt- Kessel, n. 16 above, p. 106. 
24
 See the Dubai Court of Cassation decisions in Case 230/2004, 19 December 2004. 
25
  See Nicholas Ryder, Margaret Griffiths, Lachmi Singh, Commercial Law, Principles and Policy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 53. 
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the agent loses his right to sue the contractor.
26
 But if the contractor exercises his right to sue the 
agent, according to the doctrines of election and merger, the agent will be liable under the main 
contract.
27
 Furthermore, there are some exceptional situations in which the undisclosed principal 
does not have a right to intervene in the contract that the agent has concluded with the 
contractor,
28
 and in which, accordingly, the agent may incur contractual liability to the 
contractor. 
  In the UAE, as in other civilian legal systems, when the agent concludes a contract with a 
contractor in his own name but on behalf of a principal, he does not create a direct relationship 
between his principal and the contractor. Thus, the principal cannot sue the contractor or be sued 
by him. In the UAE, such indirect representation arises in the case of a commission agent.
29
 In 
such a case, under Article 237(1) of the UAE Commercial Code, the contractual obligations must 
be fulfilled by the agent and the contractor. Thus any breach of the contractual terms by either 
party (the agent or the contractor) gives the other party the right to sue. Article 237(2) prevents 
any direct claim between the contractor and the principal based on a commission contract, which 
is regarded as concluded between the commission agent and the contractor.
30
 This provision has 
                                      
26
  Roderick Munday, n. 2 above, p. 268. 
27
  See L.S. Sealy and R.J.A. Hooley, Commercial Law, Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 3rd edition, 2005), p. 153.  
28
  See Chapter 6 above, p. 192.  
29
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 36. 
30
  Article 237 of the UAE Commercial Code provides:  
"1. A commission agent shall be directly bound to the third party with whom he entered into contract; such third 
party shall also be directly bound to the commission agent. 
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been applied by UAE courts in numerous decisions, especially those of the Dubai Court of 
Cassation.
31
 Thus, it may be concluded  that the commission agent, when he concludes the 
contract in his name on behalf of the principal, is the main party liable to the contractor, and the 
agent and the contractor can each sue the other on the basis of contractual obligations.  
 
The agent’s liability in tort 
 Under English law, the agent may be liable to the contractor in tort in respect of  his 
wrongful acts or omissions, where he acts with or without authority on behalf of the principal 
and causes loss, damage or injury to the contractor. More specifically, the agent may be liable on 
the grounds of negligent representation or negligent conduct.
32
 
 Furthermore, since the main role of the agent is to create a direct relationship between the 
principal and contractor, torts committed by the agent may involve the making of false 
representations to the contractor. The agent may incur liability for economic loss on the basis of 
the common-law torts of deceit or negligent misrepresentation.
33
 Such liability may arise from 
statements made by the agent in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the main contract. 
                                                                                                                       
2. A third party with whom the commission agent has entered into contract may not have direct recourse against the 
principal, neither may this latter have direct recourse against such third party unless there is a legal provision to the 
contrary.” On commission agents more generally, see Articles 229-44. 
31
  See the Dubai Court of Cassation decisions in Case 173/2007, 17 September 2007; and Case 37/2003, 3 
May 2003.  
32
  See Polhill v  Walter (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 114; Randell v  Trimen (1856) 18 C.B. 786; West London 
Commmercial Bank v  Kitson (1884) 13 Q.B.D. 360. 
33
  Roderick Munday, n. 2 above, p. 268. See also Basil S. Markesinis and Roderick Munday, n. 12 above, p. 
181. 
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In this case, since the agent is not a party in the contract he has negotiated, the agent incurs 
liabilities in tort, rather than contract, to the contractor.
34
   
 Under civilian legal systems, the contractor may sue the agent in tort (rather than 
contract) if the agent causes damage or loss to the contractor through wrongful acts.
35
 Some 
argue that, in respect of tort liability, the agent may be solely or jointly liable with the principal 
to the contractor.
36
 However, civilian countries differ as to the requirements for liability in tort, 
with some countries, such as Egypt, considering fault to be the basis of tort liability. Thus the 
contractor has to prove fault on the part of the agent.  
 Other countries, such as the UAE, consider damage to be the basis of tort; hence, the 
contractor can establish liability by proving damage without proving that the agent is at fault.
37
 Furthermore, the unjustifiable breaking off of negotiations towards the conclusion of a 
contract may give rise to liability in tort in some civilian legal systems, such as the UAE, Egypt 
and France.
38
  
 
 
 
                                      
34
  Roderick Munday, n. 2 above, p. 268 
35
 Gamal Moursi Badr, n. 5 above, p. 265. See also Samiha Alqalyoobi, (ةيراجتلا دوقعلا حرش) Explanation of 
Commercial Contracts (Dar Alnahda Alarabia, Cairo, 2nd edition, 1992), p. 132. 
36
 Gamal Moursi Badr, n. 5 above, p. 265. 
37
 See Ali Aljasmi, (راضلا لعفلا ىلع قيبطتلا بجاولا نوناقلا) The Law Applicable to Torts (the UAE Researcher, 1st 
edition, 2011), p. 186. 
38
  Ahmed Abdulkarim Salama, (ةيلودلا ةراجتلا دوقع تاضوافمل ينوناقلا ماظنلا) The Legal System of The Negotiation in 
International Trade Contract, (2003) V11 Security and Law Journal, Dubai Police Academy, p. 253.  
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Choice of law 
 In respect of private international law, a question arises regarding which law governs the 
relationship between the agent and the contractor. It should be noted that UAE legislation does 
not contain any provision specifying the law which governs the relationship between the agent 
and the contractor.  
 Nonetheless, on the basis of the Rome I Regulation, the question arises whether the 
relationship between the agent and the contractor is excluded from the scope of the Regulation 
by virtue of Article 1(2) (g), or whether this exclusion is confined to the question of whether an 
agent is able to bind a principal to a contractor. Some  argue that the exclusion does not extend to 
the relationship between the agent and the contractor; thus the Regulation covers any disputes 
between them.
39
 Moreover, the Commission of the European Communities explained that the 
relationships between the principal and the agent and between the agent and the contractor were 
covered by the Rome Convention 1980.
40
    
 With regard to the agent’s liability, as noted above, the agent may incur liability to the 
contractor by virtue of the terms of the contract they have concluded. When the agent has 
exceeded his authority, has acted without authority, or may be liable in tort, the question may 
arise as to whether it is convenient in such exceptional circumstances to subject the agent’s 
liability to the law governing external authority. 
                                      
39
  See Gralf Peter Calliess, Rome Regulation: Commentary on the European Rules  of Conflict of Laws 
(Wolters Kluwer and Business, New York, 2011), p 50. See also Alexander J. Belohlavek, Rome Convention: Rome 
I Regulation, (Juris, USA, 2010), p. 561. 
40
  Commission of the European Communities,  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
the  Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), COM(2005) 650 final, at p. 7. 
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Contractual liability  
 Generally, it is desirable that the law governing the existence of authority for the purpose 
of the relationship between the principal and the contractor should also govern the existence of 
authority for the purpose of the relationship between the agent and the contractor, since the 
substantive law in many systems provides a unified set of rules that apply to both external 
relationships. This may especially be the case in situations where the agent has joint liability with 
his principal to the contractor.
41
 
 Consequently, the Hague Agency Convention specifies in Article 15 that the law 
applicable under Chapter III to the agent’s authority for the purpose of the relationship between 
the principal and the contractor also governs the relationship between the agent and the third 
party arising from the fact that the agent has acted in the exercise of his authority, has exceeded 
his authority, or has acted without authority. Thus, this relationship is subjected to the law of the 
country where the agent has his business establishment or to the lex loci actus in accordance with 
Article 11.
42
 
                                      
41
  See, I.G.F., Karsten Report: Explanatory Report, Actes et documents of the 13
th
 Session of the Hague 
Conference (hereafter “the Karsten Report"), parg. 19, p. 13 et seq.  
42
  The initial proposal of the EC Commission which led eventually to the adoption of the Rome I Regulation 
included in Article 7(4) a provision closely resembling Article 11 of the Hague Convention, but the proposed Article 
7 was omitted from the Rome I Regulation as finally adopted. Article 7 of the Rome I Proposal provided:  
"1. In the absence of a choice under Article 3, a contract between principal and agent shall be governed by the law of 
the country in which the agent has his habitual residence, unless the agent exercises or is to exercise his main 
activity in the country in which the principal has his habitual residence, in which case the law of that country shall 
apply. 
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 Nonetheless, some argue that the relationship between the agent and the contractor 
subject to the law governing the main contract as determined by the Rome I Regulation.
43
  
Consequently, it seems that apart from the question of the existence of authority to bind the 
principal, the agent’s rights against and liabilities towards the contractor should usually be 
governed by the law which governs the main contract under the Rome I Regulation. That law 
applies directly to his contractual rights and liabilities arising from terms of that contact. As 
regards the agent’s warranty of authority, his liability arises under a collateral contract, which is 
usually governed by the same law as governs the main contract under the Rome I Regulation.
44
  
 Another approach is adopted by German commentators who regard the agent’s 
unauthorised act as semi-contractual, and argue in favour of the law governing the main contract 
to cover the agent’s liability.45 On the other hand, Portuguese law provides that when the agent 
exceeds his authority, the law of the principal’s domicile should extend to the relationship 
                                                                                                                       
2. The relationship between the principal and third parties arising out of the fact that the agent has acted in the 
exercise of his powers, in excess of his powers or without power, shall be governed by the law of the country in 
which the agent had his habitual residence when he acted. However, the applicable law shall be the law of the 
country in which the agent acted if either the principal on whose behalf he acted or the third party has his habitual 
residence in that country or the agent acted at an exchange or auction. 
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2, where the law applicable to a relationship covered by that paragraph has been 
designated in writing by the principal or the agent and expressly accepted by the other party, the law thus designated 
shall be applicable to these matters. 
4. The law designated by paragraph 2 shall also govern the relationship between the agent and the third party arising 
from the fact that the agent has acted in the exercise of his powers, in excess of his powers or without power." 
43
  Dicey, Morris, and Collins, n. 8 above, p. 2135. 
44
  See Golden Ocean Group v Salgaocar Mining Industries [2012] EWCA Civ 265.  
45
  H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 402. 
223 
 
between the agent and the contractor. However, Austrian law provides that the lex loci actus will 
apply in this case.
46
 
 In the UAE, it can be argued that Article 19 of the Civil Code applies to the agent’s 
contractual liability to the contractor, since there is no saving such as is found in Article 1 of the 
Rome I Regulation for the agent’s power to bind his principal to the contractor. In any case, such 
a saving would only apply to the issue of the existence of authority; and not, for example, to 
whether a contractual term was designed to make the agent jointly liable with the principal to the 
contractor.
47
 
 
Tort liability  
 Tort liability on the part of the agent arises under English and civilian laws when the 
agent causes loss, damage or injury to the contractor by his wrongful actions, such as by making 
false statements in the contractual negotiations. Moreover, under civilian legal systems, the agent 
may also be liable in tort to the contractor when he acts without authority or when he exceeds his 
                                      
46
  See Foad Mohammed Alodaini, ( ودلا عباطلا تاذ نييراجتلا ءاطسولا دوقع ىلع قيبطتلا ةبجاولا ةينوناقلا دعاوقلا ديدحتلي ) 
Determination of the Legal Rules Applicable to International Commercial Agency (PhD thesis, Cairo University, 
2012), p. 127. 
47
  Article 19 of the UAE Civil Code provides: 
"(1) The form and the substance of contractual obligations shall be governed by the law of the state in which the 
contracting parties are both resident if they are resident in the same state, but if they are resident in different states 
the law of the state in which the contract was concluded shall apply unless they agree, or it is apparent from the 
circumstances that the intention was, that another law should apply. 
(2) The lex situs of the place in which real property is situated shall apply to contract made over such property". 
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authority. In this case, questions will arise concerning the law that governs the agent’s tort 
liability.   
 Some argue that under the Hague Convention the agent’s tort liability should be governed 
by the law determined in Chapter III, since Article 15 determines the applicable law in the case 
of an agent acting without authority or in excess of his authority, without any restrictions 
formulated as to the nature of that liability.
48
 In his report, Karsten explains that the law 
governing the relationship between the agent and the contractor should be the same law, 
regardless of whether the nature of the parties’ liability is contractual or tortious; hence, Article 
15 should apply in the case of the agent’s tort liability.49 
 On the other hand, some argue that in respect of the conflict rules governing the agent’s 
liability, there should be differentiation between tortious liability and contractual liability. Thus 
the agent’s tort liability should be subjected to the law determined under the Rome II 
Regulation.
50
 Consequently, by virtue of Article 14 of the Rome II Regulation,
51
 as regards the 
agent’s tort liability, the agent and the contractor may agree to choose the law applicable to this 
liability.
52
 In the absence of any choice by the parties, by the virtue of Article 4, the agent’s tort 
                                      
48
 H.L.E. Verhagen, n. 1 above, p. 402. 
49
  Karsten Report, n. 41 above, parg. 226, p 59. 
50
  Dicey, Morris, and Collins, n. 8 above, p. 2137.  
51
  EC Regulation 864/2007, on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ 
L199/40.  
52
  Article 14 of the Rome II Regulation provides:  
"1. The parties may agree to submit non-contractual obligations to the law of their choice: 
(a) by an agreement entered into after the event giving rise to the damage occurred; or 
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liability may be governed by the law of the country where the contractor incurred its initial loss, 
but if the agent and the contractor, at the moment when the damage occurred, had their habitual 
residences in the same country, the law of that country will apply. However, if the tort is more 
closely connected with another country, the law of that country will apply.
53
  
                                                                                                                       
(b) where all the parties are pursuing a commercial activity, also by an agreement freely negotiated before the event 
giving rise to the damage occurred. The choice shall be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the 
circumstances of the case and shall not prejudice the rights of third parties. 
2. Where all the elements relevant to the situation at the time when the event giving rise to the damage occurs are 
located in a country other than the country whose law has been chosen, the choice of the parties shall not prejudice 
the application of provisions of the law of that other country which cannot be derogated from by agreement. 
3. Where all the elements relevant to the situation at the time when the event giving rise to the damage occurs are 
located in one or more of the Member States, the parties’ choice of the law applicable other than that of a Member 
State shall not prejudice the application of provisions of Community law, where appropriate as implemented in the 
Member State of the forum, which cannot be derogated from by agreement.” 
53
 Article 4 provides:  
"1. Unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of 
a tort/ delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the 
event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect 
consequences of that event occur. 
2. However, where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage both have their habitual 
residence in the same country at the time when the damage occurs, the law of that country shall apply. 
3. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected 
with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply. A manifestly 
closer connection with another country might be based in particular on a preexisting relationship between the 
parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question."  
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 It seems that the agent’s liabilities in tort arising from the contractual negotiations should 
normally be subjected to the law governing the main contract by way of closest connection under 
Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation. Article 4(3) could also be used to apply the law 
governing the existence of authority – either the law governing the main contract or (in Hague 
Convention countries) the law of the agent’s establishment or in certain cases his acts.  
 In the UAE, by virtue of Article 20 of the UAE Civil Code, the agent’s non-contractual 
obligation would be governed by the lex loci delicti.
54
 However, some argue that in respect of 
non-contractual obligations, the court may use Article 23 (on general principles of private 
international law) to apply the provisions of the Rome II Regulation. Nonetheless, it is difficult 
to justify the application of Article 23 in the face of the explicit text contained in Article 20.
55
  
 
Which of the various solutions is preferable?  
 With regard to the agent’s contractual liability to the contractor, it is generally accepted 
that questions concerning the existence and extent of the agent’s authority to bind the principal 
should be governed by the same law as is applicable to those questions in the context of the 
relationship between the principal and the contractor, in order to unify the law governing both 
external relationships that arise from the agency contract. This may conveniently be referred to 
                                      
54
 Article 20 of the UAE Civil Code provides: 
"(1) Non-contractual obligations shall be governed by the law of the state in which the event giving rise to the 
obligation took place. 
(2) The provisions of the foregoing paragraph shall not apply to obligations arising out of an unlawful act in 
connection with events taking place abroad which are lawful in the State of the United Arab Emirates 
notwithstanding that they are considered to be unlawful in the country in which they took place."  
55
  Ali Aljasmi, n. 37 above, p. 106. 
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as the law governing external authority. This law should also in general apply to the 
consequences of the existence or absence of sufficient authority in the context of the relationship 
between the agent and the contractor. In general, according to the English approach, this is the 
law governing the main contract, and according to the Hague Convention, the law of the agent’s 
establishment.  
  On the English model, a question of external authority may exceptionally be governed 
by the law of the principal’s residence under a rule analogous to Article 10(2) of the Rome I 
Regulation. Under the Hague Convention, it is important to avoid applying Articles 11 and 19 
beyond question of authority. Under any system, the law governing the main contract should 
governs its validity, interpretation and effects, for all persons and in all respects not involving the 
existence of authority. 
 In respect of preference between the English approach and that of the Hague Convention, 
it is noteworthy that the English solution has the advantage of avoiding the splitting of issues 
involving external authority from other issues relating to the main contract. There is also no 
reason to depart from the law governing external authority in relation to the issues discussed in 
this chapter in cases where the agent has sufficient authority to act on behalf of his principal, and 
in cases where the agent acts in his own name on behalf of the principal. This relates to the basic 
principle that the agent normally drops out, and to situations involving an undisclosed principal. 
 Furthermore, as regards the rights and liability of the agent in the case where he may be 
liable under the terms of the contract which he concluded with the contractor, even though he 
had sufficient authority to bind the principal to the contractor, the English solution seems 
preferable to that of the Convention, since such rights and liabilities will arise from the wording 
or interpretation of the main contract. 
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 Moreover, in respect of the agent’s obligations to the contractor which arise from lack of 
sufficient authority (acting without authority or in excess of authority) to bind the principal to the 
contractor, it must be noted that the agent’s warranty of authority under English internal law is 
regarded as a collateral contract, and this is normally subjected under English private 
international law to the law governing the main contract by reference to the provisions of Article 
3 and 4 of the Rome I Regulation based on implied choice or closest connection.  
 In respect of choice of law with regard to the agent’s liability to the contractor, the Hague 
Convention approach is preferable, when subject the agent's contractual and tortious liability to 
the same law.  
Conclusions   
  In most legal systems, it is generally accepted that the agent normally drops out of the 
contract that he concludes with the contractor when he acts on behalf of his principal. Thus, the 
contractor can neither sue nor be sued by the agent. Nonetheless, the agent may in exceptional 
circumstances be liable to the contractor, and this liability may be regarded as either contractual 
or tortious in character.  
 There are three instances under English law where the agent is contractually liable to the 
contractor. Firstly, such liability may arise from the terms of the contract which the agent 
concluded with the contractor. Secondly, the agent is liable for breach of a collateral warranty 
when he acts without authority or in excess of his authority and the principal does not ratify the 
unauthorised act. Thirdly, the agent’s liability may arise where he acts for an undisclosed 
principal. In addition, the agent may incur liability in tort to the contractor for his wrongful acts 
or omissions, whether performed with or without authority from the principal, which cause loss 
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to the contractor. In particular, liability in tort for misrepresentation may arise from acts 
performed by the agent in the negotiations with respect to the main contract. 
 In civilian legal systems, the agent’s contractual liability to the contractor may arise when 
the agent acts in his own name on behalf of the principal; for example, as a commission agent. 
However, when the agent acts without authority or in excess of his authority and the principal 
fails to ratify the unauthorised act, civilian legal system countries differ with regard to the nature 
of the agent’s liability; namely, whether it is based on tort, or a collateral contract, or on the main 
contract. The agent may incur liabilities in tort if he causes damage or loss to the contractor 
through his wrongful acts. Furthermore, the unjustiable breaking off of contractual negotiations 
is considered tortious in some civilian legal systems, such as the UAE, Egypt and France.  
 The Hague Convention approach with respect to the agent’s liability to the contractor is 
to subject contractual and tortious liability to the same law; usually that of the country of the 
agent’s business establishment. In contrast, the English approach distinguishes between 
contractual and tortious liability. Contractual liability is subjected to the law governing the main 
contract, which is determined in accordance with the Rome I Regulation, while tort liability is 
subjected to the conflict rules specified by the Rome II Regulation.  
  In the UAE, the legislator has not specifically regulated the question of choice of law in 
respect of  the relationship between the agent and the contractor. However it can be argued that 
Article 19 of the Civil Code extends to the agent’s contractual liability to the contractor, since 
there is no saving such as is found in art 1 of the Rome I Regulation for the agent’s power to 
bind his principal to the contractor. Nonetheless, in the case of the agent’s tort liability, the court 
will have to apply Article 20 of the Civil Code, which provides that the lex loci delicti should 
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apply to non-contractual obligations, and the court cannot invoke general principle under Article 
23 to apply the Rome II regime.  
 Notwithstanding the above, some argue that the agent’s contractual liability to the 
contractor is closely linked to the matters governed by the Rome I Regulation, and that it would 
be more convenient if the Regulation included this issue in its scope. It would also be beneficial 
if the UAE legislator addressed this matter and explicitly extended the law governing the main 
contract so as to govern the contractual liability of the agent to the contractor. Moreover, as 
regards tort liability, it seems that Article 20 of the Civil Code needs amendment in order to keep 
pace with modern theories and approaches in this field.     
 Overall, it would clearly be more convenient for international trade if the agent's 
contractual liability and tortious liability to the contractor were both subjected to the law 
governing the main contract between the principal and the contractor, for many reasons 
discussed above. Consequently, such a provision should be added by the UAE legislator to 
Article 19 of the Civil Code, and by the EU legislator to the Rome I and II Regulations. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
 This thesis has aimed to determine the applicable law in relation to agency contracts. 
Undoubtedly, the law governing the internal relationship between a principal and an agent may 
differ from the law governing the external relationships. Moreover, the external relationship 
between the principal and a contractor may be subject to a different law from the law governing 
the external relationship between the agent and the contractor. This thesis has studied these 
questions in the light of the provisions of the Rome I Regulation, the Hague Convention 1978, 
and the UAE Civil Code. Although this chapter will not summarize all of the points that were 
presented in the previous chapters, it will focus on the main points that answer the fundamental 
questions of the current thesis regarding conflict rules in the field of agency contracts. It will also 
provide a proposed draft of a bill, designed to be enacted by the UAE legislator, embodying what 
are regarded by the present writer as the best solutions to these questions. In addition, a draft 
proposal, designed to be adopted by the EU institutions, so as to amend the Rome I Regulation in 
a manner embodying the same principles, will also be provided. This will address, inter alia, the 
question whether the agent can bind his principal towards the contractor; this question being 
currently excluded from the scope of the Regulation. Therefore, this chapter will be divided into 
two parts: the first will summarise the main points emerging from the present study; and the 
second part will set out drafts of enactments concerning conflict rules regarding agency 
contracts, designed to amend the UAE Civil Code and the Rome I Regulation. 
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Part One 
 As seen in this thesis, in respect to agency contracts, there is an important difference in 
the substantive rules adopted by different legal systems, particularly between those of civilian 
law and those of common law. For instance, the doctrine of the undisclosed principal, accepted 
in common-law systems, is not recognised by civilian legal systems. These differences in 
substantive law have consequences in private international law. Many countries in the 
international community have attempted to unify the conflict rules regarding agency contracts. 
The Hague Convention 1978 was the first attempt to unify the choice of law rules in respect of 
agency contracts by the Hague Conference on Private International Law. The Rome I Regulation 
contains some rules that may apply to agency contracts. In any case, if the application of the 
Convention is incompatible with the Regulation, in countries which are party to both the 
Convention and the Regulation, the Convention will prevail, in accordance with the principle of 
lex special derogat legi generali, and pursuant to Article 25(1) of the Regulation, which provides 
that if the relevant international treaty existed at the time of the adoption of the Regulation, 
preference will be given to this treaty rather than to the Regulation. 
 
The internal relationship 
 In the UAE the legislator has regulated the question of choice of law in the field of 
contracts by Article 19 of the Civil Code. Since the relationship between the principal and the 
agent should be considered a contract, it should be subject to the same conflict principles as 
apply to other international contracts. The first principle is that the parties have freedom or 
autonomy in choosing a law to govern the contract. This choice may be express or implied. 
Secondly, however, if the parties do not choose the governing law, the court will apply the 
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default rules to resolve the conflict question. These apply the law of the parties’ common 
residence, or (in its absence) the law of the place of contracting. 
 Nevertheless, as seen in this thesis, the principal and the agent do not always reside in the 
same country. Furthermore, the location of the place of contracting may be determined by an 
accidental event. Moreover, there may be additional difficulties in determining the place of 
contracting as well. In these cases, the court may apply Article 23 of the Civil Code (which 
invokes general principle of private international law) to determine the applicable law.  
 Therefore, for many sound reasons, which were presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis, it 
seems appropriate to adopt the approach to the internal relationship adopted by the Agency 
Convention and the Rome I Regulation, under both of which the default rule refers primarily to 
the agent’s residence (his business establishment or habitual residence). Nonetheless, using the 
agent’s residence to determine the applicable law is too rigid and may lead to unacceptable 
results in some cases, such as when it is apparent from the circumstances that there is another 
law that has a closer connection to the contract. In this case, reference to the law of the country 
that has a closer connection to the internal relationship (the Rome I Regulation approach) offers 
more flexibility, and leads to the application of the most appropriate law. Although at present the 
UAE courts may be able in some cases to use Article 23 to reach these results, it would be better 
if the UAE legislator were to add such provisions to the Civil Code. 
 
The external relationship between the principal and the contractor    
 With regard to the external relationship between the principal and the contractor, the 
authority of the agent in relation to this relationship is excluded by Article 1(2)(g) of the Rome I 
Regulation from the scope of the Regulation. Moreover, the UAE law does not contain any 
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provision dealing with external authority in regard to the applicable law in respect of the 
relationship between the principal and the contractor. Consequently, the UAE court may use 
Article 23 of the Civil Code to find the solution.  
 In contrast, the Hague Convention has regulated this question. Article 14 gives the parties 
(the principal and the contractor) the right to choose which law governs the agent’s authority for 
the purposes of their relationship, but it also requires that such a choice must be in writing, which 
means that the Convention authorises an express choice but not an implied choice. Moreover 
English law probably accepts the same solution on this as the Hague Convention, except that 
English law does not require writing and permits an implied choice. More generally, however, 
the English conflict rules subject the agent’s external authority to create a binding contract 
between the principal and the contractor to the proper law, or the putative proper law, of the 
contract between the principal and the contractor; that is, the law which governs that contract, or 
would do so if the necessary authority existed. Under this approach there seems little need to 
deal specifically with the possibility (which in any event is likely only rarely to occur) of a direct 
agreement between the principal and the contractor as to the law which governs external 
authority as between them.  
 As regards external authority as between the principal and the contractor, the English 
approach, applying  the law governing the main contract that the agent concluded on behalf of 
his principal with the contractor seems worthy of adoption in the UAE under Article 23 of the 
Civil Code. This solution seems practicable, foreseeable, workable, clear and simple. Moreover, 
it also provides a balance between the parties’ interests; in addition to the numerous reasons 
presented in Chapter 6 of the current thesis. Nonetheless, the law governing the main contract 
might, in some cases, be one whose application and effects the principal could not reasonably 
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have foreseen. Thus, some exception is needed to enable the principal to rely in certain 
circumstances  on the law of his business establishment or habitual residence. The exception 
could be defined by analogy with the provision of Article 10(2) of the Rome I Regulation on a 
party’s consent. 
 The law governing the main contract should apply to issues such as indirect 
representation and the position of an undisclosed principal, apparent or ostensible authority, and 
ratification of the agent’s unauthorised act. Since all of these issues are connected with each 
other, the same law should govern them; moreover, it is best to unify the applicable law on all 
questions arising between the principal and the contractor. Furthermore, these legal 
consequences should also be considered as effects of the agent’s exercise of his authority, and 
thus subjected to the laws applicable to the external authority. Thus, the law governing the main 
contract should apply, subject to an exception derived by analogy from Article 10(2) of the 
Rome I Regulation. 
 Such an approach could also usefully be applied at European Union level. This would 
entail the amendment of the Rome I Regulation, by repealing Article 1(2)(g) and adding the 
appropriate provisions in favour of the law governing the main contract and the exception 
thereto. 
 Nevertheless, the existence and scope of the actual authority of an agent (whether express 
or implied) should always, and between all persons, be governed by the law which governs the 
internal relationship. 
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The external relationship between the agent and the contractor 
 As regards the external relationship between the agent and contractor, in most legal 
systems the agent normally drops out of the contract that he concludes with the contractor when 
he acts on behalf of his principal. Nonetheless, in exceptional circumstances, the agent may be 
liable to the contractor. The agent’s liability might arise from wording or circumstances 
indicating that he promises that the principal will perform the contract; or from failure to disclose 
the existence or identity of the principal; or from the agent’s purporting to exercise an authority 
which he lacks. The agent’s liability may be regarded as either contractual or tortious in 
character. Consequently, it may be necessary to distinguish between contractual and tortious 
liability. Contractual liability might then be subjected to the law governing the main contract, 
which might be determined in accordance with the Rome I Regulation, while tort liability might 
be subjected to the conflict rules specified by the Rome II Regulation. This appears to be the 
English approach.  
 In the UAE Article 19 of the Civil Code applies to the agent’s contractual liability to the 
contractor. In the case of the agent’s tort liability, the court will apply Article 20 of the Civil 
Code, which provides that the lex loci delicti should apply to non-contractual obligations, and it 
seems impossible for the court to employ Article 23 so as to invoke the Rome II regime. In 
contrast, the Hague Convention approach with respect to the agent’s liability to the contractor is 
to subject contractual and tortious liability to the same law; usually that of the country of the 
agent’s business establishment. 
 
 
 
237 
 
Reform in the UAE 
 In the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that in the UAE the legislator has not 
specifically regulated the question of choice of law in respect to agency contracts, whether in 
respect of the internal relationship or the external relationships. Consequently, the court applies 
Article 19 or Article 23 of the Civil Code when the relationship is considered as contractual; 
however, when a party’s liability is considered as a tort liability, Article 20 of the Civil Code is 
applied to the case. 
 It seems that it would be more convenient for trade, and would otherwise be beneficial, if 
the UAE legislator were to add some new provisions in the Civil Code dealing with the law 
governing the three agency relationships. Such provisions should, firstly, introduce a default rule 
applying the law of the place where the agent has his habitual residence to the internal 
relationship between the principal and the agent, Secondly, they should apply the law of the main 
contract that the agent concluded with the contractor to the external authority of the agent in 
relation to the relationship between the principal and the contractor -- in other words, to the 
question whether the agent has bound his principal to the contractor; including questions of  
indirect representation and the position of an undisclosed principal, apparent or ostensible 
authority, and ratification of the agent's unauthorised act. Moreover, the UAE legislator should 
adopt an exception analogous with Article 10(2) of the Rome I Regulation. 
 Moreover the reforming provisions should extend the law of the main contract to the 
relationship between the agent and contractor, as regards both contractual liability and tort 
liability. This will  avoid the splitting of issues involving external authority from other issues 
relating to the main contract; and the extension to tort liability will unify the law applied to 
claims between the contractor and the agent. This extension resembles the solution adopted by 
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the Hague Convention, which has unified the law governing the agent's liability towards the 
contractor, whether it is contractual liability or tortious liability. Furthermore, Article 4 (3) of the 
Rome II Regulation provides that: 
  "Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly 
 more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the 
 law of that other country shall apply. A manifestly closer connection with another 
 country might be based in particular on a preexisting relationship between the parties, 
 such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question".  
 This means that the law governing the contract may govern the tort liability, since the 
connection between the contract and the tort causes the tort to have a manifestly closer 
connection with the country whose law governs the contract.   
 Until these amendments occur, the parties should ask the court to apply the general 
principles of private international law pursuant to Article 23 of the Civil Code to determine the 
applicable law where no specific conflict rules contained in the Civil Code are applicable, and 
they should prove the provisions of the substantive law in the applicable law.  
 
Public policy and overriding mandatory rules 
 The Hague Agency Convention and the Rome I Regulation recognise the principle 
requiring respect for the forum’s public policy. The UAE legislator also has adopted the public 
policy exception in the context of choice of law rules. Nevertheless, the UAE legislator has 
added a reference to the Islamic Shari’a'; consequently, the applicable law will be set aside if its 
provisions are manifestly incompatible with UAE public policy or Islamic Shari’a. Nonetheless, 
it should be noted that not all the rules of Shari’a law establish a public policy designed to have 
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universal scope. Some of its provisions establish a public policy which is applicable only to 
Muslims, while others provisions give rise to a public policy applicable both to Muslims and 
non-Muslims. 
 The Hague Agency Convention and the Rome I Regulation also provide for the 
application of overriding mandatory rules regardless of the law otherwise governing the matter. 
In contrast, the UAE legislature has not stipulated expressly for the application of overriding 
mandatory rules in the manner of the Hague Agency Convention and the Rome I Regulation. 
Nonetheless, some argue that a UAE court may apply such rules of the lex fori in application of 
the public policy proviso specified by Article 27 of the Civil Code. However, it seems preferable 
for the legislator to enact a new Article that explicitly provides for the application of overriding 
mandatory provisions of lex fori. 
 Substantive rules on agency contracts have been laid down by EEC Directive 86/653 on 
the co-ordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents, 
which is transposed in Great Britain by the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulation 
1993 (as amended). The provisions of the Directive are regarded as overriding mandatory 
provisions. Somewhat similar provisions are made in the UAE by Federal Act 18/1981 on the 
Regulation of Commercial Agencies (the Agency Code). 
 There seems no doubt that the provisions of UAE Federal Act 18/1981 (as amended) 
constitute overriding mandatory provisions in the UAE in cases where the agency has been 
registered in the Commercial Agents Register. In practice, however, there are many unregistered 
agencies, as the principal prefers not to register the agency contract to avoid the application of 
the protective provisions. Consequently, it seems that the legislator should amend the existing 
enactment, so as to ensure that, regardless of registration, the Regulation of Commercial 
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Agencies will be applied when the agent carries out his activity in the UAE or is established in it, 
as well as imposing a financial penalty on a principal who does not register an agency. 
 
Part Two 
 In this part we will offer a draft of a bill concerning conflict rules in respect of agency 
contracts, designed for adoption by the UAE legislator and serving to amend the UAE Civil 
Code. We will also offer a draft of provisions designed to be adopted by the EU institutions by 
way of amendment of the Rome I Regulation. 
 
Draft Amendments to  the UAE Civil Code  
 We Khalifa Bin Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan President of the United Arab Emirates 
State, Pursuant to the perusal of the provisional 2 Constitution, and 
 Federal Act no. 1 of 1972, concerning the Jurisdictions of the Ministers and the Powers 
of the  Ministers and the amending Acts thereof, and 
 Federal Act no. 5 of 1985 concerning the Civil Transaction Act and the amending Acts 
thereof, and 
Acting upon the proposal of the Minister of Justice and the approval of the Council of 
Ministers and the ratification of the Federal Supreme Council, 
Have promulgated the following Act 
 
Article 1  
The Civil Transactions Act shall be amended by inserting, after Article 19, new Articles 19A, 
19B and 19C, which make provision as to the law applicable to agency relationships, as follows: 
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“Article 19A 
(1) Article 19(1) shall not apply to agency relationships. 
    (2) The agency contract between a principal and an agent shall be governed by the law chosen 
by the parties. The choice shall either be made expressly or be clearly demonstrated by the terms 
of the contract or the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, in the absence of such a choice 
this contract shall be governed by the law of the country in which the agent had his habitual 
residence at the time when the agency contract was concluded. 
    (3) Where in concluding the agency contract the agent was acting in the course of his business, 
he shall be treated for the purpose of paragraph (2) above as having been habitually resident at 
his business establishment which was involved in the negotiation or conclusion of the agency 
contract; or, where that establishment cannot be identified, at his principal place of business. 
This applies regardless of whether or not the agent is a corporate entity. 
Article 19B 
(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3)  below, the law governing the main contract between a 
principal and a contractor (ascertained in accordance with Article 19 above) shall govern the 
relationship between the principal and the contractor arising out of the fact that the agent acted in 
the exercise of his powers, in excess of his powers or without power.  This applies, in particular, 
to questions concerning indirect representation (or the position of an undisclosed principal), 
apparent authority, and ratification of the agent's unauthorised acts. 
(2) Paragraph (1) above shall not apply to questions concerning the agent’s actual authority. 
Such questions shall in all circumstances, and as regards all persons, be determined in 
accordance with the law which governs the contract between the principal and the agent, 
determined in accordance with Article 19A above. 
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 (3) By way of exception to paragraph (1), in order to establish that he is not bound by the 
agent’s acts, a principal may rely upon the law of the country in which he has his own habitual 
residence, if it appears from the circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine the 
effect of the principal’s conduct (for example, as establishing apparent authority, or amounting to 
ratification) in accordance with the law specified in paragraph (1). For this purpose where the 
principal is engaged in business activities, he shall be regarded as being habitually resident at his 
principal place of business; and this applies regardless of whether or not the principal is a 
corporate entity.  
Article 19C 
(1) The law designated by Article 19B(1) above shall also govern the relationship between the 
agent and the contractor arising from the fact that the agent acted in the exercise of his powers, in 
excess of his powers or without power, unless this relationship is the subject of an explicit or 
clearly demonstrated choice of another law by the agent and the contractor, in which case the law 
so chosen shall apply.  
(2) Where, under the rules contained in the law which is applicable under paragraph (1) to the 
mutual rights and obligations of the agent and the contractor, their mutual rights and obligations 
may be affected by the existence or extent of an effective contractual relationship between the 
principal and the contractor, account shall be taken, in determining the existence and extent of a 
contractual relationship between the principal and the contractor: 
(a) of the law which is applicable to external authority as between the principal and the 
contractor under Article 19B(1); 
(b) of the law which is applicable to actual authority under Article 19B(2), and  
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(c) of the fact (if it be the case) that the principal has successfully relied, or could successfully 
rely, against the contractor on the law of the principal’s habitual residence under Article 19B(3).”  
 
Article 2 
The  following paragraph shall be inserted into Article 26 as paragraph (3):    
"(3) Paragraph (2) above (which provides for partial renvoi) shall not apply to contractual 
obligations." 
 
Article 3  
The following paragraph shall be inserted  into Article 27 as paragraph (2): 
"(2) The application of any law specified by the preceding Articles shall not prejudice the 
application of overriding mandatory rules of the UAE. For this purpose a rule is mandatory if its 
operation cannot be excluded by a contractual term designed to do so, and a rule is overriding if 
its wording or purpose indicates that it is designed to regulate certain situations connected with 
the UAE, and in such situations to displace any foreign law which may otherwise be applicable 
under ordinary conflict rules." 
 
Draft Amendment  to the Rome I Regulation 
 Regarding the Rome I Regulation, the modification proposed is similar to the provisions 
of Articles 19B and 19C that are proposed above by way of amendment to the UAE Civil Code. 
However a provision corresponding to Article 19A (on the internal relationship) is not needed in 
Rome I Regulation. The provision corresponding to Article 19B (on the external relationship 
between the principal and the contractor) should refer to the law applicable under the Regulation 
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(usually by virtue of Articles 3 and 4; though other provisions, such as Articles 5-8, may on 
occasion apply). Consequently, we propose the following amendments to the Rome I Regulation. 
 
REGULATION (EU) No *** OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of *** on the law applicable to contractual obligations, amending Regulation No 593/2008 
(Rome I) 
Article 1 
Article 1(2)(g) of the Rome I Regulation shall be deleted. 
Article 2  
The Rome I Regulation shall be amended by inserting, after Article 8, new Articles 8A and 
8B, which make provision as to the law applicable to external agency relationships, as follows: 
“Article 8A 
(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) below, the law governing the main contract between a 
principal and a contractor (ascertained in accordance with this Regulation) shall govern the 
relationship between the principal and the contractor arising out of the fact that the agent acted in 
the exercise of his powers, in excess of his powers or without power. This applies, in particular, 
to questions concerning indirect representation (or the position of an undisclosed principal), 
apparent authority, and ratification of the agent's unauthorised acts. 
(2) Paragraph (1) above shall not apply to questions concerning the agent’s actual authority. 
Such questions shall in all circumstances, and as regards all persons, be determined in 
accordance with the law which governs the contract between the principal and the agent, 
determined in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation. 
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(3) By way of exception to paragraph (1), in order to establish that he is not bound by the 
agent’s acts, a principal may rely upon the law of the country in which he has his own habitual 
residence, if it appears from the circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine the 
effect of the principal’s conduct (for example, as establishing apparent authority, or amounting to 
ratification) in accordance with the law specified in paragraph (1). 
Article 8B  
(1) The law designated by Article 8A(1) above shall also govern the relationship between the 
agent and the contractor arising from the fact that the agent acted in the exercise of his powers, in 
excess of his powers or without power, unless this relationship is the subject of an explicit or 
clearly demonstrated choice of another law by the agent and the contractor, in which case the law 
so chosen shall apply.  
(2) Where, under the rules contained in the law which is applicable under paragraph (1) to the 
mutual rights and obligations of the agent and the contractor, their mutual rights and obligations 
may be affected by the existence or extent of an effective contractual relationship between the 
principal and the contractor, account shall be taken, in determining the existence and extent of a 
contractual relationship between the principal and the contractor: 
(a) of the law which is applicable to external authority as between the principal and the 
contractor under Article 8A(1); 
(b) of the law which is applicable to actual authority under Article 8A(2); 
(c) of the fact (if it be the case) that the principal has successfully relied, or could successfully 
rely, against the contractor on the law of the principal’s habitual residence under Article 8A(3).” 
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Conclusion 
 The present writer hopes that the UAE legislative body will amend the UAE Civil Code 
by adopting a draft bill as proposed in this thesis. Until that happens, the existing situation in the 
UAE, with respect to the conflict of laws in the field of agency relationships, involves 
application of the provisions of Article 19 of the UAE Civil Code. This provides for the 
application of a law chosen by the parties either explicitly or implicitly; and in the absence of 
any such choice, for the application either of the law of the common residence or the law of the 
place of contracting. If there is no common residence and it is also difficult to determine the 
place of contracting, the court may use Article 23 of the Civil Code to apply the law of the place 
of the agent’s habitual residence to the internal relationship between a principal and his agent. It 
may also utilise Article 23 so as to apply the law governing the main contract to the external 
relationships between the principal and contractor and between the agent and contractor. 
 In the European Union, the Rome I Regulation applies to the internal relationship 
between a principal and his agent, and to many aspects of the external relationship between an 
agent and contractor. The Hague Agency Convention applies in countries that have ratified the 
Convention (France, Portugal, and the Netherlands), so as to override the Rome I Regulation and 
also to deal with matters excluded from the Regulation, such as external authority as between the 
principal and the contractor. However, in other European countries, the conflict rules of the 
forum country apply to external authority as between the principal and the contractor. For 
instance, in England the law governing the main contract that the agent concluded with the 
contractor on behalf of the principal will govern external authority as between the principal and 
the contractor.  
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 In addition to the conflict of laws regarding agency relationships examined in this thesis, 
more research concerning choice of law with respect to electronic agency is also recommended. 
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